The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Regional and Subregional Bodies: Strengthening a Critical Partnership

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Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACSRT</td>
<td>Algiers Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism (AU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ATU</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Unit (OSCE)</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIMSTEC</td>
<td>Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sector Technical and Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICTE</td>
<td>Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (OAS)</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CODEXTER</td>
<td>Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CoE)</td>
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<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>COTER</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Committee (EU)</td>
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<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>CTATF</td>
<td>Caribbean Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Committee (United Nations Security Council)</td>
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<td>CTED</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (United Nations Security Council)</td>
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<td>EAPCCO</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Police Chiefs’ Cooperation Organization</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAAMLG</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Organization</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUROPOL</td>
<td>European Police Office</td>
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<td>GAFISUD</td>
<td>South American Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<td>ICPAT</td>
<td>IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Southern Common Market</td>
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<td>MLAT</td>
<td>Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity (now the AU)</td>
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<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN)</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>RSRs</td>
<td>Regional and Subregional bodies</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARPCCO</td>
<td>Southern African Regional Police Chiefs’ Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<td>SDOMD</td>
<td>Drug Offences Monitoring Desk (SAARC)</td>
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<td>SICA</td>
<td>Central American Integration System</td>
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<tr>
<td>STOMD</td>
<td>Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (SAARC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPB</td>
<td>Terrorism Prevention Branch (UNODC)</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNODA</td>
<td>United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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Executive Summary

On 8 September 2006, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Strategy), which calls for a holistic, inclusive approach to counterterrorism. Although the primary responsibility for its implementation rests with UN member states, effective and sustainable implementation requires the contributions of a variety of stakeholders, including regional and subregional bodies (RSRs). Both the Strategy and resolution adopted by the General Assembly in September 2008 following its first formal review recognize the need to enhance the role of RSRs (as well as other stakeholders). However, they offer few details on the different ways in which RSRs can contribute and how their role can be enhanced.

The comparative advantages of RSRs in contributing to the implementation of the UN Strategy are many. They include having at their disposal knowledge and expertise on local issues that makes them well-suited to develop approaches that take into account cultural and other contextual issues and undertake region- or subregion-specific initiatives or other actions that complement and build on global counterterrorism objectives. They can lend political support for Strategy implementation efforts, including by adding calls in regional or subregional ministerial statements for states to implement the Strategy. Such a high-level approach at the regional or subregional level may often resonate more than at the level of the United Nations. RSRs can serve as transmission belts not only between what is adopted at the global level by the United Nations and other international organizations and the states trying to implement that framework, but also through better informing the global bodies as to the different regional and subregional contexts. They can facilitate the exchange of expertise and information among governmental and non-governmental experts, as well as the sharing of good national practices and lessons learned from national implementation among the countries of the region or subregion. They can also develop frameworks of regional or subregional cooperation among relevant experts and institutions dealing with different aspects of the UN Strategy. Finally, many RSRs have been involved in work that is related to Strategy implementation—in areas such as capacity building, adopting their own counterterrorism conventions and action plans, and promoting respect for human rights—since well before the adoption of the Strategy. As a result, many have beneficial expertise and experiences to share with the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Task Force) and its working groups. Operationalizing these contributions so that they enhance and sustain implementation of the Strategy, however, requires a certain level of resources and political commitment, which is lagging in some organizations, as well as more focused engagement between RSRs and the UN system, in particular the UN Task Force.

After identifying some of the contributions that RSRs can make to the implementation of each of the Strategy’s four pillars, this report will provide a region-by-region survey of some the contributions that RSRs have made so far to the implementation of the Strategy and to counterterrorism in general, with additional information included in an appendix. This report also provides an overview of Strategy-related engagement between the UN system and RSRs. It concludes with a series of forward-looking recommendations as to how to maximize the contributions of RSRs to the implementation of the Strategy and the engagement between the Task

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3 The 24 entities represented on the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force are the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate; the Department for Disarmament Affairs; the Department of Peacekeeping Operations;
Force and RSRs. These recommendations are put forward recognizing that important work in fulfilling them is already underway in some cases. In addition, not all RSRs are in a position to adopt or implement them, and for some RSRs, the UN Strategy may fall outside of their mandate.

### Summary of Key Recommendations

Relevant regional and subregional bodies should:

- Endorse the Strategy;
- Establish counterterrorism units or focal points within their secretariats for Strategy/counterterrorism-related issues;
- Establish a regional task force or designate a lead body for coordination of Strategy-related efforts in regions with multiple or overlapping RSRs;
- Offer their members opportunities to share national experiences in working to “de-radicalize” former violent extremists and on other aspects of Strategy implementation;
- Work to stimulate the development of public/private partnerships between their members and multinational companies;
- Work with countries in their area to articulate their needs and priorities to the relevant UN bodies (or perhaps the UN Task Force’s working group focusing on integrated implementation of the UN Strategy); and
- Work to ensure the human rights–based approach to combating terrorism that underpins the Strategy is reflected in all counterterrorism-related declarations and statements.

The UN system:

- UN system engagement with RSRs on the Strategy needs to be more coherent and better coordinated;
  - The Security Council should develop and implement a strategy for coordinated engagement whereby its three counterterrorism-related bodies engage with RSRs through a single channel;
- The UN Task Force, states, and RSRs themselves should offer clear and practical suggestions as to what specific tasks RSRs can usefully perform to reinforce Strategy implementation;
- The UN Task Force should use its convening authority to bring RSRs together to share best practices and assess implementation in each region and subregion;
- The Task Force should designate a field-based representative from the appropriate Task Force entity to serve as its focal point in each region or subregion to help transport Strategy implementation into a local context and make it more in tune with priorities on the ground;
- Careful attention must be paid to rationalize this outreach with the ongoing efforts of the most active UN counterterrorism actors, including the UNODC and the Council’s counterterrorism-related subsidiary bodies; and
- Member states should ensure that the UN Task Force secretariat has both the resources and mandate to allow it to serve effectively as a strategic interface with RSRs.
I. The Four Pillars of the UN Strategy: The Potential Contributions of RSRs

Given their comparative advantages, RSRs have a central role to play in devising tailor-made approaches for implementing each of the UN Strategy’s four pillars among their respective members. The general nature of many of the Strategy’s provisions allows regions and subregions a degree of latitude as they seek to develop implementation plans and programs. They will need to determine how best to implement the Strategy to maximize its impact on the ground. This flexibility is significant because the nature and scope of the terrorist threat vary from region to region. A one-size-fits-all approach to implementation is thus neither effective nor appropriate.

Pillar I: Measures to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism

The Strategy enumerates a series of possible conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism—prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism, lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national, and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization, and lack of good governance. However, not all are equally relevant to each region or subregion and few are more aware of conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism in the particular area than are RSRs. Moreover, achieving consensus at the global level on how best to address these conditions and deciding which ones deserve priority treatment have proven elusive. Thus, tackling these questions in regional and subregional contexts is more likely to address the concerns of local stakeholders and thus may bear more fruit.

One of the most important contributions that RSRs can make to addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism is in the realm of preventive diplomacy and working to resolve and prevent the regional and subregional conflicts that fuel terrorism. As the Strategy notes, “successful prevention and peaceful resolution of prolonged unresolved conflicts … would contribute to strengthening the global fight against terrorism.” Many of the conflicts often linked to the spread of terrorism (e.g., Israel/Palestine and India/Pakistan) are regional in nature and require regional solutions. In certain areas, regional organizations have demonstrated great potential in this regard. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), for example, through its monitoring missions and other mechanisms, has played a very constructive role in defusing ethno-nationalist, separatist, and religious conflicts in Southeastern Europe and Central Asia.

In addition, RSRs may be well-situated to garner a deeper understanding of the local academic and religious communities, can foster connections to these groups, and can play a leading role in promoting inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue and developing culturally sensitive projects aimed at the empowerment of moderate religious scholars, and civil society. They can provide fora for sharing experiences and best practices in national efforts to reach out to moderate religious leaders and their communities across different faiths and in building or reforming schools, prisons, and other institutions as part of an effort to tackle radicalization. Finally, they offer platforms for sharing experiences in growing efforts to “de-radicalize” former violent extremists.

Pillar II: Measures to prevent and combat terrorism

RSRs can also play key roles in working with their members to monitor and foster implementation of the preventive counterterrorism measures that constitute the Strategy’s second pillar. For example, they can promote the

development of a uniform regional or subregional counterterrorism regime to allow for the necessary judicial and law enforcement cooperation between and among countries to help ensure that suspected terrorists are prosecuted or extradited. In some instances, regional or subregional extradition or mutual legal assistance treaties in criminal matters such as terrorism have already been adopted. Due to what is often a shared perception of the threat posed by transnational crime at regional and subregional levels, these bodies may have a comparative advantage in getting their member states to strengthen their coordination and cooperation in combating crimes that might be associated with terrorism. Although Security Council Resolution 1373 and other UN resolutions recognize the “close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potential deadly materials,” the United Nations has been slow to address these issues in a coherent manner.

RSRs, which often tend to have more homogenous memberships and more clearly defined common interests than the broader membership of the United Nations, may also be able to contribute to efforts to counter terrorism on the Internet and respond to the Strategy’s call for greater international and regional coordination in this area, which has proven difficult to achieve at the international level.

Additionally, as a result of the relationships they have often forged with local and transnational companies in their regions and their understanding of the business practices and culture of these companies, some regional bodies can play a leading role in stimulating the development of public/private sector partnerships between their members and multinational companies. These public/private partnerships in areas such as preventing cyberterrorism can make important contributions to enhancing the implementation of Pillar II of the Strategy.

**Pillar III: Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the UN system in this regard**

RSRs can play important roles in both the facilitation and delivery of capacity building assistance. They can help identify capacity gaps in their region or subregion and disseminate among their members information regarding relevant bilateral and multilateral capacity-building programs, with a view to, among other things, fostering donor coordination. In addition, these bodies could help ensure that the regional or subregional Strategy-related capacity needs are presented to the relevant UN bodies (or perhaps the Task Force working group focusing on integrated implementation of the UN Strategy) in a coherent manner. This can be achieved, for example, by developing a unified set of regional or subregional priorities and technical assistance requests that cut across a range of Strategy-related areas, helping to ensure that the United Nations better understands the needs and priorities of countries in the region or subregion and enhancing the communication between the United Nations and the relevant geographical area.

These bodies also offer platforms for training seminars conducted by bilateral and/or multilateral donors, the provision of assistance, and, more broadly, supporting the development of regional, subregional, as well as national capacity. For example, they can endorse the counterterrorism-related standards and best practices developed by international functional bodies in different fields—many of which are explicitly referred to in the UN Strategy—including aviation, port, and border security, and organize workshops with technical experts from relevant functional bodies to ensure that local officials are provided with the training and skills needed to

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5 See, e.g., the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Council of Europe, and the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation.
6 For example, the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its Executive Directorate (CTED) have had difficulty highlighting this connection in their dialogue with states. As a result, the analyses of states’ capacities and the threat too often fail to take these broader terrorism-related issues into account. Reasons for this include a lack of expertise among the small number of CTED experts, and the fact that other bodies within the UN system have the mandate to deal with them (e.g., UNODC, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the General Assembly), and the difficulties in getting different parts of the UN system to cooperate with each other.
implement these standards and best practices. In addition, RSRs have an important role to play in offering tailored, regional expertise to complement the more general legislative drafting assistance that the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is providing states to enable them to join and implement the sixteen international counterterrorism-related conventions and protocols. Finally, if given a sufficient mandate and adequate resources, RSRs can offer institutional infrastructure that can maintain the necessary focus on Strategy-related issues long after assistance providers have departed, to help ensure the long-term sustainability of these capacity-building programs and that the assistance is actually implemented by the states.

**Pillar IV: Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism**

Grounding the Strategy, and all global counterterrorism efforts, firmly in the context of human rights and the rule of law is one of its significant achievements. RSRs can contribute in a number of ways to furthering this cross-cutting theme.

“RSRs can offer institutional infrastructure that can maintain the necessary focus on Strategy-related issues long after assistance providers have departed, to help ensure the long-term sustainability of these capacity-building programs.”

A number of regions or subregions have adopted their own human rights conventions or charters, thereby placing universal human rights obligations within the relevant regional context and helping to ensure a shared regional interpretation of those obligations. Human rights bodies have been established in some regions to oversee implementation of these conventions or charters by their members. Such bodies can offer members guidance on best practices and a forum for sharing them among countries that may face many of the same challenges. They can work to improve the capacity of their members by propagating standards of conduct and providing training for security, law enforcement, and judicial officials engaged in combating terrorism. In particular, regional human rights commissions and courts can play an important role in interpreting human rights obligations for states and investigating and shedding light on abuses, providing for recourse above the national level. RSRs can serve as fora for conducting peer reviews and other monitoring mechanisms to ensure that national counterterrorism efforts comply with international and regional human rights standards, and they can apply political pressure on local states in cases where they do not.

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7 UN Strategy, Pillar IV, para. 8.
8 For example, the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and OHCHR worked hard to ensure that the joint communiqué adopted at the 14 February 2007 annual meeting included appropriate references to the human rights approach enshrined in the Strategy. See UN, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe, “Annual High-Level Meeting Between the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and Partner Organizations in the ‘Tripartite-Plus’ Format,” http://www.osce.org/atu/item_6_25997.html. (Participants underlined also the utmost importance of promoting and protecting human rights for all and the rule of law while combating terrorism and welcomed the strong focus of the Strategy on this issue.)
Finally, RSRs can contribute to the development and maintenance of effective, rule of law–based criminal justice systems within their member states, which the Strategy highlights as being critical to implementing a human rights–based approach to countering terrorism. The Strategy recognizes that many states will require assistance in developing and maintaining such a system. Different parts of the United Nations, including UNODC, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and OHCHR will likely assume leading roles in providing this assistance. As in other capacity-building areas relevant to the Strategy, however, RSRs have a key role to play in offering the necessary expertise and other resources, providing a forum for interaction with civil society to ensure that the assistance being offered is tailored to the particular needs in the region, and ensuring its sustainability.

II. Contributions to Implementation: Region by Region

As the above brief survey indicates, given the Strategy’s breadth, there is a wide range of ways in which RSRs can contribute to its implementation. Given that some RSRs have already developed robust programs aimed at promoting the implementation of UN counterterrorism mandates and since the Strategy is largely a compilation of existing mandates, many ongoing programs and initiatives are already furthering Strategy implementation. In addition to developing new programs in areas of the Strategy not currently being addressed by existing programs, these bodies could seek to use the Strategy as the vehicle through which all UN counterterrorism initiatives are promoted.

Although RSRs have much to offer in theory, the practical realities, which often include limited resources, mandates that can be narrowly interpreted to restrict certain activities, and higher priorities than dealing with terrorism, have resulted in uneven contributions from the different RSRs. Many are underfunded, providing few if any dedicated resources for counterterrorism. For some, the proliferation of counterterrorism initiatives at the global level has resulted in overload, with a resulting need to prioritize, given limited available resources. Coordination among bodies within and between regions and subregions has been spotty and few have developed the linkages with the various parts of the UN system involved in counterterrorism necessary to promote implementation of the Strategy. Moreover, few have developed holistic counterterrorism strategies and programs that include not only security-related and capacity-building measures, but also those related to promoting human rights and some of the broader political, social, and cultural issues that may give rise to terrorism. A number of RSRs that are the weakest in this regard are in areas where the threat may be the greatest and where member states are often the most lacking in their capacity (and strategy) to confront the threat.

The following survey of RSR activities relevant to the implementation of the UN Strategy highlights the diversity of contributions made so far by RSRs around the globe.10

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10 This survey of RSR activities is not intended to be comprehensive. In addition, it does not include informal cross-regional initiatives such as the Asia-Europe Economic Meeting on Counterterrorism, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) Dialogue, a number of which have taken up Strategy implementation.
Mirroring the debates that have taken place within individual African states, each intergovernmental body engaged in counterterrorism in Africa “has had to confront, at the practical level, the debate which emerged after 9/11 as to whether terrorism in its current state and manifestations, constitutes a serious threat to the continent on the same scale as poverty, the health crisis and internal conflicts.” This debate, as well as the need, particularly in the context of the U.S.-led “Global War on Terrorism,” to protect and maintain Africa’s focus on development, has complicated the efforts of some multilateral bodies in Africa to contribute to implementing the global counterterrorism framework.

Only a strategy that focuses on much-needed institutional capacity building and includes elements aimed at “reducing the hospitable environment for terrorists to recruit and thrive and … dealing with the prevalence of poverty, economic duress, interlocking conflicts, poor governance, and criminal networks, which are often exploited by terrorists,” and one in which African states have a sense of ownership, will be effective. The UN Strategy, which has a holistic framework endorsed by all African states and places great emphasis on the promotion of sustainable development, outlines this type of approach and is qualitatively different from the international conventions and protocols to combat terrorism. It also differs from the Security Council’s counterterrorism resolutions adopted after 11 September 2001, which are generally more focused on law enforcement cooperation. To ensure that implementation of the Strategy reflects an “African voice,” African organizations will need to embrace it and work with their members to implement it.

At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has adopted a broad-based normative framework to combat terrorism via its 1999 counterterrorism convention, 2002 protocol, and 2004 counterterrorism plan of action. Unfortunately that framework has yet to be implemented by many of its 53 member states. The divergence in threat perceptions among its members has contributed to lagging implementation, but competing priorities within the AU Peace and Security Commission and differing perceptions of the threat, as well as a lack of resources, have also limited the AU’s contributions in this area.

Although the AU has yet to formally endorse or otherwise adopt a position on the UN Strategy, the Peace and Security Commission is in the process of developing an AU position, with a view to convening a meeting of the Peace and Security Council in the second half of 2008 to adopt an AU communiqué on AU efforts and their relation to the UN Strategy. The intent is to have the communiqué endorsed by AU ministers in New York during the 2008 General Assembly debate. Such a high-level political endorsement of the UN Strategy from African officials should help stimulate UN Strategy implementation action at the continental, subregional, and national level in Africa.

In addition to this political support, through its Algiers Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT) established in 2004, the AU can make a practical contribution to promote implementation of both its continental counterterrorism framework and the UN Strategy. This move is a logical step, given that the two are mutually reinforcing. The ACSRT is charged with enhancing counterterrorism capacities and cooperation among its members. It envisions a highly integrated network of state and Regional Economic Communities’ (RECs) focal points coordinated centrally through Algiers. As of April 2008, it had convened two meetings of

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2 Ibid., p. 38.
4 For example, only 37 AU member states have ratified the 1999 Organization of African Unity counterterrorism convention and the 2004 AU protocol to the convention is not yet in force, due to a lack of ratifications.
all national and REC focal points and four subregional meetings. In addition, it has organized a few training seminars at its well-equipped facility in Algiers. Some states, however, have complained that they have little to show so far from their cooperation with the ACSRT, although in 2008 the ACSRT plans to devise a threat assessment template and code of conduct in the fight against terrorism, which, if completed, would provide AU members with useful tools.\textsuperscript{15}

In general, however, much like the AU Commission, a lack of both human and financial resources has limited the ability of the ACSRT to make practical contributions to fulfilling its wide-ranging mandate, although recent funding contributions from the Council of the European Union and European Commission should help.\textsuperscript{16} Given its limited capacity, broad mandate, and the difficulties the center has in working with individual AU members and REC focal point in a sustained manner, it may make more sense for the ACSRT to develop a mechanism for dealing with the RECs more effectively and prioritize its development ahead of engagement with AU states.

The 2004 protocol to the OAU counterterrorism convention explicitly endorses the complementary role that African subregional bodies, including those officially recognized by the AU as RECs, can play in furthering implementation of the AU framework. Given the institutional limitations of the AU, the key political difficulties among its members, and the vast size of the continent, more meaningful contributions to UN Strategy implementation in Africa might also be found at the subregional level.

So far, a number of African subregional bodies have developed frameworks and/or programs for addressing the terrorist threat and other cross-border crime and security issues. Some suffer from similar resource and political constraints. However, others have units within their secretariat focused on developing and implementing subregional programs and liaising with the various parts of the UN system and bilateral donors. This is particularly true for bodies such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT),\textsuperscript{17} the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs’ Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO),\textsuperscript{18} the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs’ Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO),\textsuperscript{19} and the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Organization (ESAAMLG),\textsuperscript{20} and somewhat less so for

\textsuperscript{15} Kwesi Aning, remarks at “Countering Terrorism in Africa Through Human Security Solutions,” Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Massachusetts, 29 February 2008.
\textsuperscript{16} As of 2007, the Council of the European Union intended to contribute 665 million euros to the ACSRT for a program to support AU member states’ capacities to combat terrorism; and the European Commission contributed some one million euros to help set up the ACSRT’s information technology and database system as well as its documentation center, and to organize training seminars for relevant AU member state officials.
\textsuperscript{17} ICPAT, which is staffed with various experts from the subregion, was established with support from the Dutch and Danish governments and in cooperation with the Institute for Security Studies. Its focus is on enhancing judicial measures, interdepartmental cooperation, border controls, information sharing, training, best practices, and strategic cooperation among its six member states (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda).
\textsuperscript{18} The EAPCCO secretariat is housed in the Interpol subregional bureau in Nairobi and works with ICPAT and UNODC to strengthen counterterrorism measures in East Africa and encourage the sharing of information among its member states on terrorism activities. Its affiliation with Interpol gives it direct access to that organization’s resources and expertise.
\textsuperscript{19} SARPCCO’s secretariat is housed in Interpol’s subregional bureau in Harare, Zimbabwe, so it is essentially part of that organization, giving it direct access to Interpol’s resources and expertise. SARPCCO has been able to develop and implement a series of practical programs, a number of which reinforce elements of the UN Strategy. These include the creation of a counterterrorism desk to assess relevant legislation in member countries, determine gaps and strengths, and make recommendations to the SARPCCO Legal Sub-Committee.
\textsuperscript{20} ESAAMLG, a Financial Action Task Force-regional style body, has a critical role to play in implementing the anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing provisions of the UN Strategy, which give priority attention to the implementation of the 40 recommendations on money laundering and the nine special recommendations on terrorist financing of the Financial Action Task Force. The ESAAMLG secretariat, which is funded by ESAAMLG member states as well as outside donors, currently comprised of two professional staff with plans to expand to five, organizes legislative drafting capacity building programs, with training focused on the specific FATF recommendations.
the Southern African Development Community (SADC)\textsuperscript{21} and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).\textsuperscript{22}

These and other subregional bodies have, to one extent or another, developed and implemented counterterrorism or related security programs since well before the adoption of the Strategy and even before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The programs were in fact part of the continent’s reaction to the al-Qaida attacks on Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Going forward, the challenge for those interested in promoting the implementation of the UN Strategy will be to reinforce these existing efforts and stimulate new counterterrorism initiatives that reflect local conditions, are seen as home grown, and avoid the perception of being imposed by the United Nations or other external actors.

A first step to building support for the Strategy within these RSRs is finding additional ways for the Task Force and its constituent entities to engage more regularly and effectively with these stakeholders. Its broad membership and network of member state and REC focal points would seem to provide the AU with a comparative advantage for serving as the entry point for such engagement with interested multilateral bodies on the continent. However, due to the organizational and other limitations noted above, it may be more appropriate in the short- and medium-term for this engagement to begin at the subregional level. To this end, the relevant RECs, including SADC, IGAD, and ECOWAS could appoint focal points within their respective secretariats with which the Task Force could begin to engage more regularly, not just with the relevant organization, but with its member states as well.

\textit{Central Asia}

In Central Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),\textsuperscript{23} the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),\textsuperscript{24} and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)\textsuperscript{25} have largely focused on improving joint military operations aimed at preventing drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and terrorism. Despite the overlapping membership in the three regional bodies, there is a lack of coordination among them and considerable substantive duplication of effort, including in their counterterrorism activities.\textsuperscript{26} Partly as a result of their strong operational

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21}Although SADC has yet to devise a subregional response or mechanism to address terrorism, its secretariat is working with both UNODC and CTED to enhance collaboration on counterterrorism in the SADC region. Several joint UNODC-SADC activities have been initiated, including a subregional workshop for senior criminal justice officials focusing on the legal aspects of counterterrorism and related international cooperation in criminal matters, a ministerial conference on the ratification and implementation of the universal legal instruments against terrorism, and a series of bilateral technical assistance and training activities involving individual SADC members. Finally, SADC member defense and security experts met for the first time in December 2006 under the auspices of UNODC, marking the first time SADC member state officials met specifically discuss how the subregion could improve its response to terrorism.

\item The counterterrorism portfolio within the thinly staffed ECOWAS Commission (or secretariat) is assigned to the Office of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security. The most recent counterterrorism initiative undertaken by ECOWAS was to invite all member states’ counterterrorism focal point officers to inform the commission about their counterterrorism activities, difficulties, and gaps. Armed with this information, the commission is hoping to plan meetings for the establishment of an ECOWAS coordination network for the harmonization of all coordination activities in the subregion. In addition, ECOWAS has continued to work with different partners, including both UNODC and CTED, to further legal cooperation on terrorism matters in the subregion.

\item The CIS includes the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan (Turkmenistan is currently an associate member after having withdrawn in 2005).

\item The CSTO members are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

\item The SCO members are China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Pakistan, India, Iran, and Mongolia currently have “observer” status.

\item Attempts have been made to address this lack of coordination. For example, in mid-December 2005, the CSTO general director stated that the CSTO favored creating a Eurasian Advisory Council that could include representatives from the CSTO, the SCO, NATO, and the EU. Although this idea was not acted on, at a minimum, such a body could help de-conflict multilateral counterterrorist activities in Central Asia. See Sergei Blagov, “CSTO Seen as a Shield Against Outside Meddling,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, No. 225, 5 December 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=407&issue_id=5547&article_id=237054.
\end{itemize}
focus, these organizations have been slow to develop strong ties with the various parts of the UN counterterrorism program and have not actively sought to promote the implementation of the UN counterterrorism framework among their members. However, there are some indications that this situation is starting to change. For example, both the CIS and the CSTO have taken steps to endorse the UN Strategy. In February 2007, the CSTO devised a draft plan to implement the UN Strategy. Currently being considered by the Permanent Council, the draft includes a set of measures aimed at implementing the UN Strategy within the already existing framework of the CSTO. The CIS has thus far not issued a plan for implementation, but it has issued statements in support of the United Nations as an important instrument of international cooperation in combating terrorism. In addition, its Bishkek-based Counter-Terrorism Center is compiling a list of terrorist and extremist organizations operating in its member states while working to provide threat assessments and organizing joint counterterrorism activities among its 11 members.

Primarily serving as a forum to discuss trade and security issues among its six members and four observers, the SCO has had difficulty translating its decisions from paper to action, “partly because of continuing divisions among its members. In addition to the Russia-China divide, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, as well as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, have had difficulty reaching a consensus on many issues.” Nevertheless, it did establish a Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure in 2004. Its main purpose is to facilitate cooperation in the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism within SCO structures and among its members. Meeting in August 2008 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, SCO heads of state expressed their intention to increase cooperation through the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure of the SCO and “reaffirm[ed] their commitment to strengthening the central coordinating role of the UN in mounting an international response to the threat of terrorism, to consistent implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, [and] earliest possible approval of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.” The SCO has also worked to increase its collaboration with the United Nations more broadly. The SCO secretary-general met with the head of the newly established UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia on 16 July 2008 to discuss “issues of interaction between the two organizations in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism, as well as development of political, economic and cultural cooperation in the Central Asian region.” This new UN presence in the region could provide the UN Task Force with a unique platform to deepen its engagement with the relevant states and bodies in the region.

**Europe**

Not surprisingly, given its unprecedented degree of integration and significant resources, Europe has the most developed regional architecture, with the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Union (EU), and the OSCE each playing important yet sometimes overlapping roles in pursuing a regionally coordinated response to terrorism and each promoting close cooperation with the United Nations.

The EU has developed numerous counterterrorism-related mechanisms and effectively cooperated with many elements of the UN counterterrorism program. In addition to a 2004 declaration on combating terrorism

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28 Ibid.
32 A report on the meeting between the SCO and the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy can be found under the July entries in the SCO 2008 Chronicle of Events at: http://www.sectsco.org/html/00039.html.
and a December 2005 comprehensive counterterrorism strategy and action plan, which are reviewed/monitored every six months, the EU has adopted, among other things, the first elements of a European program on critical infrastructure protection, an EU strategy for combating radicalization and recruitment to terrorism and various initiatives aimed at promoting tolerance and dialogue, an EU strategy on terrorist financing, a European Arrest Warrant that facilitates extradition among EU members, a framework decision on combating terrorism that provides a definition of terrorism and an EU terrorist list, and made various attempts to improve the exchange of information and intelligence among member countries. It has also established both EUROJUST, to facilitate coordinated criminal investigations, and EUROPOL, to facilitate coordination of intelligence and investigative support, developed a robust counterterrorism capacity-building fund to assist countries in the global South, and appointed a counterterrorism “czar” to coordinate the activities of the European Commission and EU members.

With respect to the UN Strategy, the EU has been one of its strongest proponents, seeking to find ways to reinforce both the Task Force and implementation more generally. For example, the EU counterterrorism committee (COTER) regularly includes Strategy implementation efforts and ways in which the EU can advance them on the agenda of its monthly meeting in Brussels and invites relevant UN bodies (e.g., CTED and UNODC) to attend. A number of its members have provided voluntary contributions to the Task Force to allow it to carry out its work, and in November 2007 the European Commission proposed that the EU adopt a series of measures to implement both the UN Strategy and the EU strategy, addressing issues such as protecting critical infrastructure and urban transport security; improving the exchange of information and the detection of threats; reacting to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats; supporting victims; and encouraging research and technological development. The Secretariat of the Council of the EU, in cooperation with the European Commission, has also produced a matrix of the EU’s activities as they relate to the UN Strategy.

Both the OSCE and CoE have developed holistic counterterrorism programs that in many ways mirror the breadth of the Strategy itself, while placing a premium on coordination with the United Nations. The OSCE’s multi-dimensional initiative, for example, focuses on developing the capacities of its members and improving the coordination and sharing of information among them. It was designed to complement the global framework established in various post–11 September 2001 Security Council resolutions and the universal counterterrorism instruments. Its Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU), a small office within the secretariat, is charged with facilitating and coordinating OSCE counterterrorism activities, which are carried out by a number of different OSCE secretariat bodies, including those that focus on human rights, rule of law, economic issues, and broader security questions. In addition to addressing the more traditional counterterrorism issues, the OSCE has sought to provide a forum for addressing some of the current emerging threats, including misuse of the Internet, recruitment and incitement, and suicide terrorism. In February 2007, as a sign of the importance that both the OSCE and CoE place on the UN Strategy in particular, the organizations devoted their annual high-level meeting with the United Nations to its implementation. A few months later, ministers from the 56 OSCE participating states adopted a statement voicing their support for the Strategy. It recognizes “the leading role of the United Nations in the international efforts against terrorism” and recalls “the comprehensive global approach of the Strategy towards countering terrorism by addressing not only its manifestations, but also the conditions conducive to its spread.”

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34 Counter Terrorism Measures Taken by the European Union in Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Council of the European Union, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 4 September 2008. [Copy on file with the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation]
36 The Joint Communiqué of the “Annual High-level Meeting Between the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the UN,” 14 February 2007, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=11095951.
38 Ibid.
Both of Europe’s two counterterrorism conventions, the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, which entered into force on 1 June 2007, were negotiated under the auspices of the CoE. The latter criminalizes not only terrorism but also the acts that may lead to it, such as incitement, recruitment, and training, and provides for “a much broader and improved framework of investigative and judicial cooperation” among European countries but is also open to accession by nonmember states.39 The CoE, including through its Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER), also develops and promotes regional standards and best practices, with a particular emphasis being placed on the importance of upholding human rights and the rule of law while countering terrorism. For example, in addition to negotiating and adopting legally binding counterterrorism instruments, the CoE has developed guidelines on human rights and counterterrorism and publicly accessible country profiles on the counterterrorism capacities of its 46 members, compiled standards on protecting victims of violent crime, including terrorism, and provided legislative drafting and other counterterrorism-related technical assistance—often in close cooperation with the United Nations, EU, and OSCE—to its member states for the improvement of their counterterrorism capacity.

In terms of the Strategy, the CoE’s April 2007 plan of action to support Strategy implementation, which is monitored by CODEXTER, could serve as a model for other RSRs.40 It identifies which of the different CoE committees have a role to play in contributing to the implementation of the different provisions of the Strategy. The plan of action is reviewed, and, where appropriate, updated on a regular basis by CODEXTER.

**Middle East and North Africa (MENA)**

Although neither a regional nor subregional body, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)41 and the League of Arab States (LAS)42 each have played leading roles in promoting counterterrorism cooperation among states in the MENA region.

OIC efforts have taken three forms: (1) political statements such as the declaration and resolutions of OIC summits and conferences; (2) the Code of Conduct for the fight against terrorism endorsed by the 1994 Islamic Summit held in Casablanca; and (3) the 1999 Convention of the Islamic Conference on Combating Terrorism.43 Following the events of September 2001, the OIC did develop a more proactive counterterrorism approach by adopting a plan of action at the ministerial level to combat international terrorism in 2002. The plan established an open-ended, 13-member ministerial-level committee with a mandate to formulate and recommend to member states practical measures to combat terrorism. The committee’s mandate covers many of the same issues incorporated in the UN Strategy, including strengthening counterterrorism cooperation and coordination among its members, dialogue and understanding among different civilizations, cultures, and faiths, and promoting the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 and the universal instruments against terrorism.44

Reflecting its support for the UN Strategy, in November 2007 the OIC, in partnership with the United Nations and others, organized a conference on “Terrorism: Dimensions, Threats, and Countermeasures,” which was aimed at promoting the implementation of the Strategy among its members. Following the conference, a

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41 The OIC includes 56 member states, stretching from Morocco in the West and Pakistan in the East. A full list of OIC member states is available at: http://www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/member_states.asp.

42 The LAS is comprised of 22 member states: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, Algeria, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Mauritania, Somalia, Palestine, Djibouti, and Comoros.

43 The Convention entered into force in 2002 and includes a definition of terrorism, which, by including “state” terrorism and excluding acts committed in the name of foreign occupation, is incompatible with a number of the universal instruments related to terrorism.

delegation from the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) met with senior OIC officials to discuss improving the counterterrorism capacities of OIC member states.45

Although the political commitment within the organization and among its members both to the plan of action and Strategy seems to exist, concrete follow-up activities by its member states remain somewhat limited, partly because there is no mechanism within the OIC Secretariat to promote and coordinate implementation by member states. As in other organizations where the secretariat is provided with a limited mandate and resources in the field of counterterrorism, the head of the secretariat—the OIC secretary-general—should, at a minimum, nominate a focal point within the body to engage both with the Task Force and its member states on Strategy implementation issues.

The counterterrorism efforts of the LAS have thus far centered on a number of initiatives, most prominently the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, which promoted “mutual cooperation in the suppression of terrorist offences,” but included a broad definition of terrorism that excluded wars of liberation or armed struggle against foreign occupation.46 The Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior has been entrusted with monitoring its implementation. Under the auspices of this council, the LAS has convened ministers and experts from its member states to discuss ways both to improve cooperation among them and national responses to terrorism, as well as “anti-terrorism panels.” For example, the Council hosted the sixth meeting of the Arab Anti-Terrorism Panel on 27–28 June 2008, where participants called on Arab states to implement the UN Strategy, noting the emphasis the Strategy placed on capacity building and technical assistance.47 This meeting marked the third time in which the LAS experts have discussed Strategy implementation issues since its adoption in September 2006.48

Given the LAS’s political support for the Strategy, its regular, action-oriented meetings at the level of ministers and experts to discuss discrete, often technical, aspects of counterterrorism, as well as the technical capacity within its secretariat, the LAS is well-equipped to play a significant role among its members and serve as an interface with the Task Force and its constituent members to further the implementation of the Strategy.

Southeast Asia

Countries in Southeast Asia have elected to participate in a series of overlapping formal and informal fora and arrangements, many of which include countries from outside the region. The primary ones in Southeast Asia for involving countries from the region on counterterrorism include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the regional counterterrorism training centers in Bangkok, Jakarta, and Kuala Lumpur.49 Due to the region’s relatively weak multilateral bodies and poor track record of cooperation among states and those bodies, many of their efforts are carried out with insufficient coordination with other relevant actors either within the region or at the global level. In addition, they have largely focused on the preventive aspects of addressing the terrorist threat, such as improving maritime security, training law enforcement officials, the drafting of legislation, critical infrastructure

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46 A full transcript of the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism can be found online at: http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm.
48 Interview with senior official from LAS member state, New York, 10 July 2008.
49 The International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, and the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur provide training and other technical assistance to law enforcement and other security practitioners in the region.
protection, cyber security, and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. With its holistic, multi-stakeholder approach, the UN Strategy may offer these bodies the opportunity not only to develop capacity-building programs that target more fundamental capacity issues associated with conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, but also to improve coordination and cooperation with each other as well as with the broader UN system.

APEC, which is devoted to encouraging free trade and investment, has been perhaps the most active body in the Asia–Pacific in terms of counterterrorism capacity building. Although its foray into counterterrorism has not been without controversy, particularly among its Southeast Asian members, APEC has approached the issue of terrorism apolitically—as a threat to its goals of free trade and investment in the region and succeeded in developing meaningful, pragmatic counterterrorism capacity-building programs. While it is an attractive forum for counterterrorism capacity building because it includes large donor states among its members, its narrow mandate to promote trade and investment in the region and the resistance of many of its Southeast Asian members to expanding that mandate make it difficult for it to assume a much wider UN Strategy-related role. In addition, Taiwan’s participation in APEC might make it politically difficult to get support for involving APEC in promoting the UN Strategy as such.

Both ASEAN and the ARF lack a robust mandate from their members and suffer from a dearth of human and financial resources that has limited their institutional capacity to respond to the terrorist threat. Differing threat perceptions, the treasured norms of non-interference, and the perception of terrorism as a domestic security problem among Southeast Asian countries have largely limited counterterrorism cooperation in the region to bilateral or trilateral channels, with countries in Southeast Asia generally “cooperat[ing] against terrorism in an ad hoc manner and with outside powers.” The adoption of a regional, legally binding counterterrorism instrument, the Convention on Counter Terrorism, at the January 2007 ASEAN summit could help enhance the still lacking legal cooperation among countries in the region.

In keeping with its members’ traditional preference for a loosely structured organization, the primary counterterrorism mechanisms in ASEAN and the ARF are not permanent organs but rather periodic meetings of ministers and senior officials from the member states. These meetings serve as fora where the exchange of ideas and information among national officials on best practices in combating terrorism-related crimes takes place. In the ARF setting, with its membership including states from outside the region, including major counterterrorism donor countries such as Australia, Japan, and the United States, topic-specific seminars and workshops have also been held where ARF participants meet, share best practices, discuss cooperative counterterrorism efforts, and provide recommendations for the meetings of senior officials and foreign ministers.

The 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism and the signing of the ASEAN Charter in November 2007, which seeks to establish ASEAN as a legal entity and formally move the region toward a more integrated, EU-style economic community, may significantly enhance ASEAN’s institutional capacity and ability for autonomous action, including in the field of counterterrorism, and may ultimately enable its secretariat to play a larger role in serving as a platform for facilitating the delivery of UN Strategy-related technical assistance. The convention in fact includes language “promot[ing] capacity-building including trainings and technical cooperation and the holding of regional meetings.” In addition, although it is mainly an instrument to promote enhanced

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52 The ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Transnational Crime, the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime, and the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime.
legal cooperation between states in the region on terrorism matters, the convention goes well beyond the traditional law enforcement approach of other regional or international counterterrorism legal instruments, and is nearly as broad in scope as the UN Strategy. It includes references to the need for greater cooperation among states “to address the root causes of terrorism and conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism” and to sharing best practices related to rehabilitative and social reintegration programs. With this new regional framework in place, it may be worthwhile to explore the possibility of getting ASEAN as an organization to become more involved in promoting the implementation of the Strategy among its members, including by offering itself as a platform to allow for the exchange of national experiences in these different areas. This involvement will require ensuring that the ASEAN Secretariat has the necessary mandate and resources to do so. During the time it will take for the ASEAN Secretariat to build its capacity, an individual state in the region could convene a regional Strategy implementation meeting, with partner country support if necessary, and under the auspices of ASEAN, to which all of the key stakeholders, including the UN Task Force, would be invited, and where a regional Strategy implementation plan, along with a division of labor, could be developed.

Like ASEAN, the ARF has begun to expand the scope of its counterterrorism activities. For example, its 2007 senior officials’ meeting on counterterrorism and trans-national crime focused on addressing “conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,” which involves a “sustainable strategy to win the hearts and minds of the people.”54 ARF participants reiterated the importance of “nation-building measures such as the provision of basic economic and social services, the importance of good governance and institution-building, the necessity of achieving national political consensus through reconciliation and negotiation, and the importance of national will.”55 The participants officially endorsed the UN’s “Alliance of Civilizations” Initiative, convened a “Special Informal Session on Inter-Civilizational Dialogue,” and have actively promoted initiatives aimed at facilitating inter-civilizational dialogue in the region, such as the Asia-Pacific Inter-Faith Regional Dialogue.56

Given that the ARF has a broader membership than ASEAN and holds the primary responsibility for peace and security issues in the region, it may be better placed to assume a leading role in promoting Strategy implementation. However, it was conceived of as a process rather than an institution and, as such, has a limited permanent presence beyond a small staff unit within the ASEAN Secretariat. Therefore, as with ASEAN, the ARF’s institutional capacity and mandate for engaging with the United Nations, including the Task Force, will need to be strengthened if it is to be expected to assume a more active role in this area.

South Asia

The relative lack of subregional counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia should come as little surprise, given the different experiences that countries in this subregion have had with terrorism, the resulting divergence in threat perceptions, and the intra-regional rivalries and often tense relations between and among countries in South Asia. These subregional characteristics have generally limited the ability of subregional bodies, principally the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)57 and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sector Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC),58 to develop and carry forward action-oriented counterterrorism initiatives.

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55 Ibid.
57 SAARC members are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
58 BIMSTEC members are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
Nevertheless, the SAARC has adopted a regional counterterrorism convention and otherwise condemned terrorism. Interior Ministers from SAARC member states now meet annually to discuss, among other things, improving subregional counterterrorism cooperation. The Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) and Drug Offences Monitoring Desk (SDOMD) in its secretariat have the potential to identify weaknesses in capacity and technical ability. And anti-terrorism experts from SAARC countries have recently agreed to share intelligence for curbing terrorism and other transnational crimes.\(^{59}\) Finally, and most recently, SAARC leaders approved the SAARC Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) at the 15th SAARC summit in July 2008.\(^{60}\) Once the treaty enters into force, it should facilitate enhanced cooperation among the security forces of SAARC member states to track, arrest, and extradite terrorists and other criminals.

Given the political sensitivities on issues of terrorism and counterterrorism in the subregion, however, it remains to be seen whether these initiatives will lead to improved counterterrorism cooperation. For example, India and Pakistan have shared with each other a “list of wanted persons” supposedly sheltered in each other’s country. However, neither country has acted on the request, asserting “that either the persons mentioned are not in their territory or not considered terrorists or criminals.”\(^{61}\)

The seven-member BIMSTEC was established in 1997 to facilitate cooperation in areas such as trade and investment, technology, energy, and transportation. BIMSTEC has increasingly entered into the field of regional security cooperation since its 2004 Summit Declaration expressed concern about the threat of terrorism to regional trade and urged all member states “to coordinate their efforts by exchanging information and cooperating in the ongoing efforts of the international community to combat terrorism in all its forms, “irrespective of its cause or stated rationale.”\(^{62}\) Yet, like the SAARC, its contributions to promoting more effective counterterrorism cooperation and developing the capacity of its members have been rather limited. Although it established a “Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime Sector,” which is responsible for coordinating the subregion-wide response among BIMSTEC members, it merely consists of national focal points to facilitate communication between governments. BIMSTEC has yet to establish a permanent secretariat to support the work of this group of national officials.\(^{63}\)

There has, however, been some recent progress within BIMSTEC. Meeting in advance of the November 2008 heads of state summit in New Delhi, BIMSTEC foreign ministers adopted a draft convention “on combating international terrorism, trans-border organized crime and drug trafficking.”\(^{64}\) The convention, modeled on the SAARC convention on terrorism, is expected to be signed by BIMSTEC heads of state in November.\(^{65}\) The meeting of foreign ministers also agreed to establish a working group to look into options for strengthening the institutional capacity of the BIMSTEC secretariat including its structure, financing, and staffing.\(^{66}\)

Despite the modest progress of SAARC and BIMSTEC, given the political sensitivities on issues of terrorism and counterterrorism in the subregion, it remains to be seen whether these initiatives will lead to improved cooperation and whether SAARC and BIMSTEC members will be willing to provide their respective secretariats with the mandate and resources to allow them to assume a leading role in the subregion in promoting

\(^{61}\) Ibid.
\(^{65}\) Ibid.
\(^{66}\) Ibid.
the implementation of the UN Strategy. Neither organization has endorsed the Strategy nor explicitly incorporated it into its counterterrorism activities, and many of the programs, although still in their infancy, lack the secretariat resources and political will to affect change.

As the Task Force and its individual members seek to stimulate more Strategy-related activities in these organizations and work to strengthen partnerships in this area between them and UN system entities, they should be mindful of the considerable overlap in membership and mandates and thus should guard against any duplicative efforts.

The Western Hemisphere

In the 34 member state Organization of American States (OAS), the Western Hemisphere has perhaps the most developed and effective regional organization in the world outside of Europe. The OAS, including through its secretariat, has played an important role throughout the region in promoting development, democracy, rule of law and human rights, building security capacity to deal with drug trafficking, illicit firearms trafficking, border control, and facilitating and providing counterterrorism capacity-building assistance, all of which is related to the implementation of the UN Strategy. Nevertheless, institutional fragmentation within the OAS system, the financial limitations of its secretariat, and the fact that some regional actors see the organization as “an instrument of direct or indirect domination” have somewhat hindered its ability to implement its wide-ranging mandates effectively.

The work of the OAS is complemented by a number of subregional bodies, including the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), and the Central American Integration System (SICA). Although many of these subregional bodies suffer from a lack of resources, a number of them have leveraged the support of the international community through multilateral and bilateral assistance to carry out programs to enhance the counterterrorism and other security-related capacities of states in the region. In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank, through its loans and grants, helps finance development projects and supports strategies to reduce poverty, expand growth, increase trade and investment, promote regional integration, and foster private sector development and modernization of the state, all of which are critical to furthering holistic implementation of the UN Strategy. Each of these bodies has a role to play in furthering Strategy implementation in the region. The UN Task Force needs to become better acquainted with the activities of these relevant organizations and seek to create synergies between these activities and those of the relevant UN actors in the region.

Of particular relevance to Strategy implementation is the OAS Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICCTE), which consists of all 34 OAS member states, and is supported by a small staff unit within the OAS Secretariat. CICCTE has sponsored, endorsed, or arranged funding for a variety of capacity-building programs, working closely with some of the individual entities on the UN Task Force, including UNODC and UN specialized agencies. It has found areas of common interest among members in different subregions, e.g., tourism for Caribbean countries and protecting against human smuggling, drug trafficking, and other organized criminal activity for Central American countries. By doing so, it has succeeded in providing or facilitating the delivery of counterterrorism-related training and assistance relevant to those areas—focused on enhanced border, port, and/or aviation security—to countries in need in the various subregions.

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CICTE has developed some innovative and cost effective ways to keep states and other key stakeholders informed of its work, which offer models for others—including the Task Force. For example, the CICTE network of National Points of Contact serves as the principal means by which the secretariat communicates with states on technical issues and organizes in-country training activities to allow for more direct contact with security experts in the capitals. The CICTE Secretariat also regularly circulates a newsletter to keep its members and other interested parties aware of its past, current, and future work. Given both its track record and interest in promoting the implementation of the UN Strategy among its members, the CICTE Secretariat would be the logical regional focal point to interact more closely with the Task Force.

III. Strategy-related Engagement Between the UN System and RSRs

There exists both a diversity of RSRs pursuing UN Strategy-related activities, many of which are not labeled as “counterterrorism,” and more than 20 UN system entities on the Task Force, many of which have been engaged with different RSRs since well before the adoption of the Strategy. With RSRs in some areas often underresourced and treating other issues as more of a priority than terrorism and counterterrorism, UN system engagement with these bodies on the Strategy needs to be more coherent and better coordinated, so as not to overburden what are often limited staff resources, especially in RSRs with small and sometimes nonexistent secretariats. The General Assembly, including in the UN Strategy, as well as the Security Council and the Secretary-General have called for UN entities and RSRs to improve coordination and cooperation. At the operational level, however, interaction between UN entities engaged in different issues relating to counterterrorism and RSRs remains largely ad hoc and uncoordinated. As the Secretary-General’s 2006 report, A Regional-Global Security Partnership, notes, “those areas of cooperation that have been developed in an ad hoc manner remain rather haphazard in our collective contribution to a global-regional mechanism in peace and security.”

Under the current approach in the field of counterterrorism, some Task Force entities, often with overlapping mandates, have established or are seeking to establish separate formal or informal relationships with RSRs. Most strikingly, the three Council counterterrorism-related expert groups (the CTED, the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee Monitoring Team, and the 1540 Committee Group of Experts) continue to do so separately. This redundancy puts an increased burden on the organizations, many of which have only one person in their secretariats following all security-related issues. Representatives from some may also confuse distinctions among the different Council mandates, given their somewhat overlapping nature, and ask themselves why they need to have three different Council counterterrorism-related points of contact.

Since the 1990s the UN has worked to strengthen ties with RSRs in the realm of international peace and security. (For a list of relevant UN documents on cooperation between the UN and regional organizations see: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.3505277/.) The UN, for example, has made a priority of bolstering relations with the AU and other RSRs on issues of crisis prevention and peacekeeping as well as other issues including counterterrorism. The centerpiece of those efforts has been a series of high level, thematic, and working group meetings between the United Nations and regional and other intergovernmental organizations convened by the Secretariat. The UN has sought to refine and improve the modalities of that interaction and the Secretary-General has submitted a series of reports to the Security Council providing recommendations for clarifying and improving the relationship between RSRs and the Security Council (Report of the Secretary-General: A Regional-Global Security Partnership - Challenges and Opportunities, A/61/204-S/2006/590, 28 July 2006; Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in Particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, S/2008/186, 24 March 2008; and Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1625 (2005) on Conflict Prevention, Particularly in Africa, S/2008/18, 14 January 2008).

Among the main tasks assigned to the CTC/CTED early on was to reach out to international, regional, and subregional bodies to encourage them to become more involved in the global counterterrorism campaign—for example, by developing counterterrorism action plans, best practices, capacity-building programs, units within their secretariats, and urging their members to join the international terrorism-related treaties and to implement Resolution 1373. The CTED has succeeded in interacting with a wide range of RSRs, a few of which have participated in the CTED site visits to member states. Yet it has had difficulty having sustained interaction with those bodies where capacity is often lacking both at the institutional level and among their members, and thus where the need for more active CTED involvement is greatest.\textsuperscript{70} In many instances, the extent of CTED interaction has been one-off participation in meetings or workshops hosted by a particular regional or subregional body. These gatherings are used as a platform to reach out to the relevant member states, rather than as part of a long-term strategy to develop the capacity and expertise within these bodies to contribute to furthering the implementation of UN counterterrorism mandates. Perhaps most significant, however, the CTED has generally had the least engagement with bodies in regions and subregions where the threat might be the greatest, including the MENA region, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

Like the CTC/CTED, the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee, with the help of its Monitoring Team, has reached out to different RSRs to get their technical and/or political support for member state implementation of the sanctions regime. This support includes getting these bodies to distribute updates to the committee’s Consolidated List to their members and to urge their members to submit reports and other information to the committee. The list of regional and subregional bodies that the Monitoring Team has reached out to includes the AU, ASEAN, CARICOM, the EU, the OAS, the OSCE, and the SCO, which are nearly all of the same ones that the CTC/CTED has sought to engage with over the years.\textsuperscript{71}

The 1540 Committee, with the support of its experts, and in close cooperation with the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), also relies heavily on outreach activities to RSRs to promote implementation of Resolution 1540, including by building more widespread political commitment to the resolution.\textsuperscript{72} As a result of its interaction with different regional bodies, the members of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the OAS, and the OSCE have all committed themselves to preparing national action plans for implementing Resolution 1540. In addition to engaging directly with these and other regional and subregional bodies such as the AU, the LAS, CARICOM, and MERCOSUR, the 1540 Committee, again in cooperation with UNODA, has organized a series of outreach workshops in different regions, including Central Asia, South America, the Middle East, and West, and Southern Africa to generate a greater awareness about the resolution, the process for moving toward full implementation, the need for reporting to the Committee, and of the available assistance. These in-region workshops have also fostered the sharing of relevant national experiences among technical experts from capitals in the relevant region.\textsuperscript{73}

Although there have been few attempts by the three Council counterterrorism-related expert groups to engage with the myriad of RSRs in a more coherent manner, the three Council expert groups have developed a common strategy to address the problems faced by states that have yet to submit the reports required by the three

\textsuperscript{70} For example, it has not had any significant interaction with either the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the ASEAN Regional Forum, which has impeded the CTED’s ability to engage effectively with states in Southeast Asia.

\textsuperscript{71} For example, the OSCE’s Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) agreed to engage the Team in the OSCE assistance and capacity-building programs, and the OSCE’s Office of the Coordinator on Economic and Environmental Activities agreed to share with the committee challenges related to the Security Council’s al-Qaida/Taliban assets freeze raised at its workshops. In addition, the Team has, in some cases, reached out to regional bodies such as ASEAN to obtain a threat analysis and assessment of the impact of al-Qaida ideology in the relevant region.

\textsuperscript{72} For a more thorough discussion of the engagement of RSRs in the implementation of Resolution 1540 see Implementing Resolution 1540: the Role of Regional Organizations, L. Scheinman (ed.), (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, September 2008).

\textsuperscript{73} Briefings by Chairman of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV/5806, 17 December 2007, p. 5.
Committees. In doing so, they have sought to address a problem identified by heads of state in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and in the Strategy itself. Working with UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB), the three groups have organized a number of subregional workshops for national officials involved in the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions or are responsible for writing reports to the three Committees. Rather than one-off workshops, these seminars should become part of a broader and longer-term coordinated effort not only to work more closely with states in particular regions and subregions, but to develop the capacities of the relevant regional and subregional bodies to continue working with the relevant states after the Council experts have departed.

Perhaps uniquely among the UN’s counterterrorism actors, UNODC’s TPB has sought to build these capacities, developing partnerships with organizations such as the AU, SADC, ICPAT, the OSCE, the OAS, and the OIC. This cooperation has included jointly organized and conducted training seminars, workshops, ministerial conferences, and technical assistance missions. Through its experts and consultants based in different regions, its training and other workshops in the field, and its ability to draw on the expertise and resources of other UNODC entities involved in anti-drugs, anti-crime, and criminal justice reform work, the TPB, unlike the CTC/CTED and the other relevant Council bodies, is able to develop sustainable, broad-based, symbiotic relationships with regional and subregional bodies. In return for TPB’s assistance, the partnership organizations provide TPB with local expertise and experience, which enhances the overall quality and relevance of the TPB’s technical assistance programs.

Despite the efforts of UNODC’s TPB and other UN actors, many RSRs do not have counterterrorism units within their secretariats or counterterrorism action plans to enable them to make meaningful contributions to Strategy implementation. Cooperation and coordination among and between these groups and the United Nations remains uneven. Recognizing this fact, the UN Strategy encourages regional and subregional organizations to create or strengthen existing counterterrorism mechanisms and centers and encourages the CTC/CTED, UNODC, and Interpol to provide them with assistance in doing so if necessary.

IV. Conclusion: Enhancing UN Strategy-related Engagement Between the United Nations and RSRs

Although the UN Strategy encourages cooperation and coordination and recognizes the contributions that RSRs can make to its implementation, it offers few concrete proposals in this area. The important function of working with interested RSRs in all regions to help them establish priorities and develop programs and projects in furtherance of the Strategy has not been adequately addressed so far. The Task Force, states, and RSRs themselves should offer clear and practical suggestions as to what specific tasks RSRs can usefully perform to reinforce Strategy implementation.

For example, interested RSRs could formally endorse the Strategy, preferably at the ministerial level, and develop their own plan for implementing it. Relevant RSRs could work with countries in their area to articulate their needs and priorities to the Task Force, and ensure that the discussions in New York and within the Task Force are rooted in the on-the-ground realities, needs, and priorities of each region or subregion and are responsive to them. To this end, interested RSRs should be given a voice in the design and

“The important function of working with interested RSRs in all regions to help them establish priorities and develop programs and projects in furtherance of the Strategy has not been adequately addressed so far.”

implementation of UN Strategy-related programs relevant to their work. Thus, for example, consideration could be given to expanding the Task Force to include representatives from relevant RSRs or increasing their participation in the activities of the Task Force working groups.

Where they are lacking, RSRs could provide their secretariat with the mandate and resources to engage with their member states and the United Nations on Strategy issues. If resources are an issue, the necessary funding and expertise could be sought from partner countries or appropriate NGOs. Interested RSRs could be encouraged to approach the Task Force and its representative entities directly to articulate the vulnerabilities, needs, and priorities of their members. Finally, in some parts of the world, e.g., where there are a multitude of relevant regional and subregional entities such as Southeast Asia, it might make sense to establish a regional or subregional Strategy implementation task force, with the relevant regional or subregional body serving as the focal point for engagement with the United Nations in New York and the UN Task Force members in the region.

To its credit, the Task Force recognizes the importance of building partnerships with these actors, but currently lacks the wherewithal and mandate to do so. The secretary-general’s first-ever report on the UN’s efforts to implement the Strategy notes that RSRs provide a resource that has not been tapped by the UN system to its greatest advantage. It emphasizes the importance of strengthening the capacities of RSRs, encouraging the cross-regional sharing of expertise between those bodies that have developed effective counterterrorism programs and those that have yet to do so. It continues that the UN system, through the Task Force, if staffed and resourced to do so, could provide a strategic interface with RSRs as well as global bodies and civil society. This useful proposal will be difficult to implement effectively, however, unless the Council develops and implements a strategy for coordinated engagement between its three counterterrorism-related bodies and RSRs. Therefore, the Council should instruct these bodies to engage with RSRs through a single channel, particularly when discussing capacity-building issues.

Although the idea of having the Task Force serve as a strategic interface between the United Nations and RSRs on Strategy issues is a good, albeit general, one, the details will need to be fleshed out. For example, the Task Force could use its convening authority to bring RSRs together to share best practices and assess implementation in each region and subregion. The Task Force, or representatives thereof, could meet with the relevant RSR and member states to develop a Strategy implementation action plan and each year have a follow-up meeting on what has been done and what more is needed. The existing UNODC mechanism where it discusses criminal justice issues with regional bodies and governments could be used for this purpose. In addition, the Task Force could designate a field-based representative from the appropriate Task Force entity to serve as its focal point in each region or subregion to help transport Strategy implementation into a local context and make it more in tune with priorities on the ground. As the Task Force secretariat seeks to deepen its engagement with RSRs, careful attention must be paid to rationalize this outreach with the ongoing efforts of the most active UN counterterrorism actors, including the UNODC and the Council’s counterterrorism-related subsidiary bodies.

In the end, RSRs have a critical role to play in ensuring that the Strategy receives the necessary political support from local actors—support that will be needed to ensure that its broad provisions lead to concrete initiatives where it matters: on the ground. The potential of RSRs to contribute, however, has yet to be realized, in part due to a lack of coherent engagement by the Task Force and its representative entities. This deficiency stems both from a lack of resources and the sense that the Task Force’s main task is to coordinate within the United Nations rather

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than between the United Nations and outside stakeholders. Ensuring that the Task Force secretariat has both the resources and mandate to allow it to serve effectively as a strategic interface with these bodies is, however, essential to the long-term success of the Strategy.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

**Regional and Subregional Organizations**

1. **Endorse the Strategy and reiterate calls in regional and subregional ministerial statements for states to implement the Strategy.**

2. **Adopt and implement existing regional counterterrorism frameworks.**

3. **Devise plans of action for Strategy implementation and commit to reviewing implementation efforts on a regular basis.**

4. **Establish counterterrorism units or focal points within their Secretariats for Strategy-/counterterrorism-related issues.**

5. **Provide their secretariat with the mandate and resources to engage with their member states and the United Nations on Strategy issues.** If resources are an issue, the necessary funding and expertise should be sought from partner countries or appropriate NGOs.

6. **Establish regional task force or designate lead body for coordination of Strategy-related efforts in regions with multiple or overlapping RSRs.**

### Pillar I: Measures to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism

7. **Promote inter-cultural and inter- and intra-religious dialogues and develop culturally sensitive projects aimed at empowerment of moderates, religious scholars, and civil society.**

8. **Work to devise effective mechanisms of preventive diplomacy and work to resolve regional and subregional conflicts that fuel terrorism.**

9. **Offer their members opportunities to share national experiences in working to “de-radicalize” former violent extremists and on other Strategy-related issues.**

### Pillar II: Measures to prevent and combat terrorism

10. **Promote the development of uniform regional or subregional counterterrorism regimes to allow for the necessary judicial and law enforcement cooperation between and among them to help ensure that suspected terrorists are prosecuted or extradited.**

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* These are put forward recognizing that important work in fulfilling these recommendations is already underway in some cases. In addition, not all RSRs are in a position to adopt or implement them, and for some RSRs, the UN Strategy may fall outside of their mandate.
11. **Endorse the counterterrorism-related standards and best practices developed by international functional bodies in different fields**—many of which are explicitly referred to in the UN Strategy—including aviation, port, and border security.

12. **Work to stimulate the development of public/private sector partnerships** between their members and multinational companies, which may be well placed to make important contributions to enhancing the implementation of Pillar II of the Strategy.

**Pillar III: Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism**

13. **Work to facilitate and deliver capacity-building assistance to aid their members in implementing the Strategy**. They can help identify capacity gaps in their region or subregion and disseminate among their members information regarding relevant bilateral and multilateral capacity-building programs, with a view to, among other things, fostering donor coordination.

14. **Work with countries in their area to articulate their needs and priorities to the relevant UN bodies** (or perhaps the Task Force’s working group focusing on integrated implementation of the UN Strategy) in a coherent manner, and ensure that the discussions in New York and within the Task Force are rooted in the on-the-ground realities, needs, and priorities of each region or subregion and are responsive to them.

15. **Provide a forum for training seminars involving bilateral and/or multilateral partners, the provision of assistance, and, more broadly, supporting the development of regional, subregional, as well as national capacity.**

16. **Organize workshops with technical experts from relevant functional bodies to ensure that local officials are provided with the training and skills needed to implement the international standards and best practices referred to in Recommendation 11.**

17. **Engage with assistance providers and member states to help maintain necessary focus on Strategy-related issues** after assistance providers have departed to help ensure the long-term sustainability of these capacity-building programs and that the assistance is implemented by the states.

**Pillar IV: Measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism**

18. **Encourage members to “accept the competence of the international and relevant human rights monitoring bodies” as called for in the Strategy, support and cooperate with the OHCHR, and support and liaise with the Special Rapporteur as well as other relevant UN special procedures mandate holders.** For example, they can invite the Special Rapporteur to conduct regional or subregional visits and co-host workshops with the Special Rapporteur and OHCHR, focusing on the human rights framework in the Strategy.

19. **Work to ensure the human rights–based approach to combating terrorism that underpins the Strategy is reflected in all counterterrorism-related declarations, statements, or other documents.**
20. Adopt human rights conventions or charters and devise other human rights institutions—or implement existing regimes—which place the universal human rights obligations within the relevant regional context and help to ensure a shared regional interpretation of those obligations.

21. Provide their members guidance on the sharing of best practices and a forum for discussion among countries that may face many of the same human rights and counterterrorism challenges.

22. Improve the human rights capacity of members by propagating standards of conduct and providing human rights training for security, law enforcement, and judicial officials engaged in combating terrorism.

23. Provide a role for regional human rights commissions and courts in interpreting human rights obligations for states and investigating and shedding light on abuses, providing for recourse above the national level.

24. Consider conducting peer reviews and other monitoring mechanisms to ensure that national counterterrorism efforts comply with international and regional human rights standards, and apply political pressure on local states in cases where they do not.

25. Develop and maintain effective, rule of law–based criminal justice systems within member states by offering the necessary expertise and other resources, and by providing a forum for interaction with civil society.

UN System

26. UN system engagement with RSRs on the Strategy needs to be more coherent and better coordinated so as not to overburden what are often limited staff resources, especially in RSRs with small and sometimes nonexistent secretariats.

   a. The Security Council should develop and implement a strategy for coordinated engagement whereby its three counterterrorism-related bodies engage with RSRs through a single channel, particularly when discussing capacity-building issues. This engagement should be part of a long-term strategy to develop the capacity and expertise within these bodies to contribute to furthering the implementation of UN counterterrorism mandates.

   b. CTED should work to improve and maintain sustained interaction with RSRs, particularly with RSRs where capacity is lacking both at the institutional level and among their members, and thus where the need for more active UN involvement, e.g., the MENA region, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, is greatest.

   c. The CTC/CTED should reconsider how it approaches its mandate to enhance the coordination and cooperation among RSRs, which it currently seeks to accomplish through large annual meetings of representatives of international, regional, and subregional bodies. Smaller, less formal gatherings may better yield the sort of dialogue, informal exchange of views, building of trust, and pragmatic results that its organizers desire.
d. UNODC/TPB and the Council subsidiary bodies should build on their region-focused workshops aimed at improving reporting to the committees by making those seminars part of a broader and longer-term coordinated effort to work more closely with states in particular regions and subregions and develop the capacities of the relevant regional and subregional bodies to continue working with the relevant states after the Council experts have departed.

e. The CTC/CTED, UNODC, and Interpol, as provided for in the Strategy, should assist SRSs with establishing counterterrorism units within their secretariats or counterterrorism action plans to enable them to make meaningful contributions to Strategy implementation and improve cooperation and coordination among them and between them and the United Nations.

f. Interested RSRs should be given a voice in the design and implementation of UN Strategy-related programs relevant to their work. For example, consideration could be given to expanding the Task Force to include representatives from relevant RSRs or increasing their participation in the activities of the Task Force working groups.

27. The Task Force, states, and RSRs themselves should offer clear and practical suggestions as to what specific tasks RSRs can usefully perform to reinforce Strategy implementation.

28. The Task Force could serve as a strategic interface between the United Nations and RSRs on Strategy issues:

a. The Task Force could use its convening authority to bring RSRs together to share best practices and assess implementation in each region and subregion.

b. The Task Force, or representatives thereof, could meet with the relevant RSR and member states to develop a Strategy implementation action plan and each year hold a follow-up meeting to discuss accomplishments and identify future goals based on needs.

c. The existing UNODC mechanism where it discusses criminal justice issues with regional bodies and governments could be used for this purpose.

d. The Task Force could designate a field-based representative from the appropriate Task Force entity to serve as its focal point in each region or subregion to help transport Strategy implementation into a local context and make it more in tune with priorities on the ground.

e. Careful attention must be paid to rationalize this outreach with the ongoing efforts of the most active UN counterterrorism actors, including the UNODC and the Council’s counterterrorism-related subsidiary bodies.

29. Member states should ensure that the Task Force secretariat has both the resources and mandate to allow it to serve effectively as a strategic interface with RSRs.
**Survey of the Strategy-Specific Statements and Activities of Regional and Subregional Bodies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional/Subregional Bodies</th>
<th>Strategy-Specific Statements and Activities</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>African Union (AU)</strong></td>
<td>The AU has yet to formally endorse or otherwise adopt a position on the Strategy. The Peace and Security Commission is, however, in the process of developing an AU position, with a view to convening a meeting of the Peace and Security Council in the second half of 2008 to adopt an AU communiqué on AU efforts and their relation to the UN Strategy. It is then the intention that this communiqué would be endorsed by AU ministers in New York during the 2008 General Assembly debate. 76</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)</strong></td>
<td>APEC has not formally or informally released any statements, speeches, or documents explicitly referring to the UN Strategy. 77 Taiwan’s participation in APEC may make it politically difficult to get support for involving APEC in explicitly promoting the Strategy. APEC has, however, issued numerous counterterrorism-related statements and undertaken myriad related activities, particularly in the realm of capacity building, which contribute to implementation of the Strategy.</td>
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<td><strong>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)</strong></td>
<td>ASEAN leaders, in the November 2007 Joint Declaration of the ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit, issued a “Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership.” The Plan of Action encouraged the implementation of the UN Strategy with “the aim of promoting comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses at national, regional and international levels to counter terrorism.” 78</td>
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<td><strong>ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)</strong></td>
<td>In August 2007, ARF ministers “commended the signing of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism” and “urged the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy.” 79 In May 2007, the “5th ASEAN Regional Forum Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime” discussed issues of inter-civilizational dialogue as a means to enhance the fight against terrorism. In the summary report of the meeting, participants “reiterated their commitment to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” and welcomed the “adoption by consensus of a UN Global Strategy on combating international terrorism by the UN General Assembly on 9 September 2006.” In addition, the report reaffirmed the ARF’s “commitment to fulfill the various international instruments on combating terrorism, including the 13 UN Conventions and Protocols.” 80</td>
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* This survey provides an overview of the Strategy-specific activities of certain regional and subregional bodies. It does not reflect all related activities of those bodies or all relevant regional and subregional bodies.

76 Email correspondence with the AU Secretariat, 4 July 2008.
77 Email correspondence with APEC Secretariat, 18 July 2008.
79 “Chairman’s Statement of the Fourteenth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” Manila, Philippines, 2 August 2007.
## Survey of the Strategy-Specific Statements and Activities of Regional and Subregional Bodies

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<tr>
<th>Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)</th>
<th>In February 2007, the CSTO devised a draft plan to implement the UN Strategy, which is being considered by the Permanent Council, and included a set of measures aimed at implementing the UN Strategy within the already existing framework of the CSTO.(^8^1) At a 4 September 2008 Council of Foreign Ministers meeting of the CSTO in Moscow, the “Program of Collective Action by the CSTO Member States in Carrying Out the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2008-2012” was considered.(^8^2) The following day, the CSTO issued a declaration emphasizing “the key role of the United Nations Organization as a universal mechanism for the maintenance of international peace and security … of particular significance is the implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, putting into practice the UN Security Council’s antiterrorist resolutions and reaching agreement as soon as possible on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.”(^8^3)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)</td>
<td>The CIS maintains on its Web site that the United Nations must remain a fundamental element of combating terrorism and voices support for international cooperation against terrorism and for strengthening the international legal framework in accordance with UN Security Council and UN General Assembly resolutions.(^8^4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council of Europe (CoE)</td>
<td>The CoE in various forums has welcomed the adoption of the UN Strategy and has held a number of meetings on its own and in conjunction with other organizations on furthering its implementation. At the 14 February 2007 “Annual High-level meeting between the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations and partner organizations,” it welcomed the adoption of the Strategy and “agreed that the Strategy can be efficiently implemented only through the consistent long-term efforts of society as a whole and underscored the paramount importance of initiatives and programmes aimed at promoting tolerance and mutual respect for other cultures, religions and beliefs.”(^8^5) The CoE has held a number of meetings on practical issues related to all four pillars of the Strategy and in April 2007 devised a document that identifies which of the different CoE committees has a role to play in contributing to the implementation of the different provisions of the Strategy.(^8^6) That document is reviewed, and, where appropriate, updated on a regular basis by CODEXTER with input from the relevant CoE committees.</td>
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\(^8^5\) The Joint Communiqué of the “Annual High-level Meeting Between the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the UN,” 14 February 2007, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1095951.  
## Survey of the Strategy-Specific Statements and Activities of Regional and Subregional Bodies

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<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</strong></td>
<td>ECOWAS has not specifically addressed the UN Strategy, but it has begun steps to harmonize all counterterrorism activity in the subregion by inviting member states to inform the ECOWAS Counterterrorism Focal Point about their “activities, difficulties, and gaps.” In addition, ECOWAS has participated in numerous seminars and workshops with the ACSRT, and in 2006, ECOWAS partnered with the UNODC to organize a seminar on the legal aspects of international cooperation against terrorism.87</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>European Union (EU)</strong></td>
<td>The EU and its members regularly reiterate their support for the UN Strategy and continue to seek to reinforce both the UN Task Force and implementation of the Strategy more generally.88 The EU counterterrorism committee regularly includes Strategy implementation efforts, and ways in which the EU can advance them, on the agenda of its monthly meeting in Brussels and invites relevant UN bodies (e.g., CTED and UNODC) to attend. A number of its members have provided voluntary contributions to the UN Task Force to allow it to carry out its work, and in November 2007, the European Commission proposed that the EU adopt a series of measures to implement both the UN Strategy and the EU strategy, addressing issues such as protecting critical infrastructure and urban transport security; improving the exchange of information and the detection of threats; reacting to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats; supporting victims; and encouraging research and technological development.89</td>
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<td><strong>Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)</strong></td>
<td>In the final declaration of the first ever IGAD ministerial level meeting on countering terrorism (September 2007), the IGAD ministers of justice called on IGAD members to “to implement the Plan of Action of the African Union on the prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa and to implement the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”90 and requested the continuation of the UNODC/ICPAT capacity-building training programs. In March 2008, ICPAT partnered with the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation to host a conference in Addis Ababa on the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in East Africa. The conference sought to identify ways in which states, relevant multilateral bodies, and other stakeholders in the subregion could contribute to the implementation of the UN Strategy.</td>
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87 Email correspondence with ECOWAS Counterterrorism Focal Point, 8 July 2008.
89 Ibid.
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<tr>
<th><strong>League of Arab States (LAS)</strong></th>
<th>The LAS, under the auspices of the Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior, hosted the sixth meeting of the Arab Anti-Terrorism Panel on 27–28 June 2008, where participants called on Arab states to implement the UN Strategy, noting the emphasis the Strategy placed on capacity building and technical assistance. This meeting marked the third time that LAS experts have discussed Strategy implementation issues since its adoption in September 2006.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)</strong></td>
<td>At the February 2007 Annual High-level Meeting Between the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the UN, the OSCE secretary general endorsed the Strategy, saying that it &quot;establishes a blueprint for invigorating counter-terrorism work at multiple levels.&quot; In November 2007, the OSCE released a &quot;Ministerial Statement on Supporting the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,&quot; which recognized &quot;the leading role of the United Nations in the international efforts against terrorism&quot; and recalled &quot;the comprehensive global approach of the Strategy towards countering terrorism by addressing not only its manifestations, but also the conditions conducive to its spread.&quot; The ministers agreed that the UN Strategy runs parallel with its counterterrorism efforts and vowed to continue to work toward full implementation of the Strategy by working to strengthen the international legal framework, increase cooperation in criminal matters, and build the capacity of regional organizations and member states to combat terrorist financing. In addition to the OSCE’s Anti-Terrorism Unit in the secretariat, the OSCE’s multidimensional approach to counterterrorism includes the efforts of, among others, the Forum for Security Cooperation, which listed the UN Strategy as a top priority for 2008, the Office of Economic and Environmental Activities, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). In February 2007, ODIHR published a final report on the “Expert Workshop on Human Rights and International Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism,” which highlighted the pillars of the UN Strategy and noted that &quot;respect for human rights features as more than just one of the four pillars of a sustainable Plan of Action, since it also figures as a component in all other pillars of the strategy against terrorism.&quot; In the spring of 2007, ODIHR also had a meeting and released a report on the “Role of Civil Society in Preventing Terrorism,” which recognized the UN Strategy’s emphasis on the importance of engaging civil society as a way to enhance counterterrorism efforts.</td>
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92 Interview with senior official from LAS member state, New York, 10 July 2008.
93 The Joint Communiqué of the “Annual High-level Meeting Between the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the UN,” 14 February 2007, [https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1095951](https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1095951).
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 The January Press release can be found at: [http://www.osce.org/item/29313.html](http://www.osce.org/item/29313.html).
99 Ibid.
| Organization of American States (OAS) | The OAS in the 7th Regular Session of its Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) on 1 March 2007 put forth a declaration “welcoming the recently adopted United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” and calling on member states to implement the “provisions of the inter-American and universal instruments against terrorism.” In June 2008 the OAS General Assembly recognized “the importance of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy … and the importance of its implementation in the fight against terrorism.”

| Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) | In November 2007, the OIC, in partnership with the United Nations and others, organized a conference on “Terrorism: Dimensions, Threats, and Countermeasures,” which was aimed at promoting the implementation of the Strategy among its members.

| Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) | In August 2008 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, SCO heads of state expressed their intention to increase cooperation through the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure of the SCO and “reaffirm[ed] their commitment to strengthening the central coordinating role of the UN in mounting an international response to the threat of terrorism, to consistent implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, [and] earliest possible approval of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.”

| Southern African Development Community (SADC) | SADC has not explicitly endorsed the UN Strategy nor devised a subregional response or mechanism to address terrorism, but it is working with both UNODC and CTED to enhance collaboration on counterterrorism in the SADC region and is undertaking a regional threat assessment with an eye toward devising a regional counterterrorism strategy.

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101 “Support for the Work for the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism,” OAS AG/RES. 2396, 3 June 2008.
The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation is a nonpartisan research and policy institute that works to improve coordination of the international community’s response to terrorism by providing governments and international organizations with timely, policy-relevant research and analysis. The Center has analyzed multilateral counterterrorism efforts on behalf of over a dozen governments, the UN, and private foundations and is the only research center in the world focused on strengthening global counterterrorism cooperation.

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