


IN PRACTICE

Case Studies in Advancing Cooperation Between Governments and Civil Society Concerning the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Individuals Associated With Violent Extremism



By **Christina Nemr** and **Patrick Tobin**

September 2022

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ABOUT THIS REPORT

Starting in 2019, the Global Center on Cooperative Security initiated a project to understand the challenges and opportunities in advancing cooperation with civil society in the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist prisoners across Southeast Asia. This particular project built on previous Global Center work highlighting the unique and beneficial role that civil society can play in rehabilitating and then facilitating the return of former violent extremists to their communities.

Early engagements on this current project convened governmental and civil society stakeholders from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to understand their experiences in working together, or not, on rehabilitating and reintegrating violent extremist prisoners. Participants included government officials working on strategies regarding preventing and countering violent extremism, prison officials managing rehabilitation in custodial settings, and civil society representatives helping shape and implement policies and programming. The valuable lessons gleaned from these engagements resulted in a brief outlining 10 cooperation objectives and their resulting challenges and opportunities. This follow-on report attempts to ground these lessons in actionable guidance, using numerous case studies from across the five countries to illustrate how cooperation between governments and civil society organizations can move from ideas into practice.



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ABBREVIATIONS

ACG	Inter-Agency Aftercare Group (Singapore)
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
BFMI	Balay Mindanaw Foundation (Philippines)
BJMP	Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (Philippines)
BNPT	Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (National Counter Terrorism Agency) (Indonesia)
CDS	Center for Detention Studies (Indonesia)
CrCF	Cross Cultural Foundation (Thailand)
CSTP	Coalition for Security Towards Peace (Philippines)
CVE	countering violent extremism
DGC	Directorate General of Corrections (Indonesia)
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government (Philippines)
INSEP	Institute for Society Empowerment (Indonesia)
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JAD	Jamaah Ansharut Daulah
JI	Jemaah Islamiya
NAP	national action plan
PADI	Partnership for Advancing Democracy and Integrity (Indonesia)
P/CVE	preventing and countering violent extremism
PINGO	Portal Indonesian NGO
PPIM	Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (Center for the Study of Islam and Society) (Indonesia)
RMP	Royal Malaysia Police
RRG	Religious Rehabilitation Group (Singapore)
UIN	Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (Indonesia)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
VERA	Violent Extremism Risk Assessment
YLP	Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian (Peace Circle Foundation) (Indonesia)
YPP	Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (Institute for International Peace Building) (Indonesia)



INTRODUCTION

Ensuring national security, particularly when it comes to terrorism and violent extremism, is a key role and responsibility of governments. Yet, the many elements inherent to addressing violent extremist offenses require a coordinated approach beyond just governments. Civil society organizations play an important role in shaping policies and assisting with rehabilitation and reintegration processes for individuals associated with violent extremism, including prisoners, detainees, and returnees, when they are given the space, security, and resources to do so.

For example, the Malaysian civil society organization IMAN Research is a think tank that focuses on peace-building and sustainable development, including countering violent extremism and rehabilitation and reintegration. Established in 2015, it has traditionally helped provide guidance on the Malaysian government's approach to violent extremism through research, policy papers, and direct engagement. It is expected to continue playing this role, especially as Malaysia is finalizing a national action plan (NAP) on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), with discussions having started in 2017. Since 2018, however, a series of changes in government has resulted in less space for civil society organizations such as IMAN Research to share their input and analysis.

In the rehabilitation and reintegration space, IMAN Research works with lawyers and civil society organizations to support their efforts in facilitating the reintegration of former violent extremist prisoners following their incarceration. Its engagement allows insights into specific causes for violent extremist

behavior and ways to address the enabling environment, data which it typically uses as the basis for research reports. Increasing restrictions on the role of civil society organizations, however, means that IMAN Research and other civil society organizations are unable to publish their findings unless the government releases its own information in the media first. In addition, the Royal Malaysia Police has restricted access to prisons and detainees. This severely limits the knowledge IMAN Research is able to pass on to improve government-led programming on countering violent extremism (CVE) and rehabilitation and reintegration. Although the Malaysian government has declared its willingness to include civil society organizations in the NAP process, its prioritization of resources and limited engagement of expert organizations indicate otherwise.

This example is but one instance in a landscape of varying engagements between governments and civil society around rehabilitation and reintegration issues, some more collaborative than others. It reveals a reality of experience. Simply alluding to cooperation with civil society in national strategies against violent extremism is not sufficient if such cooperation is not rooted in political will or reinforced with the security and space to operate or even backed by commensurate budgets. Given the diversity of experiences, this report aims to explore the practical examples of how governments and civil society have cooperated to accomplish rehabilitation and reintegration goals, whether individuals are prisoners, detainees, or returnees. In doing so, it highlights the importance of and necessity for such cooperation, despite the challenges.



BACKGROUND ON THE REGION

Before examining the state of cooperation concerning rehabilitation and reintegration issues, it is necessary to understand the context of violent extremism across the region in which such programs take place. Two decades ago, the 2002 Bali bombings by terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI) created a modern focal point on terrorism in Southeast Asia. On the heels of 9/11, this event sent shockwaves through the international community, with the bombing killing 202 people and injuring hundreds of others. With JI operating not just in Indonesia but in multiple Southeast Asian countries, the fear of violent extremism emerged and became a prominent regional issue. Over the past 20 years, the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia has evolved, from the concern of JI's strong extremist network to apprehension over al-Qaida regrouping in the region to the fear that Southeast Asia will become a new hub for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to the issues of returning foreign terrorist fighters from Iraq and Syria.

The expert narrative on violent extremism in Southeast Asia has outweighed the empirical evidence, and the alarming warnings and predictions of potent violent extremist hubs and activities have not come to fruition.¹ Yet, there are many indications that the risks remain. The Global Terrorism Index offers a general overview of terrorism trends and provides a ranking system to measure the impact of terrorism, and the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia rank in the top 25 countries most impacted by terrorism in the 2022 iteration, highlighting that terrorism issues are still very present in the region.² Data indicate that 1,000–1,500 Southeast Asian nationals and residents traveled to Iraq and Syria to support armed terrorist groups between 2014 and 2018.³ The number of returnees is

challenging to calculate, but it is even more difficult to understand the threat level they pose.⁴

Additionally, it may be years before the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism in Southeast Asia is known. International and national recessions tied to the pandemic and, more recently, to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 could provide great economic hardships and become a catalyst and driver for radicalization and recruitment.⁵ Furthermore, violent extremists' use of online platforms and social media to spread violent ideology and recruit is well documented, but there are fears that the pandemic has pushed people to spend even more time online and increased the risk of radicalization to violence.⁶

The threat of violent extremism, porous borders and vast coastlines, and interconnectivity by land, sea, and air has caused the five countries examined in this report to adopt strong governmental approaches to tackling violent extremism and terrorism within their jurisdictions. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have dealt with varying degrees of real or perceived threats from violent extremism. The detention, rehabilitation, and reintegration of violent extremists in these five countries provide lessons of cooperation between governments and civil society organizations.

INDONESIA

In early January 2021, Indonesia officially released its highly anticipated national action plan on countering violent extremism that leads to terrorism, signed by President Joko Widodo.⁷ The Badan

1 UN Development Programme, *Assuming the Worst: Narratives and Their Impacts on Violent Extremism in South-East Asia*, 2020, pp. 15–18, https://www.entryandexitpoints.asia-pacific.undp.org/reports/UNDP_NarrativesandtheirImpactsonViolent%20Extremism.pdf.

2 Institute for Economics & Peace, "Global Terrorism Index 2022: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism," *IEP Report*, no. 84 (March 2022), <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GTI-2022-web.pdf>.

3 "Financing and Facilitation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Returnees in Southeast Asia," The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and Global Center on Cooperative Security, November 2021, p. 9, https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Typology-Report-on-FTFs-in-SEA_PUBLIC.pdf.

4 Ibid., p. 18.

5 Sidney Jones, "COVID-19 and Extremism in Southeast Asia," *Asia-Pacific Journal* 18, no. 15 (August 2020), <https://apjpf.org/-Sidney-Jones/5437/article.pdf>.

6 Gordon Corera, "Coronavirus: Police Warn of Lockdown Radicalisation Threat," BBC, 10 June 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-52997441>.

7 "Regulation of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 7 of 2021 on National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism That Leads to Terrorism 2020–2024," 7 January 2021, <https://peraturan.go.id/common/dokumen/terjemah/2021/Perpres%207%202021%20English.pdf>.

Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), the country's national counterterrorism agency, coordinates counterterrorism-related activities and oversaw the action plan's drafting and implementation. Rehabilitation and reintegration efforts concentrating on "preparedness, counter-radicalization, and deradicalization" are contained in Pillar 1 of the plan. Under this pillar, the plan has two "focuses" on deradicalization in prisons and increasing the deradicalization program outside of prisons, which outline the BNPT's overall rehabilitation and reintegration strategies, actions, scheduled outputs, and hopeful outcomes.⁸ Although the plan may refocus efforts, a multitude of rehabilitation-related activities have been initiated over the past 15 years by various governmental and law enforcement agencies, as well as civil society actors, including religious groups, victims, and former violent extremist prisoners; universities; and, to a lesser extent, the private sector.⁹ Stakeholders anticipate that the plan will help direct governmental activities from the national and local levels while providing sufficient collaboration and space for civil society engagement. Indeed, of the five countries highlighted in this report, Indonesia offers the most examples of how cooperation on rehabilitation and reintegration efforts between governments and civil society can work in practice.

MALAYSIA

The Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) Special Branch Counterterrorism Unit leads the country's counterterrorism framework, and the law enforcement-driven approach relies heavily on deradicalization efforts. Malaysia's approach to rehabilitation and reintegration, with the RMP at its head, enlists the Ministry of Home Affairs and Prisons Department to oversee a comprehensive program for deradicalization, the

Department of Islamic Development to focus on violent extremist prisoners counseling and "reeducation of Islam," and the Social Welfare Department and State Alms Department to provide financial support to the families of detainees.¹⁰ Malaysia has claimed a high success rate in rehabilitating violent extremist prisoners, in part by pointing to the small number of terrorist attacks given Malaysia's comparatively large population of foreign fighters.¹¹ The RMP specifically claims that the Malaysian rehabilitation and reintegration system has a 95 percent success rate in its rehabilitation and deradicalization programs in combating terrorism and violent extremism, with only 13 relapsed individuals out of 240 released detainees from 2001 to 2011.¹² It is difficult to independently verify this surprisingly high percentage. Malaysia's state- and security-centric approach provides little to no space for civil society engagement, and nongovernmental organizations have reported limited ability to communicate with and help support violent extremist prisoners when integrating back into society following release.

THE PHILIPPINES

The 2017 siege of the Philippine city Marawi by ISIL-affiliated groups underscored the long-standing threat of violent extremists with which the Philippines has contended since the 1970s.¹³ The violent extremism landscape in the Philippines has constantly shifted among terrorist splinter groups, and the threat has included Islamist and communist extremist movements. The Marawi siege and other struggles in Mindanao put much of the focus on the government's hard, security-centric counterterrorism approach, although more recent P/CVE efforts by the Philippines have helped to advance rehabilitation and reintegration. Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (Resilient Communities in Conflict-Affected Communities) is

8 Ibid., pp. 48–78.

9 Christina Nemr et al., "It Takes a Village: An Action Agenda on the Role of Civil Society in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Those Associated With and Affected by Violent Extremism," Global Center, August 2018, p. 10, http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC_It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf.

10 Mohd Mizan Bin Mohammad Aslam, "Deradicalization Programs for SOSMA, POTA, and POCA Detainees in Malaysia," Middle East Institute, 23 June 2020, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/deradicalization-programs-sosma-pota-and-poca-detainees-malaysia>.

11 Nemr, "It Takes a Village," p. 10.

12 Laili Ismail, "Police: Msia's Deradicalisation Programme Has 95 Per Cent Success Rate," *New Straits Times*, 26 January 2016, <https://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/01/124116/police-msias-deradicalisation-programme-has-95-cent-success-rate>.

13 Ashley L. Rhoades and Todd C. Helmus, "Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines," RAND Corp., 2020, pp. 2–10, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA200/RRA233-2/RAND_RRA233-2.pdf.

an initiative under the Office of Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process that has aimed to reduce the socioeconomic drivers of radicalization and build the capacity of national governmental agencies and local governmental units for conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas.¹⁴ As part of the powerful, broad, and controversial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020,¹⁵ the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) and the Bureau of Corrections were mandated to develop assessment tools to evaluate violent extremist prisoners as part of the prison system rehabilitation process.¹⁶ Created through the Human Security Act of 2007 and enhanced under the antiterrorism act, the Anti-Terrorism Council, the leading body on counterterrorism and CVE issues, established a P/CVE NAP. As a directive of that action plan, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) was tasked to oversee the plan's implementation and work with civil society to harmonize civil society and governmental efforts against violent extremism and aid rehabilitation and reintegration methods.¹⁷

SINGAPORE

No terrorism incidents have occurred recently in Singapore, but its government still identified counterterrorism as the nation's top security policy priority as of 2020, maintaining a comprehensive strategy to address it based on global and regional trends.¹⁸ Additionally, the long-standing and controversial

Internal Security Act gives the Ministry of Home Affairs extensive powers to detain suspected violent extremists without due process. In the past five years, Singapore's violent extremism threat has come from individuals self-radicalized by ISIL propaganda online. Arrests and the subsequent detention of suspected violent extremists has centered on local citizens and foreign domestic workers.¹⁹ Similar to the Malaysian methodology, the Singapore approach on rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist prisoners is rooted in correcting the misinterpretation of Islamic beliefs and countering extremist and terrorist ideologies.²⁰ The Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) is a government-supported but not government-funded organization comprised of Islamic scholar and teacher volunteers with a rehabilitation and reeducation mandate that includes counseling for violent extremist prisoners and outreach for community resilience-building efforts around extremism. In recent years, the RRG has had to include youth awareness-raising programs and counternarratives against online extremism outreach to combat lone wolf and self-radicalized extremists.²¹ Although the RRG handles detainee rehabilitation, the Inter-Agency Aftercare Group (ACG), a collection of Malay-Muslim community mosques and civil society organizations supported by the government and structured like the RRG, manages the reintegration process, specifically by helping the families of violent extremist prisoners. The ACG supports the families through counseling on

14 Philippine Office of Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, "Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (PAMANA)," 14 November 2016, <https://peace.gov.ph/2016/11/payapa-masaganang-pamayanan-pamana/>.

15 Human rights activists have raised concerns about the overly broad definition of terrorism in the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, stating that the act could be used to prosecute political opponents and reduce the space for freedom of expression. Julie McCarthy, "Why Rights Groups Worry About the Philippines' New Anti-Terrorism Law," NPR, 21 July 2020, <https://www.npr.org/2020/07/21/893019057/why-rights-groups-worry-about-the-philippines-new-anti-terrorism-law>. Activists also fear that the broad nature of the act will facilitate the continued practice of "red-tagging," or the public identification of individuals suspected of affiliation with the communist insurgency, often resulting in the torture of alleged suspects and extrajudicial killings. Human Rights Watch, "Philippines: End Deadly 'Red-Tagging' of Activists," 17 January 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/17/philippines-end-deadly-red-tagging-activists>.

16 An Act to Prevent, Prohibit and Penalize Terrorism, Thereby Repealing Republic Act No. 9372, Otherwise Known as the "Human Security Act of 2007," Rep. Act No. 11479, § 52 (3 July 2020), <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/06jun/20200703-RA-11479-RRD.pdf>.

17 Philippine Mission to the United Nations, Note No. 000350-2020, 29 May 2020, https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/75/int_terrorism/philippines_e.pdf (containing "Measures Undertaken by the Philippine Government to Eliminate International Terrorism").

18 See V. Arianti et al., "Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 12, no. 1 (January 2020): 34–38, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/CTTA-Annual-Threat-2020.pdf>; Susan Sim, "Not If, but When: Developing National Counter-Terrorism Policy in the Age of al-Qaeda and ISIS," in *Good Practices in Counter-Terrorism*, ed. Haldun Yalçınkaya (Ankara: Center for Defense - Defence Against Terrorism, 2021), pp. 54–62, https://www.academia.edu/49506369/Good_Practices_in_Counter_Terrorism.

19 Arianti et al., "Southeast Asia," pp. 5–39.

20 Religious Rehabilitation Group, "About RRG," n.d., <https://www.rrg.sg/about-rrg/> (accessed 4 June 2022).

21 Muh Nahdohdin et al., "Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 11, no. 1 (January 2019): 6–32, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26568577>.

community reintegration issues and financial assistance for employment and education expenses.²²

THAILAND

Unlike the other countries in this report, Thailand's violent extremist threat is attributed to ethnonationalist insurgents in the country's deep south provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla. At present, the main concern for international or regional terrorism is from Bangkok's role as a regional transportation hub; Thai southern extremists appear not to align with ISIL-related rhetoric and methods.²³ Thailand's military-dominant government, through the Office of the National Security Council, is in the process of drafting a NAP on P/CVE to support the already approved national counterterrorism strategy.²⁴ It remains to be seen if this initiative will provide a clear framework for the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremists, as well as the space for civil society

to engage in the opaque, abusive custodial system. Human rights watchers continue to document numerous instances of torture by the police and military against detained Malay Muslims in the southern provinces, though the government has not prosecuted any officials for the mistreatment.²⁵ Additionally, an existing rehabilitation and reintegration endeavor overseen by the Fourth Army Region titled "Bring People Home" has received mixed reviews. The project's goal is to offer southern insurgents the ability to surrender to authorities and return to normal civilian life. As of 2018, the program has not gained a great deal of traction, with only 288 former insurgents enrolled out of tens of thousands of violent extremists.²⁶ Although the program has appeared to help those enrolled, many are skeptical of a military-led rehabilitation and reintegration program and wonder if Bring People Home is more of a public relations campaign than an effective rehabilitation program.²⁷

22 Shashi Jayakumar, "Deradicalisation in Singapore: Past, Present and Future," International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2020, p. 11, <https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ICSR-Report-Deradicalisation-in-Singapore-Past-Present-and-Future.pdf>.

23 Nahdohdin et al., "Southeast Asia," p. 27.

24 Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand to the United Nations, no. 56101/264, 28 May 2020, https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/75/int_terrorism/thailand_e.pdf (containing "Thailand's Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism").

25 Human Rights Watch, "Thailand: Events of 2021," n.d., <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/thailand> (accessed 4 June 2022).

26 Nahdohdin et al., "Southeast Asia," pp. 22–27.

27 Mariyam Admad, "Thai Military Revamps Program to Entice Deep South Rebels to Surrender," BenarNews, 9 February 2018, <https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/bring-home-02092018160352.html>.

Box 1. Definitions

For the purposes of clarifying roles and responsibilities, “government” refers to multiagency partners at national, regional, and local levels who are contractually affiliated with and employed by the state and typically involved as coordinators of the rehabilitation and reintegration process. This includes prisons, probationary services, police, and other partner agencies, such as those providing social services.^a

Civil society is the range of nongovernmental and voluntary organizations and individuals that have a presence in public life at local, national, and international levels. This includes independent community groups, research institutions, charitable foundations, and faith-based associations. As an example, independent organizations that have an interest in prisons, are concerned with the well-being and rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners, campaign for wider criminal justice reform, or provide community-based services, resources, and support would be considered part of civil society.

Rehabilitation is a purposeful, planned intervention that aims to change the factors believed to be the cause of a person’s criminal behavior. During the rehabilitation process, stakeholders may undertake approaches focused on deradicalization, disengagement, or both. Deradicalization is the attitudinal process of disabusing a person of their extreme views, while disengagement is the behavioral process of steering a person away from their extreme

group’s activities, without necessarily changing their views.^b Typically following rehabilitation, reintegration is the safe transition to the community in which a person’s changed attitudes or behavior and a community’s acceptance and assistance lead to their productive functioning in society.^c Preparing for and implementing effective rehabilitation and reintegration programming is a key component of ensuring long-term peace, stability, and security.

Violent extremist prisoners include individuals prosecuted and incarcerated on terrorism-related offenses and those prosecuted and incarcerated for general offenses who become radicalized to violent extremism while in prison.^d In those circumstances where individuals are incarcerated but not yet formally prosecuted, sometimes referenced as pretrial, this report will refer to them as detainees.^e Cooperation on rehabilitation and reintegration can be challenging if violent extremist detainees remain in pretrial detention with limitations on who can access them and limited access to interventions that may be helpful.^f Yet, initiatives to advance rehabilitation efforts in prison must take care to differentiate between violent extremist prisoners and pretrial detainees, recognizing that the latter have not been formally prosecuted. Additionally, rehabilitation and reintegration programs should distinguish among the varying risks and needs of men, women, and juvenile offenders.^g

- a Sebastian Feve and Christopher Dean, “Cooperating With Civil Society to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Violent Extremist Prisoners,” *Global Center on Cooperative Security Policy Brief*, August 2020, p. 2, https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Global_Center_Cooperating_CS_O_RR.pdf.
- b See Ellie B. Hearne and Nur Laiq, “A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism,” International Peace Institute, June 2010, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/a_new_approach_epub.pdf; John Horgan, “Deradicalization Programs: Recommendations for Policy and Practice,” *RESOLVE Network Policy Note*, August 2021, https://www.resolve.net.org/system/files/2021-08/RSVE%20Policy%20Note_Horgan_August%202021.pdf.
- c Christina Nemr et al., “It Takes a Village: An Action Agenda on the Role of Civil Society in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Those Associated With and Affected by Violent Extremism,” Global Center on Cooperative Security, August 2018, p. 1, http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC-It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf.
- d See Christopher Dean, Monica Lloyd, and Sebastien Feve, “Guidance on Establishing Frameworks to Assess Violent Extremism in Prisons,” *Global Center on Cooperative Security Policy Brief*, June 2021, p. 2, <https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GCCS-PB-Guidance-Establishing-Frameworks-to-Assess-Violent-Extremism-in-Prisons-2021.pdf>. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime defines a violent extremist prisoner as a prisoner “who promotes, supports, facilitates or commits acts of violence to achieve ideological, religious, [or] political goals or social change. In some cases, a violent extremist prisoner may not be in prison for an offence (or alleged offence) related to violent extremism, but nonetheless has been assessed as being a violent extremist according to the definition set out above.” UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons,” *Criminal Justice Handbook Series*, October 2016, p. 143, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf.
- e Ibid., p. 67.
- f Christopher Dean and Eelco Kessels, “Compendium of Good Practices in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders,” Global Center, August 2018, p. 8, https://www.veocompendium.org/_downloads/GC_2018_Oct_Compendium.pdf.
- g Ibid.



SETTING THE STAGE FOR COOPERATION

International human rights law and the standards of the United Nations state that the rehabilitation of offenders and their successful reintegration into the community should be the objective of criminal justice systems.²⁸ Even more so, numerous multilateral forums have recognized the importance of including civil society organizations in the development and implementation of rehabilitation and reintegration programs.²⁹ Governmental or police-led initiatives with little civil society involvement can undermine the delicate rehabilitation and reintegration process, particularly when communities of focus have had overwhelmingly negative experiences with the authorities, leading to distrust and fear. Civil society organizations typically have unique access to and long-standing relationships with their communities that grant them the experience and influence to help shape the policies affecting them, as well as the ability to help shape the community's perception of those policies.³⁰

In addition to their potential role in helping shape custodial and detention policies, trainings, assessments, monitoring, and intervention, civil society organizations integrated in their community are also likely to be the first stakeholders who encounter individuals returning from conflict zones.³¹ Any such individuals who then avoid prosecution and incarceration will still need assistance rehabilitating from the conflict and violence they encountered, as well as assistance reintegrating back into potentially scornful, resentful communities. Civil society organizations are

well placed to provide such services to help ensure that grievances do not fester.³²

As noted, however, the landscape of civil society differs from country to country, and any discussion about the role of and opportunities for civil society cooperation should be tempered with the realities on the ground and the challenges that exist. First and foremost, cooperation between civil society and government is difficult if both parties are fundamentally opposed to or are distrustful of each other. For example, human rights-focused civil service organizations may not want to engage in any governmental efforts they perceive to be unjust or unfair while governments may not be willing to work with entities who will criticize their policies or implementation.³³ Relatedly, civil society involvement in rehabilitation and reintegration policies may result in threats to their work or personal security. Their independence and credibility may be questioned by prisoners, or they may be threatened by the community.³⁴ In some cases, they may come under governmental suspicion themselves, particularly if they engage in advocacy or activities that are not aligned with governmental narratives.³⁵

Of particular note for cooperation challenges is the sustainability of funding combined with the existence of competing priorities. Popular and effective rehabilitation and reintegration activities, particularly ones implemented in the community and reliant on donor funding, are often sustained only by discrete funding and struggle to find follow-on funding sources.

28 See UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Compendium of United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice*, 2006, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/compendium/compendium_2006.pdf.

29 See UN Security Council, S/RES/2396, 21 December 2017, para. 32. See also UNODC, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons," *Criminal Justice Handbook Series*, October 2016, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf. The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) also highlights the importance of community actors, including civil society organizations, in rehabilitation and reintegration. Magnus Ranstorp, "Developing a Local Prevent Framework and Guiding Principles," RAN Centre of Excellence, November 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/policy_paper_developing_local_prevent_framework_guiding_112016_en.pdf.

30 Nemr, "It Takes a Village," p. 3.

31 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Non-custodial Rehabilitation and Reintegration in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism*, January 2020, p. 69, <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/7/444838.pdf>.

32 UNODC, "Introductory Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of Offenders," *Criminal Justice Handbook Series*, December 2012, p. 8, https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/crimeprevention/Introductory_Handbook_on_the_Prevention_of_Recidivism_and_the_Social_Reintegration_of_Offenders.pdf.

33 See Sebastian Feve and Christopher Dean, "Cooperating With Civil Society to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Violent Extremist Prisoners," *Global Center on Cooperative Security Policy Brief*, August 2020, pp. 6–7, https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Global_Center_Cooperating_CSO_RR.pdf.

34 Ibid., p. 14.

35 Ibid., p. 16.

This is particularly acute as governmental and donor priorities evolve. Viable projects have come to an end in part because of these challenges. For example, the Indonesian Institute for International Peace Building (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian, or YPP) previously ran a program that offered loans of \$375–750, as well as business training, to wives of violent extremist prisoners to support them in setting up their own businesses.³⁶ Despite being deemed a beneficial and impactful program, it ended after a few years because of priority changes and funding constraints. Faced with limited funding, the YPP decided to focus on strengthening local government officials' capacity and knowledge to run reintegration programs because they believed that to be a more beneficial and sustainable program. Additionally, limited funding affects the ability to provide rehabilitation and reintegration to all prisoners, their families, and communities, necessary programming that should not solely be reserved for those associated with terrorism-related offenses.

Despite these and other challenges, governments and civil society organizations across Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand continue to find avenues of cooperation with varying degrees of success. Below are numerous case studies showing this cooperation and the challenges. Building on the 10 cooperation objectives (table 1), the case studies are grouped into four sections that offer an overarching concept integral to the rehabilitation and reintegration process.

The case studies featured are examples of how governments and civil society have approached rehabilitation and reintegration across the five countries of focus, but are not intended as an assessment of the success or propriety of the actions taken nor as an embrace of the approach. Rather, they are meant to highlight discrete elements that may be informative as stakeholders consider ways to improve cooperation between governments and civil society.

36 Nemr, "It Takes a Village," p. 15.

Table 1. Ten Objectives of Rehabilitation and Reintegration Cooperation Between Government and Civil Society

OBJECTIVE		DESCRIPTION
1	Informing Prison Policies	Inform prison policies to ensure they align with international standards and correspond to domestic realities.
2	Monitoring Prison Conditions	Improve the monitoring of prison conditions to ensure appropriate treatment of violent extremist prisoners.
3	Mobilizing Community Support	Strengthen public and political support for rehabilitation and reintegration processes for violent extremist prisoners.
4	Recruiting and Training Prison Staff	Facilitate the recruitment and training of diverse and skilled prison staff to manage violent extremist prisoners.
5	Informing Assessment Processes	Support the development of more valid and reliable assessment processes to assess risks and needs of violent extremist prisoners.
6	Implementing Custodial Interventions	Implement custodial interventions to support the rehabilitation of violent extremist prisoners during their incarceration.
7	Implementing Community Interventions	Implement community interventions that support the rehabilitation of violent extremist prisoners during their incarceration.
8	Facilitating Community Reintegration	Facilitate the transition and reintegration of former violent extremist prisoners into communities.
9	Supervising Community Reintegration	Monitor and supervise former violent extremist prisoners during the reintegration process.
10	Reducing Community Stigmatization	Reduce stigmatization experienced by former violent extremist prisoners during the reintegration process.

Source: Sebastien Feve and Chris Dean, "Cooperating With Civil Society to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Violent Extremist Prisoners," Global Center on Cooperative Security, August 2020, p. 4.

OVERARCHING CONCEPT 1: ALIGN THE STAKEHOLDERS AND BUILD BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF AND APPROACH TO REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION

Rehabilitation and reintegration are fraught topics whose strategy development and implementation must account for the perceptions and participation of numerous parties from conception. These parties include governmental agencies at the national and local levels, law enforcement, and the broader community affected by rehabilitation and reintegration policies. Although a difficult task, ensuring broad support and cooperation from these groups lays the

groundwork for one of the key priorities for sustainable rehabilitation and reintegration: addressing the stigmatization in and out of custodial settings that could hinder an individual's ability to disengage from violent extremism and prepare to reenter society.

Accounting for and addressing the potential unpopularity of or uncertainty around rehabilitation and rehabilitation programs³⁷ upfront help pave the way for national action plans rooted in feasibility, prison policies based on reality, and community reintegration plans designed with empathy. Yet, such plans and policies need not be developed independent of each other.³⁸ Cooperation between government and civil society organizations helps ensure the development of relevant, practical national and local policies and frameworks, particularly around prison policies, facilitating community perspectives and interests.³⁹

Case Study 1: Harmonizing Governmental Initiatives Under the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism at the Local and National Levels in the Philippines

The Philippine Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) supervises and oversees local governmental units in promoting peace and order and ensuring public safety. It also aims to ensure good governance and practice a whole-of-nation approach in which the government, civil society organizations, private sector, and communities work together.

The DILG is the lead implementer of the Philippine national action plan (NAP) for preventing and countering violent extremism. The plan is a comprehensive, harmonized strategy and was a product of a series of consultations among national governmental agencies, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) assisted in the plan's formulation.

The NAP was adopted on 27 May 2019 in Anti-Terrorism Council Resolution No. 38, with the DILG designated as lead implementer. In implementing the plan, particularly concerning rehabilitation and reintegration efforts, the DILG works with local government units and civil society organizations to align the mission and goals and develop a framework for community-based rehabilitation and reintegration. The framework development then leads to the generation of policy recommendations. Building on these recommendations, the DILG works with local government and community stakeholders to conduct focus group discussions and identify vetted, reputable civil society organizations who can assist in implementation.

In formulating these recommendations, the DILG has worked with international organizations

37 Feve and Dean, "Cooperating With Civil Society to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Violent Extremist Prisoners," pp. 7–8.

38 See Global Counterterrorism Forum, "Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalization to Violence: Addendum to the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders," n.d., p. 4, [https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/2016%20and%20before/Addendum%20to%20the%20Rome%20Memorandum%20on%20Legal%20Frameworks%20ENG%20\(1\).pdf?ver=2020-01-13-154324-110](https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/2016%20and%20before/Addendum%20to%20the%20Rome%20Memorandum%20on%20Legal%20Frameworks%20ENG%20(1).pdf?ver=2020-01-13-154324-110).

39 Nemr, "It Takes a Village," p. 13; Feve and Dean, "Cooperating With Civil Society to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Violent Extremist Prisoners," p. 5.

such as the UNDP and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund and held consultations with civil society and youth leaders in conflict-ridden regions such as Mindanao. Following DILG engagement, local governments are expected to tailor the policy recommendations and civil society engagement to their immediate context, producing their own policy, implementation, and

civil society partnership efforts. The NAP rollout from the national to the local level commenced in 2020 and involves around 41 national government agencies to coordinate the whole-of-nation plans and activities. In 2021–2022, the localization of the NAP, particularly in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, was intensified to ensure adaptability to the local context.

Case Study 2: Involving the Local Community in Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Indonesia

The Empatiku Foundation is an Indonesian-based civil society organization that aims to mainstream empathy in the security and education sectors as an effort to address violent behaviors such as violent extremism. They provide technical assistance to the Indonesian government regarding the implementation of rehabilitation practices for individuals who have been exposed to violent extremist ideology, such as deportees and returnees affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Drawing on its knowledge that the community plays a key and important role in preventing violent extremism, Empatiku implements its community-based early-warning systems (EWS) programs against violent extremism, which enhance the resilience of the local community and help it facilitate the reintegration of former terrorist inmates and former deportees and returnees. The EWS programs focus on (1) increasing community knowledge and awareness of the risks of violent extremism and terrorism, as well as increasing capacity for early warning; (2) improving community capacity to conduct case management for early-warning cases and social reintegration cases (e.g., case documentation, case verification, case conference, remedial case handling and treatment, and referral case handling); and (3) improving knowledge and capacity to execute community social activities to boost social cohesion. To accomplish this last task, EWS programs support health, youth, religious, and education groups, among others, by providing small seed funding to help

facilitate the sustainability of reintegration activities that engage returnees.

Given the important role of women, children, and youth in preventing violent extremism, the program incorporates the implementation of gender perspectives and child protection approaches. To further ensure longevity, Empatiku works closely with other civil society organizations and governments at the village, district, and provincial levels. They also engage in dialogue and discussion with the national government and conduct policy advocacy to ensure that the EWS programs exist under a legal umbrella. Empatiku places an emphasis on respecting community autonomy and avoiding any notions of community policing by applying several principles to its programming, including a focus on human rights and doing no harm, being sensitive to individual differences and needs, and maintaining confidentiality and fairness.

The work has not been without challenges. As with all advocacy efforts, Empatiku's work has been slowed by personnel changes at the city level, resulting in lost time as it works to educate new officials on its on-the-ground actions. Additionally, it has had to address discrimination and the stigma surrounding returnees, in part due to disinformation spread by village police officers. In one case, such disinformation led local leaders to place surveillance cameras on a family.

Despite these challenges, Empatiku has established EWS programs in five villages in two cities

(South Tangerang and Depok) in two provinces (West Java and Banten) since 2018, with support from a Netherlands-funded grant provided to C-SAVE, the umbrella civil society organization of which Empatiku is a member. Empatiku's efforts have engaged 7,000 people and led to the management of 23 early cases in South Tangerang and Depok. Empatiku's civil society partners have gone on to develop EWS programs in 12 villages in East Java, Central Java, and West Java provinces.

Its advocacy has further led to a draft mayoral regulation on the prevention of violent extremism for South Tangerang and a governor regulation for the implementation of the national action plan for preventing and countering violent extremism in Banten. To track the activity, Empatiku has developed a dedicated user database identifying relevant cases and how the community responds to the violent extremist challenge.

Case Study 3: Developing an Early-Warning and Early-Response System for Preventing Violent Extremism in Indonesia

In 2019 the Indonesian Institute for Society Empowerment (INSEP) launched a six-month initiative to strengthen collaborative networks among religious leaders, community leaders, government officials, and security forces at the local level for preventing violent extremism.^a To do this, they created an early-warning and early-response system for the prevention of violent extremism. The purpose of this INSEP initiative was highlighting the importance of the local layer of actors in reporting, preventing, and stopping violent extremism and helping detect violent extremist propaganda and rhetoric from the start in neighborhood communities.

In the development phase, INSEP held a number of consultations involving national and local resource persons and stakeholders to produce a handbook for the initiative. The handbook provided the guidelines, framework, and structure for the collaborative networks that make up the base of any early-warning reporting system and early-response mechanism. The collaborative network included regional government agencies, city administrators, religious leaders, community leaders, community and neighborhood units, village security officials, nongovernmental organizations, and community groups.

INSEP selected Bekasi City in West Java and Sidoarjo Regency in East Java to implement the initiative in a six-month pilot. INSEP held trainings with the relevant national, regional, local, and community actors in each of the cities to help them understand the violent extremism indicators, prevention of violent extremism in an early-warning context, and communication methods for early-warning information and collection.

Each pilot city saw some results from its efforts. In Sidoarjo Regency, early-warning detection alerted stakeholders to extremist groups that aligned themselves with the banned radical organization Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. In another instance, community members detected the spread of violent extremist Islamic Khilafah propaganda by a motorbike group and reported the episode to local police. In Bekasi City, local leaders reported suspicious activity from members of a group house; the members, suspected to be aligned to an extremist group, fled before police apprehended them.

The large number of stakeholders intentionally included in this initiative led to some challenges. The network lacked a centralized voice to keep the initiative unified and committed, a role INSEP hoped would be played by local agencies.

Additionally, with the information system being a voluntary-based reporting mechanism, the program could only be as effective as the information it collected, and overall commitment was not always apparent.

The INSEP early-warning and early-response system for the prevention of violent extremism only touched on the first component of a system to establish an early-warning mechanism. The hope is for the continual improvement and expansion of the program to form a strong link from early warning to early and effective response.

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- a Rudy Harisyah Alam, Sapto Priyanto, and Mulyana, "Early Warning and Early Response for Preventing Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Building Local-Level Collaborative Networks," n.d., pp. 5–11, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757619> (from the proceedings of the 2nd ICS international conference titled "Countering Radicalism & Terrorism in the Digital Era - Reshaping a Global Peace Community," 29–30 September 2020).

Case Study 4: Creating Top-Down Messaging to Tackle Ideological Misconceptions in Malaysia

Malaysia's deradicalization methods rely heavily on the "reeducation" of violent extremist prisoners, and the government-centric approach mostly excludes cooperation with civil society. In 2015 the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) Special Branch Counterterrorism Unit and the Department of Islamic Development, known by the acronym JAKIM, saw the need for public awareness campaigns to counter the narratives of religiously inspired violent extremist ideologies, specifically the perceived threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.^a The goal was to prevent Malaysian youth from radicalizing and being detained. The RMP and JAKIM therefore established the Jihad Concept Explanation Action Committee to tackle misconceptions about jihad within social settings, with the six-member committee consisting of five governmental agencies and one civil society organization, the Institute of Islamic Strategic Research Malaysia.^b The committee targeted youth

ideological misconceptions and collaborated with schools, universities, mosques, and suraus (community prayer areas) to spread counter messaging. Social media and other public awareness campaigns were created with the hope of identifying Muslim youth leaders to help publicize the true meaning of jihad through various antiterrorism activities. Some civil society groups, such as the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, recognized the importance of the campaign and came together to produce their own counterextremist messaging through public talks, posters, video clips, and other forms of media.^c Quantitative measures of impact of the awareness-raising campaign have been difficult to assess. Some critics of the committee's program have questioned the effectiveness of mostly government-led narratives, asserting that top-down messaging lacks the credibility to be impactful, while raising human rights concerns regarding its substance.^d

a "Malaysia Targets Spread of Terrorist Ideology in Main Battlefronts Including Schools, Internet," Asia News Network, 19 April 2015, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-targets-spread-of-terrorist-ideology-in-main-battlefronts-including-schools>.

b Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani, "Countering Violent Extremism in Malaysia: Past Experience and Future Prospects," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 9, no. 6 (June 2017): 7–8, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26351526>.

c Ibid.

d Nicholas Chan, "From Jemaah Islamiyah to Islamic State in Malaysia," in *Global Jihad in Southeast Asia: Examining the Expansion of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda*, ed. Mona Kanwal Sheikh (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2019), pp. 59–79, https://pure.dii.dk/ws/files/3071520/DIIS_Book_Global_jihad_in_Southeast_Asia_2019_final.pdf.

OVERARCHING CONCEPT 2: SUPPORT THE SHAPING OF PRISON-BASED TRAINING, ASSESSMENT, AND MONITORING

The experiences individuals face in custodial settings—prisons, detention centers, or otherwise—will set the stage for rehabilitation and eventual reintegration. It is imperative that day-to-day management of violent extremist prisoners and detainees be guided by transparent legal frameworks, policies, and procedures implemented justly in compliance with international law.⁴⁰ Furthermore, management of violent extremist prisoners and detainees must be shaped by mechanisms of internal and external oversight empowered to hold authorities accountable for the treatment of individuals in custody. Such measures not only facilitate effective rehabilitation, but they also create an environment where all stakeholders, including prison personnel, are empowered to conduct assessment and monitoring in a safe and secure manner.⁴¹

Training should focus on helping officials avoid bias in attitude and practice in order to avoid abusing an already existing power imbalance.⁴² Civil society organizations, particularly ones mirroring prisoner populations and representing diverse linguistic, ethnic, or cultural communities or ones providing human rights knowledge and resources, can assist in this training effort.⁴³ Civil society can similarly assist with developing and implementing assessment and monitoring plans. It can help ensure that risk and needs assessments are conceived in a contextually relevant manner, account for the varying needs of different populations, and are implemented in a valid and reliable way to evaluate progress and guide eventual reintegration plans.⁴⁴ Regular visits to and interactions with prisons and detention centers from civil society also create an environment for transparency regarding and the documentation of any potential human rights abuses, as well as demanding accountability for them.⁴⁵

Case Study 5: Providing a Full Spectrum View of Terrorism Offenses to Inform Sentencing and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism More Broadly in Indonesia

The Center for Detention Studies (CDS), a non-profit organization focused on penal reform in Indonesia, facilitates a number of initiatives to promote the rights of detainees and prisoners, from the broad collection of data on terrorism cases to trainings, assessments, and monitoring in prisons.

In 2021 the CDS launched a geospatial database of terrorism crimes, supported by Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice 2, which is a five-year project strengthening Indonesia's justice and security

sector.^a Data collection for the database has been ongoing since 2018 when it was initiated by a study on the sentencing pattern of terrorism offenses in Indonesia supported by a USAID Cegah project.^b The database includes information on the demographic background of convicted terrorists, the terrorist networks with which they were associated, and the sentencing provided for the crime. The primary data source is court decisions on terrorism cases, which are accessed in collaboration with the

40 Christopher Dean and Eelco Kessels, "Compendium of Good Practices in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders," Global Center, August 2018, p. 7, https://www.veocompendium.org/_downloads/GC_2018_Oct_Compendium.pdf.

41 Ibid., p. 2.

42 Feve and Dean, "Cooperating With Civil Society to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Violent Extremist Prisoners," p. 9.

43 International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, "Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization," n.d., <https://www.theijl.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Prison-Recommendations-FINAL-1.pdf>; Nemr, "It Takes a Village," p. 29.

44 Feve and Dean, "Cooperating With Civil Society to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Violent Extremist Prisoners," p. 11.

45 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, "Community Participation in Prisons: A Civil Society Perspective," 2008, p. 11, http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/prisons/community_participation_in_prisons.pdf; International Centre for Prison Studies, "Guidance Note 12: Encouraging the Involvement of Civil Society," 2004, p. 2, https://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/gn12_5.pdf.

Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia and the Directorate General of Correction.

In the time that the database has been operational, it has been used by researchers and university students to access primary data and by parole officers to undertake community research. In the near future, however, given that the CDS has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), the country's national counterterrorism agency, regarding data exchanges, the database will become one of the main data sources for BNPT terrorism mapping to understand where criminal activity may be taking place and where to allocate resources. Additionally, it will be used by prosecutors as a source of information to understand the dynamics of terrorist groups and the relationship between convicted terrorists, while judges will use it to help determine sentences for similar offenses.

To ensure data privacy, the CDS provides differing levels of access depending on the user category. For example, law enforcement users can access data ranging from personal information to court decisions, while student users cannot access personal information such as home addresses or other identifying information. To ensure proper use of the system and control data sharing, the CDS requires non-law enforcement officials interested in accessing the database to submit an access request accompanied by a cover letter from their affiliated institution.

Additionally, for all data relating to children involved in terrorism, the database will anonymize identity in accordance with Indonesia Juvenile Criminal Justice System Law (Law No. 11 of 2012), which mandates that every child under the age of 18 who is in conflict with the law have their identity protected.

a For more information, see Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice 2, "About Us," n.d., <https://aipj.or.id/> (accessed 3 July 2022).

b Center for Detention Studies (CDS), "Sentencing Pattern of Terrorism Offences in Indonesia," 2019, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/11ykITuTCMngOGNJacOAoB8dxxG-nc9iH/view>; CDS representative, communication with authors, 9 March 2022.

Case Study 6: Improving Assessment and Monitoring of Violent Extremist Prisoners in Custodial Settings in Indonesia

The Center for Detention Studies (CDS), a non-profit organization focused on penal reform in Indonesia, conducts trainings for correctional officers related to the assessment and rehabilitation of violent extremist prisoners. Participants include prison and parole officers, as well as cadets from the Polytechnic of Correctional Science. In implementing these trainings, the CDS cooperates with the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC), the Human Resource Development Agency of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the country's national counterterrorism agency, and academics.

The CDS has also collaborated with the DGC on developing three assessment instruments for terrorist prisoners, building on guidance and experience from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA)

approach.^a The first assessment tool developed was the Prisoners Placement Screening Instrument that is used to assess prisoner risk for the purpose of placement or transfer. The second is the Criminogenic Instrument for High-Risk Terrorist Prisoners, which is used to determine recommendations for the appropriate treatment program for violent extremist prisoners in super-maximum security prisons. The third is the Rehabilitation Assessment System for Prisoners, which is used to assess the development of all prisoner behavior on a daily basis and is not exclusive to violent extremist prisoners.

Additionally, the CDS and DGC conduct prison monitoring up to two times a year to evaluate whether the approved assessment instruments have been used by the officers, whether the officers

understand how to use the instruments, and how to address any obstacles that arise. As the sustainability of effort and tools has been a challenge in

the past, the CDS aims to ensure that the instruments it develops integrate into standard practice and survive personnel and strategy changes.

- a UN Office on Drugs and Crime, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons," *Criminal Justice Handbook Series*, October 2016, p. 142, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf. For more information on the VERA risk assessment tool, see Custodial Institutions Agency, Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Security, "Violent Extremism Risk Assessment 2 Revised," n.d., <https://www.vera-2r.nl/> (accessed 9 June 2022).

Case Study 7: Shaping the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners From Incarceration to Reintegration in Indonesia

Since 2015, the Global Center on Cooperative Security has been working with the Indonesian Directorate General of Corrections (DGC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the national counter-terrorism agency, as well as a group of local and international experts, to enhance Indonesia's approach to the management of violent extremist prisoners throughout the incarceration, rehabilitation, and reintegration process. The Global Center's Countering Violent Extremism in Prison program in Indonesia has focused on the provision of specialized trainings for specific categories of prison staff, which aim to provide tailored guidance on how to manage terrorism-related offenders along the criminal justice chain while leveraging a "whole of society" approach.

The Global Center has delivered trainings to more than 250 prison officers and prison staff across Indonesia. The various trainings adopt interactive approaches, building on the professional experience of Indonesian prison officers responsible for the management of violent extremist prisoners and reinforcing good practices according to a set of common normative standards. The trainings are based on available international guidance, expertise, and good practices from implementation, specifically tailored to the context and realities of the Indonesian prison system. The trainings also incorporate content from the Indonesian Ministry of Law and Human Rights and the DGC, while

reinforcing at its core the UN human rights and international normative standards in the treatment of prisoners, such as the Nelson Mandela Rules. Tailored training programs target prison staff working with violent extremist prisoners in maximum- and nonmaximum-security prisons, female prison staff working with violent extremist prisoners, and probation and parole officers tasked with providing community-based treatment to terrorism-related offenders and defendants.

In conjunction, the Global Center's on-going program works closely with local civil society organizations in Indonesia that specialize in providing social support and reintegration assistance to violent extremist prisoners following their release and that engage in community-led prevention and countering of violent extremism. The Global Center works to establish streams of communication and collaboration with its governmental partners and Indonesian civil society through a series of in-country multi-stakeholder workshops and consultations on delivering rehabilitation and reintegration services for violent extremist prisoners. As successful reintegration of terrorism-related offenders is best achieved by leveraging a community-led approach, maintaining close working relationships with civil society organizations and community leaders is a critical component of Global Center programming.^a

- a Sebastian Feve and Christopher Dean, "Cooperating With Civil Society to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Violent Extremist Prisoners," *Global Center on Cooperative Security Policy Brief*, August 2020, https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Global_Center_Cooperating_CS_O_RR.pdf.

Case Study 8: Developing Modules for the Management of Niche Categories of Prisoners in Indonesia

Starting in 2018, the Indonesian Institute for International Peace Building (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian, or YPP), a nongovernmental organization based in Jakarta, has supported the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) in developing strategies and policies regarding rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist prisoners.

The YPP specifically supports the DGC in developing standard operating procedures and modules for prison officers working on rehabilitation treatment and management at women's and juvenile prisons. This activity started in 2021 and is in the finalization process after having faced some delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Once the modules are completed, implementation will start in the second half of 2022.

Case Study 9: Tailoring Assessments of and Corresponding Interventions for Detainees in the Philippines

In partnership with the Coalition for Security Towards Peace (CSTP), the Philippine Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) in July 2020 lobbied for provisions regarding the management of detainees associated with terrorism-related cases in jails and prisons in the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020. The provisions mandated that the BJMP and Bureau of Corrections establish a system of classification for detainees being held on suspicion of terrorism. Given that the majority of terrorism detainees remain in the trial phase with no sentencing for months, there was previously no way to facilitate their participation in assessments, classification, and interventions that would address their circumstances. To ensure that detainee rights are respected during the assessment, classification, and intervention process, the BJMP crafted policies and standard operating procedures adhering to the recognition that the prisoners are pre-trial detainees and not formally prosecuted.

In line with the newly enacted provisions, the BJMP and CSTP began developing assessment tools and protocols to identify the radicalization and vulnerability and susceptibility to violent extremism of detainees in 2020. The six assessment

tools include indicators of underlying drivers and reasons for being engaged in violent extremist activities, of criminogenic needs, and of other security-related risks that were tailored specifically to fit the cultural and social context in the Philippines.

The assessment tools and their protocols were finished in mid-2021 and subsequently released for use in a selected facility that houses detainees incarcerated for terrorism-related cases, although implementation has not been without challenges. In addition to delays in training caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, providing the appropriate technical training for prison staff who do not necessarily have psychology or social work backgrounds has been time intensive. The BJMP is increasingly investing in continued training to ensure that any staff who ultimately become case managers have the requisite knowledge and skills to deliver appropriate responses aligned with the results of the risk assessments. Despite these challenges, 115 detainees have undergone the assessment process, which in turn has informed their classification and management.

Case Study 10: Improving Information Sharing and Intake Assessments to Shape Disengagement in Indonesia

Portal Indonesian NGO (PINGO), an Indonesian civil society organization promoting good governance and best practice in the Indonesian nonprofit sector, is assisting the Indonesian government with developing effective rehabilitation practices. From 2019 to 2021, PINGO conducted research on the elements of promising practices in prison-based disengagement approaches for violent extremist prisoners in Indonesia alongside the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Indonesian Directorate General of Corrections (DGC). During this time, PINGO also acted as a team leader helping to develop the Indonesia national action plan on countering violent extremism, which includes efforts to address deradicalization in prisons.

The challenge to date revolves around weak data information and limited sharing among government officials and with civil society organizations, which ultimately impact the disengagement process. For example, PINGO found that data on the risk and needs of violent extremist prisoners provided to correctional facilities when the prisoners

were admitted were incomplete. The initial forms provided focused on items assessing historical or static factors and did not focus on dynamic risk factors that could be used to assess disengagement from violence.

To address this challenge, PINGO recommended improvement in several areas. First, it recommended development of an additional assessment tool for use by corrections officers who work with violent extremist prisoners that is based on research evidence and international best practices on the assessment of violent extremists. Such a tool would focus on risk and need factors in a broader way than the factors measured in the terrorism profiling form, which will enable the corrections officers to identify individualized interventions and approaches that can promote disengagement from violence and measure changes in the prisoner's risk and needs over time. It also recommended training and providing consistent guidelines regarding the use of the existing terrorist profiling form being used by the DGC.

OVERARCHING CONCEPT 3: FACILITATE INTERVENTIONS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE PRISON TO SUPPORT REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION

Interventions and programs that facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration occur in and outside of custodial settings, involving not only the violent extremist prisoner but their family and broader community as well. Inside prisons and detention centers, interventions could include education programs, psychosocial

support, or religious counseling,⁴⁶ among other activities, all of which benefit from the input of or direct implementation by civil society actors. Violent extremist prisoners and detainees may be more receptive to engagement with nongovernmental organizations, particularly if they harbor mistrust of the authorities.⁴⁷

External or community intervention programs can be implemented where internal access to violent extremist prisoners and detainees is not possible, but they should also be considered an essential element of rehabilitation and reintegration in and of themselves. The family and loved ones of violent extremist prisoners and detainees can sometimes be the primary

46 UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and UN Counter-Terrorism Centre, "Additional Guidance on Aftercare and Reintegration Programmes for Violent Extremist Offenders," n.d., pp. 1–7, <https://toolkit.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/En/Additional-Guidance-on-Aftercare-and-Reintegration-Programmes-for-VEO.pdf>.

47 Hedayah and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, "Building on the GCTF's Rome Memorandum: Additional Guidance on the Role of Psychologists/Psychology in Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs," n.d., p. 7, <http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Hedayah-ICCT%20Psychology%20Good%20Practices.pdf> (summary of May 2013 workshop).

influences enabling or hindering rehabilitation and reintegration and should be engaged accordingly.⁴⁸ Engagement can take many forms but could include psychosocial support for the family members struggling to see their loved one incarcerated or could focus on socioeconomic training or support to bolster individuals struggling in the absence of a breadwinner.⁴⁹ At the same time, engagement should extend to the

broader community that will be receiving the released violent extremist prisoners to assist with socializing the benefits of reintegration and addressing their concerns.⁵⁰ The earlier community interventions occur, the better empowered and equipped individuals will be to engage with violent extremist prisoners following their release.⁵¹

Case Study 11: Breaking Down Ideological Misconceptions With Muslim Preachers in Indonesia

A representative from the Advisory Board of the Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (Center for the Study of Islam and Society) (PPIM) at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) collaborated with the Indonesian antiterrorism police unit Densus 88 to develop a program that brought Muslim preachers to prisons. The three-year program started in late 2019 and revolved around preachers delivering sermons for an hour and then answering questions from prisoners incarcerated for violent extremist offenses.

The intent was to challenge violent extremist ideology, but feedback from the preachers and prisoners revealed that the broad nature of the program did not have the intended effect. The

preachers were limited to discussions through camera and loudspeaker and were unable to interact with the prisoners in person. Prisoners could only ask questions by submitting them on paper to a guard who then delivered them to the preacher. The sermon was broadcast to all prisoners without discerning which ones may be more receptive to such a dialogue, leading to complaints that the sessions were boring as the engaged prisoners could not challenge or converse back and forth with the preacher. Based on the feedback, PPIM UIN recommended to Densus 88 in 2020 that the program be tailored to smaller groups of prisoners who were motivated to engage and interact with the religious scholars.

Case Study 12: Engaging Former Violent Extremist Prisoners to Raise Awareness of the Terrorism Threat in Indonesia

The Indonesian Institute for Society Empowerment (INSEP), a research and program organization focused on terrorism prevention and the deradicalization of former prisoners convicted of terrorism offenses, facilitates the involvement of prominent former violent extremist prisoners in counterradicalization programs.

Based on research and engagements with current and former prisoners across Indonesia, the Philippines, and Egypt, INSEP established a strategy of inclusion of former violent extremist prisoners in violent extremism prevention and deradicalization programs. Since 2016, INSEP has been inviting former prisoners to serve as

48 UNODC, “Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons,” p. 38.

49 Feve and Dean, “Cooperating With Civil Society to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Violent Extremist Prisoners,” p. 15.

50 Nemr, “It Takes a Village,” p. 18.

51 Feve and Dean, “Cooperating With Civil Society to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Violent Extremist Prisoners,” p. 14.

short-term consultants to share their experiences of involvement in violent extremism in seminars and discussions attended by religious, community, and neighborhood leaders. To be eligible for the program, the former prisoners must have held an important role or position in their previous networks or groups, have a mastery of religious knowledge, and be recognized as prominent individuals by other violent extremist prisoners.

The inclusion of these former prisoners in INSEP programs serves two purposes. First, the former prisoners aim to persuade Indonesians who are still skeptical that terrorism is a real threat. Some Indonesians continue to believe that terrorism is the result of the Indonesian government or a foreign actor scheme. One strategy to address their skepticism is to provide the opportunity for the former violent extremist prisoners to testify about their involvement in terrorism directly to those who express doubt. Second, INSEP aims to create publications based on these former prisoners' experiences with terrorism. The publications are delivered to religious teachers to serve as an instructional resource. INSEP has produced two such publications: a compilation of materials in 2017 for delivering religious sermons and guidelines in 2019 for the early warning and early response for the prevention of violent extremism.

Program evaluations have shown that attendees were surprised and pleased that they could hear the stories of former violent extremist prisoners directly, starting from the beginning of their involvement in terrorist activities until their exit. Program attendees noted that the accounts of these prisoners impacted their previous beliefs, decreasing their skepticism about the existence of terrorist organizations. They indicated their intent to share the information they learned during the workshop with their local communities.

The inclusion of former violent extremist prisoners in the programs, especially those who were influential or leaders inside terrorist groups, has also had a positive effect on encouraging changes in extreme thinking. Based on interviews, INSEP found that encounters with prominent former prisoners contributed to the tempering of current violent extremist prisoners' views. Further research is needed to determine the extent to which the leaders of former violent extremist prisoners could bring about positive changes in extremist thinking of other prisoners.

As with many programs focused on engaging former violent extremist prisoners, establishing trust while avoiding participants becoming dependent on INSEP programs was one of the most difficult parts of engagement. INSEP overcame this obstacle by stating clearly from the beginning what they hoped to accomplish with the program and the limited resources they had. Furthermore, they did not make any promises or expectations they would not be able to honor.

Another challenge concerns identifying the appropriate individuals best suited for the program and ensuring their protection from reliving trauma or being exposed to radicalization. To identify appropriate former prisoners for participation, INSEP conducts a background check; consults with several stakeholders, including police officers, who have knowledge of the individuals; and carries out an initial assessment of their eligibility and suitability for the program.

Although the engagement program ended in 2019, INSEP continues to maintain lines of communication and engagement with the former violent extremist prisoners. This continued engagement is partly meant to serve as a deterrent to them returning to violent extremism and sometimes includes providing the prisoners with in-kind assistance or resources.

Case Study 13: Conducting Monitoring of and Training on Human Rights in Southern Thailand

Cross Cultural Foundation (CrCF), a human rights civil society organization based in Bangkok, works on access to justice for families of detained and convicted terrorism suspects, intervening at every stage of the detention process. To help empower individuals prior to or after their detention, the CrCF provides human rights education and paralegal training to former detainees; family members of detainees (typically the sisters, wives, or daughters); and students in the southernmost provinces in Thailand. The foundation provides these services in partnership with three other civil society partners: (1) Duayjai, which promotes access to justice for detainee families, documents extrajudicial killings, and combats violence against women and children in the southernmost provinces of Thailand; (2) The Network of Affected People from Emergency Law, comprising former detainees from the counter-insurgency in the south that documents torture allegations and detentions and provides legal assistance; and (3) Patani Human Rights Network, a women and youth network based in Yala Province working to advance human rights.

In collaboration with its partners, the CrCF provides trainings on average once a month to small groups of two to three families, with typically no more than 20 individuals at a time. The exact topics for the trainings are selected in coordination with those being trained based on their needs, but typically relate to court, bail, and visitation procedures, including how to deal with mental and social issues the detainees may be facing.

For individuals in detention, the CrCF and its partners conduct visits to monitor and maintain documentation of torture and mistreatment. Based on its monitoring of detainees, the CrCF submits

an annual report to the UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture.

When detainees are released, typically due to a lack of evidence of wrongdoing, the CrCF and its partners work with them and their families to ensure that they, now on the blacklist, are not rearrested. Martial law and the emergency decree in southern Thailand mean that all released and blacklisted individuals are subject to strong military surveillance in the form of checkpoints and digital monitoring. The CrCF fosters trust between each detainee and their family to share information and help each other stay vigilant to avoid any activities that may be misconstrued as participation in extremist activities.

After detention or incarceration, the CrCF and its partners provide social and psychological support or help transfer individuals to clinics and rehabilitation centers, state or private. As an example of the impact their work can have, one individual they assisted later graduated from a local university and now works as paralegal with a local nongovernmental organization helping other detainees.

Among the challenges for the CrCF's work is dealing with officers in the detention system who provoke violence against the detainees with impunity.^a The dominant Buddhist Thai culture, combined with propaganda against Muslims and the prioritization of Islam as a national security threat since 11 September 2001 has led to some officers displaying extreme brutality against Muslim detainees. The International Committee of the Red Cross has conducted trainings for the Thai military since 2008,^b but organizations such as the CrCF have seen little impact as the violence and brutality continue with few consequences for offending officers.

a For further information and documentation on torture and mistreatment of detainees, see Duayjai, HAP, and CrCF Torture Situation in Pattani, "Torture and Ill Treatment in the Deep South Documented in 2014–2015," January 2016, <https://voicefromthais.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/torture-report-english-as-of-10-feb-2016-released-version.pdf>; Prachatai English, "2 Months On, Beatings of Protesters in Custody Yet to Be Investigated," 14 January 2022, <https://prachatai.com/english/node/9654>.

b International Committee of the Red Cross, "Thailand: The Right Balance Between Security Necessities and Humanitarian Concerns," 10 January 2018, <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/thailand-right-balance-between-security-necessities-and-humanitarian-concerns>.

Case Study 14: Providing Tailored Assessments of and Interventions for Youth Violent Extremist Prisoners to Try and Prevent Recidivism in Indonesia

SeRVE Indonesia is a grassroots civil society organization that works to counter radicalization and violent extremism and help people through community-based initiatives. As part of its work, SeRVE Indonesia provides consultations, counseling, and radicalization monitoring of violent extremist prisoners for some parole departments under the Directorate General of Corrections. Given SeRVE Indonesia's work on deradicalization and countering violent extremism (CVE) issues and community networks, SeRVE Indonesia was asked to provide its services to a number of juvenile violent extremist prisoners.

Prisoner 1. A 17-year-old was sentenced to five years and eight months for a failed attempt to detonate a suicide bomb in a church in East Sumatera.^a Although considered a lone-wolf attack, the prisoner was self-radicalized through online propaganda material and videos that spread the message of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Prisoner 2. A 17-year-old was sentenced for providing support to terrorist group Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) in the bombing of a church in East Kalimantan in 2016. The prisoner had family ties to the JAD network at the time.

Prisoner 3. A 14-year-old was detained while awaiting trial for providing support to JAD in the bombing of a church in East Kalimantan. They were asked to buy bomb materials by a family member, who is highly ranked in JAD in East Kalimantan.

As is the case with all relationship building, developing communication and gaining trust were key to SeRVE Indonesia's work with each prisoner. It visited the prison where the three were initially housed to conduct violent extremist assessments tailored to the circumstances surrounding each prisoner, attempting to identify the drivers of violent extremism and providing counseling based on the assessment outcomes. Because Prisoner 1 was a case of self-radicalization, as opposed to

the family-based recruitment and radicalization of prisoners 2 and 3, SeRVE Indonesia undertook a different approach to its assessment and engagement.

For Prisoner 1, SeRVE Indonesia helped to provide educational support during the rehabilitation and reintegration process, in line with what other students their age would be receiving. Following their release and reintegration into society, SeRVE Indonesia worked with governmental authorities to help facilitate them receiving a scholarship to attend university, continue their education, and build a career.

Prisoner 2 denounced their former terrorist organization during the rehabilitation process. Beyond providing support to the prisoner, SeRVE Indonesia reached out to the family of Prisoner 2 to help them understand the rehabilitation and reintegration process, get their assessment on Prisoner 2's deradicalization progress, and help them understand the economic drivers of extremism. SeRVE Indonesia assisted with job and vocational searches for Prisoner 2, but following their release, it was discovered that the prisoner had maintained ties with their former extremist network. SeRVE Indonesia is no longer in contact with Prisoner 2 and is concerned about possible recidivism.

SeRVE Indonesia started the rehabilitation process involving Prisoner 3 while they were awaiting trial. When Prisoner 3 was sentenced, they were moved to a different penitentiary on an island out of the geographical range of SeRVE Indonesia staff. SeRVE Indonesia no longer has contact with Prisoner 3, whose direct family links to JAD made the prospect of successful rehabilitation and reintegration difficult.

SeRVE Indonesia does not formally collaborate with governmental agencies in Indonesia, but it has established informal relationships with local parole offices that facilitate SeRVE Indonesia's role in the rehabilitation and reintegration process.

For example, the parole office in Kalimantan requested that SeRVE Indonesia provide assistance to prisoners 2 and 3 and helped make introductions to the parents of both prisoners.

The case of Prisoner 1 shows the possibility of successful rehabilitation and reintegration, but SeRVE Indonesia experiences three key challenges to its continued work with prisoners. First, the sincerity of the violent extremist prisoners during the rehabilitation process creates trust issues for counselors. SeRVE Indonesia staff question if some of the prisoners and detainees with whom they work will truly denounce violent extremism following their release and fear that they will return to extremist networks. To help address this concern, SeRVE Indonesia maintains communications with the country's national counterterrorism agency to ensure that

individuals continue receiving the assistance they need postrelease, where feasible. Second, the lack of funding to continue work in prisons and communities on CVE issues is a large burden. SeRVE Indonesia staff mostly volunteer their time and money to help the prisoners, and more financial support, particularly from the government, would help improve its deradicalization operations. Third, Indonesia is large and expansive, so geographical challenges occur with the movement of prisoners throughout the country. The relocation of individuals before, during, and after trial makes it difficult for SeRVE Indonesia, primarily based in Jakarta, to perform in-person visits and maintain necessary communication. As prisoners are released, however, SeRVE Indonesia uses messaging apps to provide support during reintegration.

a Rishi Iyengar, "A Suicide Bomber Tried to Attack a Church in Indonesia, but His Vest Failed to Detonate," *Time*, 29 August 2016, <https://time.com/4470120/indonesia-medan-suicide-bombing-isis-islamist/>.

Case Study 15: Collaborating on the Cycle of Rehabilitation and Reintegration Stages From Start to Finish in Indonesia

The Partnership for Advancing Democracy and Integrity (PADI) is an Indonesian civil society organization that works at all stages of the imprisonment, rehabilitation, and reintegration process for violent extremist prisoners, from prior to imprisonment to their release and return to the community.

Before the individual is sent to prison, PADI attempts to coordinate with the team of lawyers or the police to obtain information on the crimes committed, the convict's mental condition, and any mitigating circumstances surrounding their criminal activities. In doing so, PADI aims to set the stage for rehabilitation by understanding the unique factors to address while making clear that it will be monitoring the prisoner's treatment in prison and ensuring that the prisoner's legal rights are upheld. Additionally, as lawyers for violent extremist prisoners are not typically hired by the offender's family and therefore receive little

compensation for their work, PADI's engagement with them includes providing transportation and facilitating logistics so they can meet with their client and the client's family.

During the violent extremist prisoner's time in prison, PADI attempts to monitor their ideological and behavioral change to the extent possible through their lawyer and family or even through the relevant prison guards or police officers, using a questionnaire tailored to each prisoner to determine if there is discernible change.

Some of the biggest challenges PADI encounters concern the stigma of terrorism offenses, which manifests in a few ways. During a violent extremist prisoner's incarceration, their family is often initially reluctant to meet with organizations such as PADI as they are facing exclusion from their community and suspicion from law enforcement and therefore do not trust new faces. Additionally,

once the violent extremist prisoner is released back into the community, navigating community suspicion around whether they are truly reformed is a difficult task, which translates into difficulty in helping them find a job and livelihood.

Once violent extremist prisoners are released from prison, PADI attempts to engage with the

individuals they can access to provide economic empowerment. PADI helps them with business ideas, introduces them to local business networks, and provides information on small- and medium-sized business capital assistance programs for which they may be eligible.

Case Study 16: Easing Difficulties Faced by the Families of Incarcerated Individuals in the Philippines

The Metro Manila District Jail Annex 2, in partnership with the civil society organization Restorative Justice - Caritas Manila, initiated a project in December 2021 intended to support the families of prisoners, including violent extremist prisoners. The project, called Tulong Kapamilya, is based on the premise of restorative justice principles and aims to extend support and assistance to families of prisoners with the end goal of encouraging participation that improves their situation as their loved one is incarcerated. Activities include engaging the

children of inmates by facilitating reading activities, providing gifts, assisting with groceries, and providing health education. One of the continued challenges is gaining trust from the intended families, but officials consistently engage the beneficiaries to overcome this issue. Tulong Kapamilya is one of several activities on which the Metro Manila District Jail Annex 2 and Restorative Justice - Caritas Manila have partnered, based on a memorandum of agreement they signed in late 2021.

Case Study 17: Addressing Religious Misconceptions That Lead to Violent Extremism in Singapore

The rise in the early 2000s of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI) caused a great deal of concern for the Singaporean government. The arrest of members of a Singapore-based JI cell in December 2001 led to the development of a strategy to manage violent extremist detainees in the post-9/11 era. To quell any fears of overarching authoritarianism from the Malay-Muslim community, the Singaporean government invited two prominent Islamic scholars (*ustads*) to interview the detainees, who determined that the detainees had a misguided interpretation of Islam. The early experiences of these *ustads* laid the groundwork for addressing these misconceptions through the creation of the Religious Rehabilitation Group

(RRG), a collection of volunteer *ustads*, counselors, psychologists, and other support staff that focus solely on the rehabilitation aspects of violent extremist prisoners. From an 11-person organization at its inception in 2003, the RRG has grown to a 46-member group.^a The RRG is strongly supported by the government of Singapore, but it is not federally funded. In essence, the RRG is a civil organization that works with governmental agencies, such as the Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, to assess, counsel, deradicalize, and eventually release violent extremist prisoners back into society. Yet as the threat of violent extremism has evolved in Southeast Asia and globally, so has the mandate of the RRG.

In 2017, authorities detained Singapore's first female violent extremist prisoner to be referred to the RRG. Syaikhah Izzah Zahrah al Ansari was attempting to travel to Syria to marry a fighter from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) after posting years of pro-ISIL propaganda through social media.^b Along with her young child, she hoped to provide support to ISIL and collect the "heavenly rewards" of a martyr's widow.^c Following her detention, the RRG started its rehabilitation process with Izzah to counter the narrative of ISIL and help her understand a peaceful version of Islam. After two years of RRG counseling and rehabilitation, Izzah was released in 2019 for showing strong progress and evaluated as no longer being a security threat.

The role of the RRG has come with challenges directly tied to the evolving threats of extremism and the need for the RRG to keep pace with the trends. The recent, sharp rise in self-radicalization from online propaganda, especially from youth, has caused a shift in the RRG philosophy to counter this new messaging. To tackle this "lone wolf" challenge, the group has (1) developed counternarrative content and broadened its outreach on social media platforms, such as Facebook and YouTube; (2) invested more time in community engagements by publicizing educational reports and holding public and religious talks; and (3) created a roster of younger counselors who understand more of the obstacles and issues that face today's youth.^d

- a Shashi Jayakumar, "Deradicalisation in Singapore: Past, Present and Future," International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2020, p. 12, <https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ICSR-Report-Deradicalisation-in-Singapore-Past-Present-and-Future.pdf>.
- b "First Woman Detained for Radicalism in Singapore Released With Restrictions," CNA, 25 June 2019, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/first-woman-detained-radicalism-singapore-released-restrictions-1321196>.
- c Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs, "Detention of a Radicalised Singaporean Under the Internal Security Act," 12 June 2017, <https://www.mha.gov.sg/mediaroom/press-releases/detention-of-a-radicalised-singaporean-under-the-internal-security-act/>.
- d Jayakumar, "Deradicalisation in Singapore," pp. 21–22.

OVERARCHING CONCEPT 4: PREPARE FOR SUSTAINABLE REINTEGRATION THROUGH COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND SUPPORT

Following an individual's release back into the community, the process of reintegration becomes a dynamic, nonlinear process that requires vigilance, empathy, and hands-on support, all things that civil society actors are well placed to offer. Although releasees or returnees will likely have strict monitoring conditions placed on their day-to-day lives, civil society may be able to assist to ensure such conditions are compliant with human rights considerations or to relay to security officials how the conditions impact their ability to reintegrate

meaningfully.⁵² Equally important, civil society can assist with making introductions to the local business community or facilitating socioeconomic opportunities to help ensure that releasees and returnees maintain an income, create structure and stability, and develop new social networks.⁵³

Furthermore, although offline reintegration into the community is the priority for returning violent extremist prisoners, the nature of the communities they may find online following their return are equally important. Returnees experiencing isolation and ostracization following their return may find comfort and solace in online communities.⁵⁴ Even if such online communities do not present an immediate violent extremism risk, they may be prone to sharing disinformation or information on charged

52 Jayakumar, "Deradicalisation in Singapore," p. 16.

53 UNODC, "Introductory Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of Offenders," pp. 69–71.

54 The Asia Foundation, "Violent Conflict, Tech Companies, and Social Media in Southeast Asia: Key Dynamics and Responses," 2020, <https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Violent-Conflict-Tech-Companies-and-Social-Media-in-Southeast-Asia.pdf>; Nava Nuraniyah, "The Evolution of Online Violent Extremism in Indonesia and the Philippines," *Global Research Network on Terrorism and Technology*, no. 5 (2019), https://static.rusi.org/20190711_grntt_paper_5.pdf.

and politicized topics designed to elicit outrage. Reintegration efforts must incorporate an approach for communicating with releasees and returnees to understand where they get their information, the

news or social sources they use, and how that may be impacting their successful reintegration. This requires careful management so as not to violate privacy or civil liberties.

Case Study 18: Expanding Livelihood and Exposure Opportunities in Indonesia

Through a project titled Convoy Indonesia, the Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (Center for the Study of Islam and Society) (PPIM) at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN), has assisted Ali Fauzi, a former Jemaah Islamiya member turned peace activist, in his efforts to promote rehabilitation and reintegration through his organization, the Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian (Peace Circle Foundation) (YLP). Following an assessment of the needs of former violent extremist prisoners, the PPIM UIN and YLP determined that a more focused skills training program on journalism would be beneficial. The PPIM UIN subsequently collaborated with the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at UIN Jakarta to conduct the training, identifying the appropriate individuals to lead the sessions while YLP identified the appropriate participants. The team conducted three trainings in total that provided former prisoners with the tools they needed to express their feelings and ideas

through writing, some of whom were published in *Jawa Pos*, a national daily newspaper based in Surabaya, East Java.

The PPIM UIN, with the assistance of the Japanese embassy in Jakarta, has also helped provide scholarships for 10 religious leaders from *pesantran*, or Islamic boarding schools, each year since 2004 to visit a variety of schools and religious institutions in Japan in an effort to expose them to the ways in which educational and religious institutions in Japan have integrated traditional customs into contemporary Japanese society. Exposure also helps the religious leaders form new communities and new ways of thinking outside of their close-knit and closed *pesantran* groups. Feedback from the participants is overwhelmingly positive because it allows them to see how different communities use different norms, institutions, and practices to address social challenges.

Case Study 19: Linking Local Government and Community Stakeholders to Facilitate the Reintegration Process in Indonesia

Starting in 2018, the Indonesian Institute for International Peace Building (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian, or YPP), a nongovernmental organization based in Jakarta, has supported the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) in developing strategies and policies concerning the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist prisoners.

The YPP supports the DGC in developing a policy on the implementation of a community-based corrections program. The program revolves around supporting the Parole Office in implementing reintegration programs for released violent extremist prisoners by linking them with local government offices

and civil society organizations. The YPP has found that these local government and community stakeholders are willing to work with the parole officers but typically do not know how to link with them.

To match the relevant local government and community stakeholders to the violent extremist prisoners, the YPP first conducts assessments to determine the needs of the violent extremist prisoners and then analyzes how it can fulfill their postrelease needs. The role each local government or community stakeholder then plays depends on their capacity and expertise, for example, the regional health office will help

individuals in accessing free health care provided by the government.

As part of this program, the YPP successfully encouraged 18 parole officers from Solo and Klaten to undertake a different approach in conducting the reintegration process of the violent extremist prisoners, one that meaningfully incorporated the active input and engagement of local stakeholders. The program has been well received by the DGC because it gives them a new perspective and knowledge in conducting reintegration for the parolees, not only in terrorism cases but for other offenses as well.

There have been challenges in implementing this program, namely trying to raise awareness among parole officers that the concept is worthy, as well as mobility restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic that limited active in-person outreach and engagement. To help overcome these challenges and ensure sustainability, the YPP has produced a module on guidelines and training to standardize implementation of the program.

Separate but similar to the community-based corrections program, the YPP implements another program to support the reintegration of former violent extremist prisoners, deportees, and returnees

through the involvement of the local government. Through this activity, led by the Nations and Political Unity Office, the YPP tries to fill the gap in the reintegration process at the local level, which rarely involves the local government. In early 2019, the YPP supported the Central Java government in establishing the Deradicalization Working Group/ Task Force to improve multiagency collaboration at the local level. One of the main tasks of this task force is to conduct a reintegration process of radicalized individuals in collaboration with the Parole Office and civil society organizations. This initiative has been running since 2019, and some activities to support the task force have been conducted with support from donors and governmental funds. There have been challenges, including determining the best way to advocate for the idea of local government involvement in the reintegration of radicalized individuals given that many local governments assume that all issues related to radicalism and terrorism belong to the central government. In addition, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, large portions of governmental funds were allocated to focus on pandemic-related activity. This created situations in which the task force did not have enough funding for its activities, resulting in most of its activities being supported by donors and civil society organizations.

Case Study 20: Collaborating With Government to Lead the Reintegration Process Through Psychosocial and Livelihood Interventions in the Philippines

Balay Mindanaw Foundation (BFMI), a Philippine-based human rights civil society organization focused on peace and development, works with the government to help prevent violent extremism in southern Philippines, focusing specifically on former rebels who surrendered known as returnees. In the province of Basilan, where there is an existing joint task force running programs such as the Program Against Violent Extremism, the BFMI has developed a three-year program that aims to support and enhance the existing initiatives focusing on these former rebels. The program, called

“A Comprehensive Approach to Preventing Violent Extremism in Southern Philippines,” is funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and is being implemented in collaboration with local government agencies, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National Police, and the private sector. Other major partners for the program include governmental line agencies such as the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Office of the Presidential

Adviser on the Peace Process, and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Offices.

The returnees are initially placed in AFP custody where they undergo a process of screening, assessment, and deradicalization as standard military procedure. Once completed, they obtain a Certificate of Conduct Pass. As an accredited civil society organization in Basilan, the BFMI maintains a memorandum of understanding with the Basilan provincial government and the AFP at the brigade and battalion levels to ensure its ability to engage the returnees after this process.

The BFMI engages with returnees at the point in which they are returned to their communities, engaging them in psychosocial interventions, education, and livelihood trainings, including (1) profiling and psychosocial support interventions, (2) enterprise and agricultural development trainings, (3) religious education, (4) facilitating educational scholarship or job opportunities, (5) distributing food packs, (6) ensuring medical needs are met, and (7) providing legal consultation. Since June 2019, the BFMI has conducted

several psychosocial interventions and livelihood trainings, reaching 214 returnees. Feedback from the returnees on the program shows that they appreciate the community support and opportunities granted to them because it allows them to restart their lives with their families and fulfill their obligations, particularly as the majority of the returnees are fathers and husbands.

One of the major challenges of the project implementation is the occasional encounters between the AFP and the Abu Sayyaf Group. Due to these security issues, project activities have been delayed or canceled multiple times. Such encounters also create fear and anxiety among the returnees and families that they may erroneously be linked with the violent extremists. To maintain trust and confidence among the stakeholders, the BFMI helps facilitate constant communication and debriefings among the returnees and the AFP. The BFMI also helps create a safe, secure environment through their activities that allows authorities such as the AFP and local government to monitor the returnees unobtrusively and within the bounds of their civil rights.

Case Study 21: Running a Foundation That Employs Former Violent Extremists in Indonesia

The Center for Police Science Research and Terrorism Studies in Indonesia supports the strategies and programs of the Debintal Foundation in Indonesia, an institution established in late 2021 with support from the National Police's counterterrorism office, Densus 88. The vision of the Debintal Foundation is to foster love for the country and encourage the realization of the unity and integrity of all Indonesian people. The foundation also aims to promote peace and unity in Indonesia's security services. It employs former violent extremist prisoners to address all aspects of violent extremism, from developing strategies for preventing terrorist recruitment to rehabilitation, reintegration, and prevention of recidivism to counternarratives. The foundation is in its

infancy but currently engages seven former violent extremists with socioeconomic and skills training, with dozens more to be engaged in the coming months. In the future, the foundation will be used as a model for another foundation that will be founded by other former prisoners convicted of terrorism offenses.

The Debintal Foundation is in the process of developing a collaborative program with the Directorate General of Corrections that aims to provide guidance to prisoners convicted of terrorism offenses to reduce recidivism. Through this program and others, the foundation aims to provide a model of how to engage former prisoners convicted of terrorism offenses through sustainable programming.

Case Study 22: Creating a Community of Support for Former Violent Extremist Prisoners in Indonesia

The Gema Salam Foundation is an Indonesian civil society organization that works to empower former violent extremists and help them reintegrate into the general population. The foundation operates in the Central Java cities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta and coordinates with local governments and law enforcement agencies to provide a support system for current and former violent extremist prisoners.

One founder of the Gema Salam Foundation, Jack Harun, was a former bomb-maker who assisted in the 2002 Bali bombings. He was convicted in 2002 and served six years in prison.^a He participated in an Indonesian government-run rehabilitation program and denounced his former extremist ideology. Following his discharge, he recognized the challenges of returning to communities and the need for support and assistance outside of prison.

The Gema Salam Foundation was launched by Harun and several former terrorist offenders who

felt that their reintegration back into society was obstructed by community stigmatization regarding their terrorist past. Consisting of about 40 former terrorist offenders, the foundation works with the local government of Central Java and the Ministry of Social Welfare to provide counseling to prisoners in the region; campaign against violent extremism in schools, places of worship, and youth organizations; create a network of former violent extremist prisoners for support; and deliver economic assistance to violent extremist prisoners to start new careers and provide for their families.^b One such socioeconomic program in coordination with the Ministry of Social Welfare gives deradicalized former violent extremist prisoners an assistance package of 15 million rupiahs per person (approximately \$1,000) to help start a business and achieve economic empowerment.^c This assistance has been used to help former terrorists start automotive workshops, laundry business, and food stalls and restaurants.^d

a "It's Only a Matter of Time: Ex-Terrorists in Central Java to Reintegrate With Society," *Jakarta Post*, 20 February 2020, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/02/20/its-only-a-matter-of-time-ex-terrorists-in-central-java-to-reintegrate-with-society.html>.

b F.V. Indraswari and W.M. Wiswayana, "The Pattern and Mechanism of Community Involvement in Preventing Radicalism and Terrorism (Study Case in Central Java Province, Indonesia)," n.d., p. 5, <https://eudl.eu/pdf/10.4108/eai.26-11-2019.2295188>; Yudha Satriawan, "Merangkul Kembali Mereka ke Pangkuan NKRI," *Voice of America*, 29 June 2019, <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/merangkul-kembali-mereka-ke-pangkuan-nkri/4978129.html>.

c Satriawan, "Merangkul Kembali Mereka ke Pangkuan NKRI."

d Ibid.



CONCLUSION

Cooperation on rehabilitation and reintegration requires broad agreement on the approach and defined roles of government and civil society. Without it, it is difficult to build support for what can be a polarizing and difficult issue set. These case studies offer examples of how government and civil society cooperate across prison programming, custodial and noncustodial interventions, and community reintegration efforts, but they often lay bare the realities of such efforts.

First, the space for mutual cooperation is not consistent from country to country, leading to an abundance of examples from countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines versus countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Second, cooperation does not always indicate coordination. There were several

examples of similar work in the same country, seemingly indicating overlapping efforts, even though the location of each implementation differed. Nonetheless, governmental cooperation with a vibrant, active civil society can sometimes mean that the same governmental agency may be working on similar efforts with different civil society organizations in prisons, for example, without coordinating to streamline such efforts. Finally, the effectiveness of any cooperation and programming depends on the sustainability of effort, a difficult prospect given evolving priorities, unanticipated tests such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and shifting personnel. Despite these challenges and more, the case studies provide illustrations of what cooperation can look like while illuminating how future efforts can address the inherent complexities.



The Global Center works to achieve lasting security by advancing inclusive, human rights-based policies, partnerships, and practices to address the root causes of violent extremism. We focus on four mutually reinforcing objectives:

- Supporting communities in addressing the drivers of conflict and violent extremism.
- Advancing human rights and the rule of law to prevent and respond to violent extremism.
- Combating illicit finance that enables criminal and violent extremist organizations.
- Promoting multilateral cooperation and rights-based standards in counterterrorism.

Our global team and network of experts, trainers, fellows, and policy professionals work to conduct research and deliver programming in these areas across sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South, Central, and Southeast Asia.