



Preventing Conflict and Terrorism: What Role for the Security Council?

**NAUREEN CHOWDHURY FINK
WITH RAFIA BARAKAT**

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Abstract

In 2001 the report of the UN Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict reiterated a pledge to move the United Nations from a “culture of reaction to a culture of prevention.” Reflecting these trends, international actors have expressed greater interest in taking a more preventive approach on terrorism and countering violent extremism issues. How the strategic objective of terrorism prevention is to be implemented, however, remains an ongoing challenge for policymakers and practitioners. This policy brief offers an overview of the prevention agenda at the United Nations and considers how the agenda relates to international counterterrorism efforts. Following an exploration of the tools and resources currently and potentially available to the Security Council, this brief outlines a series of recommendations for consideration by UN officials, member states, and relevant stakeholders for strengthening UN capacities and enabling a more dynamic, integrated, and proactive approach to the complex security challenges the United Nations confronts today.

In 2001 the report of the UN Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict reiterated a pledge to move the United Nations from a “culture of reaction to a culture of prevention.”¹ Recalling “the most pitiful lesson of the past decade ... that the prevention of violent conflict is far better and more cost-effective than the cure,” the report urged a stronger role for the Security Council both in structural and operational conflict prevention.² Building on this, the United

Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted by the General Assembly in 2006, urged member states to address the “conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,” including “prolonged unresolved conflicts,” among others.³

arms, address transnational organized crime, or regulate the trade in natural resources that might fuel conflict. See Christoph Mikulaschek and Paul Romita, “Conflict Prevention: Toward More Effective Multilateral Strategies,” International Peace Institute, December 2011, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/epub_conflictprevention_dec2011.pdf.

³ This is often referred to as Pillar I of the Strategy. Other pillars include measures to prevent and combat terrorism (Pillar II), measures to build state capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the UN system in this regard (Pillar III), and measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (Pillar IV).



Naureen Chowdhury Fink is a Senior Analyst in CGCC's New York office, where she leads efforts on issues related to countering violent extremism. Naureen works with partners in the United Nations, Global Counterterrorism Forum, governments, and civil society to strengthen international and local capacities to respond to terrorism and related transnational threats. Her regional work has focused on South Asia, where CGCC works with law enforcement officials and experts to strengthen regional counterterrorism cooperation.

¹ UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, *Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/55/985-S/2001/574, 7 June 2001, para. 4.

² Ibid, para. 1. “Structural prevention” refers to measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place or do not recur. “Operational prevention” refers to measures applicable in the face of immediate crisis. In recent years, the term “systemic prevention” has emerged to refer to transnational actions taken to address risks in multiple world regions, for example, efforts to reduce the illicit trade in drugs and small



Rafia Barakat is a Programs Associate in CGCC's New York office, where she provides program support and substantive research assistance. She contributes to the development and planning of new projects and to strengthening relationships with CGCC partners across the globe.

Reflecting these trends, international actors have expressed greater interest in taking a more preventive approach on terrorism and countering violent extremism issues. As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton noted in a high-level Security Council meeting in 2010, “[W]e have to realize that countering terrorism means more than stopping terrorists. It means stopping people from becoming terrorists in the first place.”⁴ Additionally, the high human and material cost of conflict and violence, including terrorism, and concerns about UN peacekeeping forces being overstretched have made prevention more compelling. How the strategic objective of terrorism prevention is to be implemented, however, remains an ongoing challenge for policymakers and practitioners. This policy brief will examine the role that the Security Council can and should play to support implementation of this fundamental element of the Strategy.

In 2011 and 2012, the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC) partnered with the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations to host a series of roundtable discussions with current and incoming Security Council members with a view to strengthening multilateral terrorism-prevention capacities. Participants also included senior representatives of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Committee Directorate (CTED) and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), as well as officials from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

These discussions addressed three key questions: What resources or information did the Security Council require to adopt a preventive approach toward terrorism and violent extremism? What tools and resources were available to the council to gather the

necessary data and analyses for terrorism prevention activities? Could and, if so, how can the United Nations enhance an early-assessment capability in regard to identifying potential terrorist threats to international peace and security?

This brief draws on these exchanges as well as numerous discussions with UN officials, member state diplomats, and experts over a two-year period. From this research comes the finding that terrorism prevention efforts should be integrated into broader multilateral conflict-prevention efforts, as initiatives to address structural drivers of conflict and violence also support implementation of the first pillar of the Strategy.

The first section of this brief will explore the changing nature of global terrorism over the past decade and its implications for the international response to terrorism more broadly and the United Nations in particular. The second section will examine conceptual, political, and institutional challenges that impede a more comprehensive approach to preventing conflict and terrorism. The third section will examine what tools and resources the council has for terrorism prevention activities, given the existing political and institutional framework. The final section offers a series of recommendations for consideration by UN officials, member states, and relevant stakeholders for strengthening UN capacities and enabling a more dynamic, integrated, and proactive approach to the complex security challenges the United Nations confronts today.

⁴ UN Security Council, S/PV.6390, 27 September 2010.

The Challenges of Conflict and Terrorism

Although the United Nations has confronted the issues of armed conflict and violence for more than six decades, the increasingly complex and transnational nature of contemporary security challenges warrants a review of the Security Council's response capacities. In the field, possible connections between transnational groups have made taking a more comprehensive approach toward these challenges imperative. Operatives, resources, and ideas are increasingly able to move through porous borders and terrorist groups can utilize new communications platforms to reach global audiences, drumming up support and recruits.



Under-Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe, UN Department of Political Affairs (left) and Ambassador Jose Filipe Moraes Cabral, permanent representative of Portugal to the UN (October 2011). Photo by Elliot Moscovitz.

In February 2010, a Security Council presidential statement recognized these potential connections and the threat they could pose to international peace and security. The statement further invited the Secretary-General to “consider these threats as a factor in conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated missions’ assessment and planning and to consider including in his reports, as appropriate, analysis on the role played by these threats in situations on its agenda.”⁵ In short, the statement created a platform for more-proactive engagement on these issues.

The complexity of the challenges in the field have been highlighted by the conflict in Mali between Bamako and the Islamist forces of Ansar Dine and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, where concerns about armed violence, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons were intermeshed with broader regional development and security challenges. Following the earlier conflict in Libya, concerns about the Sahel and its porous borders, weak governance, and developmental challenges such as food insecurity further exacerbated the scope of the threats. Noting these dynamics, a UN assessment concluded that “any immediate or long-term strategy to mitigate the impact of the Libyan crisis [on the Sahel] should take into account the root causes of problems in the region.”⁶ Moreover, the report reiterated the need for multilayered responses at national, regional, and multilateral levels.⁷

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⁵ UN Security Council, S/PRST/2010/4, 24 February 2010.

⁶ UN Security Council, S/2012/42, 18 January 2012, para. 68 (*Report of the Assessment Mission on the Impact of the Libyan Crisis on the Sahel Region*).

⁷ For more on the conflict in Libya and the role of the Security Council, see Naureen Chowdhury Fink, “Preventing Terrorism and Conflict in Libya: An Innovative Role for the United Nations?” *CTC Sentinel* 5, no. 2 (February 2012): 16–20, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/preventing-terrorism-and-conflict-in-libya-an-innovative-role-for-the-united-nations>.

Prevention is particularly important because it is unclear to what end drivers of conflict ... can motivate individuals or groups. These drivers may also contribute to violent extremism, terrorism, armed conflict, or political instability, underscoring the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to preventing conflict and terrorism.

Consequently, law enforcement officials cannot effectively address threats only within domestic parameters but require the cooperation of regional and international partners and civil society actors to neutralize such criminal and terrorist networks. Prevention is particularly important because it is unclear to what end drivers of conflict, such as grievances, unstable economic and sociopolitical environments, and ideological beliefs, can motivate individuals or groups. These drivers may also contribute to violent extremism, terrorism, armed conflict, or political instability, underscoring the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to preventing conflict and terrorism. Moreover, violent extremism can be both a cause and consequence of conflict, making it the concern not only of counterterrorism practitioners but all those involved in mitigating the effects of armed violence. For example, senior counterterrorism officials from Africa have described how radical Boko Haram leaders have exploited societal cleavages and tensions to incite violence under the banner of religious ideology in Nigeria and beyond. In South Asia, militants in Pakistan have attacked schools, students, markets, and public spaces, jeopardizing long-standing development efforts and sowing sectarian and regional tensions. A proactive approach to countering violent extremism therefore requires the inputs of a broad range of practitioners.



Security Council member state diplomats (October 2011).
 Photo by Elliot Moscovitz.

Taking a More Integrated, Preventive Approach

Building on the Secretary-General's 2001 report on the prevention of armed conflict, there has been a significant normative and cultural shift toward prevention efforts. This reflects new opportunities for engagement in the post-Cold War era and a growing acceptance of preventive engagement, particularly in Europe and Africa. Moreover, there has been a wider acceptance among states and conflict prevention practitioners to address the root causes of conflict even while addressing more-acute crises.⁸

At the United Nations, this has translated into a greater focus on enhancing resources for preventive diplomacy and political affairs, mediation, and early intervention to address imminent disputes. Several entities engaged in prevention efforts, such as the DPA, DPKO, UN Development Programme (UNDP), and UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, are also constituent members of the CTITF. This task force was established to support member states in implementing the Strategy and comprises 31 entities whose work relates to one of the four Strategy pillars. Among the CTITF's working groups—informal bodies made up of voluntary groupings of entities—one is focused on preventing and resolving conflicts.

⁸ Mikulaschek and Romita, "Conflict Prevention," pp. 2–3.

Despite these developments, a number of obstacles impede coordination and coherence among conflict prevention actors. UN member states and officials lack clarity regarding the operational implications of terrorism prevention efforts, their relation to existing conflict prevention mechanisms and frameworks, and the division of responsibilities in the UN system. This has contributed to the persistence of institutional silos that prevent closer working arrangements between conflict prevention and counterterrorism officials. Despite acknowledgment of the potential interconnections between security challenges, resources for addressing transnational threats in an integrated manner remain “paltry.”⁹ As one senior UN official observed in 2011, “[T]ransnational threats are orphans in the UN system.”¹⁰

Much of the work that contributes to implementation of the first pillar of the Strategy is undertaken by UN entities without the “counterterrorism” label. The entities most closely engaged in development, humanitarian, and peace-building efforts are often best positioned to develop an understanding of the political and social dynamics in the field and to identify potential indicators or challenges related to violent extremism and terrorism as part of a broader effort to address conflict dynamics. Many of the UN entities working on these issues, however, which are also CTITF members, remain hesitant to engage in a system-wide discussion that includes counterterrorism issues. Their reluctance often stems from concerns about the security of field staff and worries that political sensitivities about international counterterrorism efforts will negatively impact their operating space and relations with host countries and communities and that long-standing programs and projects might be jettisoned because of their perceived association with counterterrorism efforts.¹¹

Differences among Security Council members regarding the politics of preventive engagement also affect the body’s ability to take a more proactive approach toward transnational threats such as terrorism. Most recently, heated debates among council members regarding the 2011 intervention in Libya and principles such as the “responsibility to protect” (R2P), which was cited as a rationale for international action, have exacerbated cleavages among the membership. Advocates who believed they might be avoiding “another Srebrenica” through an R2P intervention were confronted by critics concerned that “R2P was just a warrant for war.”¹² Preventive interventions are regarded warily by states watchful for intrusions on their sovereignty and concerned about increasing the opportunity for external involvement in

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From left: Security Council member state diplomat; Naureen Chowdhury Fink, CGCC; and Frederico Silva, Permanent Mission of Portugal to the UN (December 2012). Photo by Matthew Schwartz, CGCC.

⁹ James Cockayne and Camino Kavanagh, “Flying Blind? Political Mission Responses to Transnational Threats,” in *Review of Political Missions 2011*, ed. Alischa Kugel (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2011), p. 21, <http://cic.nyu.edu/content/review-political-missions-2011>.

¹⁰ Senior UN official, comments at CGCC roundtable discussion on the Security Council and terrorism prevention, New York, October 2011.

¹¹ Senior UNDP official, discussions with authors, New York, spring 2012; UN public information officials, discussions with author, New York, summer 2012.

¹² “The Lessons of Libya,” *Economist*, 19 May 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/18709571>.

domestic matters. Consequently, some members remain hesitant to support preventive engagement conceptually and politically, even to address threats such as transnational terrorism.

Additionally, there does not appear to be widespread agreement among council members on the role of the Security Council in addressing structural or systemic drivers of terrorism and conflict. Specifically in relation to terrorism, some council members have voiced a preference for these issues to be addressed through the CTITF and those of its entities more focused on development and humanitarian issues.

Related to this issue are concerns regarding “mission creep” for field missions. The increasing complexity of mandates for field missions and peace operations has resulted in calls for expectations and obligations to be matched to existing resources. Consequently, some council members have expressed hesitation to add “terrorism prevention” to the already lengthy list of tasks assigned to field missions, particularly in a troubled global financial climate where resources for UN peace operations are likely to shrink.



Security Council member state diplomats (October 2011). Photo by Elliot Moscovitz.

Resources Available to the Security Council for Terrorism Prevention

Notwithstanding some of the challenges outlined above, the Security Council can draw on a number of existing tools to integrate terrorism prevention efforts into its work. Indeed, under Article 34 of the UN Charter, the council is authorized to “investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.”¹³ Through its field missions, the council can obtain analyses of political dynamics and trends and the potential needs or openings for terrorism prevention efforts. Through country visits and reports on the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1624, CTED can better understand the challenges and needs of individual states and regions and facilitate the capacity-building assistance needed to address any gaps identified.

Among the council’s instruments aimed at preventing the outbreak or recurrence of conflict are fact-finding missions that allow council members to assess possible threats on the ground.¹⁴

¹³ “Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice,” 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, <http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter-all-lang.pdf>.

¹⁴ DPA, “Part VI: Consideration of the Provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter,” *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council*, 16th supp. (2008–2009), p. 18, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2008-2009/Part%20VI/08-09_PartVI.pdf#page=18.

Conducted under the authority of Article 34, these fact-finding missions may also be used to determine whether and how terrorism relates to potential conflict dynamics on the ground. The opportunity to engage directly with national and local actors is key in determining the extent to which issues related to violent extremism and terrorism may be driving or resulting from conflict and political instability. Moreover, the results of such analyses could be brought back to relevant stakeholders in the UN system, including CTED, the CTITF, DPKO, and DPA, to determine an appropriate response.

Security Council resolutions, such as Resolutions 1373, 1377, and 1963, have provided the fundamental framework for international efforts to prevent terrorism and develop the necessary national and institutional capacities to do so in line with the second and third pillars of the Strategy. CTED's role in the facilitation of capacity-building assistance, outlined in Resolution 1377, provides an important means by which the council supports the development of preventive capacities at national and regional levels.

UN action on terrorism issues can benefit from significant efforts already invested in conflict prevention capacities because structural and systemic drivers of conflict, such as weak governance, grievances, political instability, or repression, can lead to such outcomes as armed conflict, political violence, or violent radicalization and terrorism. Furthermore, unstable economic and sociopolitical environments can prove appealing to violent nonstate actors, including organized criminal networks, drug traffickers, and terrorist groups, who can incite or exacerbate conflict. As a result, terrorism prevention efforts can draw on relevant tools, guidelines, and lessons learned from UN conflict prevention.¹⁵ The World Bank's *World Development Report* for 2011 underscored the negative developmental impact of ongoing conflict and instability.¹⁶ Therefore, there is significant but not always complete overlap between terrorism prevention and conflict prevention efforts. Although each objective warrants a differentiated and nuanced approach, the potential overlaps highlight the importance of increased interaction among relevant practitioners at the policy development and implementation levels. For example, regional practitioners in Africa have expressed fears that Boko Haram has the potential not only to incite further violence and conflict in Nigeria but throughout eastern and western Africa.¹⁷



Mike Smith, executive director, UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (October 2011). Photo by Elliot Moscovitz.

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¹⁵ Phil Williams and Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability," U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 2012, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1101>.

¹⁶ World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development* (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2011).

¹⁷ Senior African counterterrorism officials, discussions with author, Bogota, January 2013.



Muhammad Rafiuddin Shah, UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (October 2011). Photo by Elliot Moscovitz.

Consequently, the council's working group on preventing conflict in Africa and the CTITF Working Group on Preventing and Resolving Conflict might find it useful to work together to develop a more comprehensive, system-wide approach to the potential threat.

The use of Security Council resolutions to integrate terrorism prevention concerns into broader conflict prevention and postconflict stabilization efforts was demonstrated with regard to Libya. Resolution 2017 explicitly cited

terrorism prevention as a goal of multilateral efforts, and Resolution 2022 embedded this concern into the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). In practice, this preventive aspect of the mission's mandate appears to have been largely sidelined, but the resolution provides a possible model for a more integrated and comprehensive approach by the Security Council to prevent violent conflict in the future. Moreover, Resolution 2017 is notable for creating an informal think tank of relevant experts, including the Libya Sanctions Committee panel of experts, CTED, DPA, UNSMIL, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, and International Civil Aviation Organization, and requesting it to "assess the threats and challenges, in particular related to terrorism, posed by the proliferation of all arms ... in particular man-portable surface-to-air missiles, from Libya, in the region."¹⁸ Such informal assessments could play an important role in enhancing the council's abilities to take more proactive and preventive action regarding terrorism where deemed necessary.¹⁹

Through its resolutions, the council has the power to ensure that missions have the personnel and capacity required to fulfill their mandate. In some instances, these capacities may be used to address a wide range of threats. For example, there is increasing discussion about the role of UN police officers in peace operations in addressing transnational organized crime. The capacities developed to serve this role may have attendant benefits in being applicable to identifying and addressing the risk posed by other illicit actors. In 2009, UN Police Adviser Andrew Hughes, who was heading the DPKO Police Division at the time, told a gathering of UN officials that "the threats faced by the global community include not just international wars and conflicts but civil violence, organized crime and terrorism," adding that "law enforcement is a key element in facing many of these challenges to international peace and security and support to national policing services is essential for peace security, human rights, development and democracy."²⁰

¹⁸ UN Security Council, S/RES/2017, 31 October 2011, para. 5.

¹⁹ Fink, "Preventing Terrorism and Conflict in Libya," pp. 16–20.

²⁰ "Combating Terrorism, Organized Crime Among UN Police Work, Says Top Adviser," UN News Centre, 12 February 2009, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29889&Cr=law+enforcement&Cr1=policen#US9306KR-Ak>.

The Way Forward

Outlined below are recommendations for consideration by Security Council members, as well as the broader membership from which elected members of the council are drawn. They offer some practicable ideas for a more proactive and integrated approach to addressing conflict and terrorism issues by the council and indicate how existing UN mechanisms might support this objective.

Develop an early-warning mechanism to alert the Security Council to possible terrorist threats

An early-warning mechanism would enable the council to take a more informed and proactive approach toward terrorism issues. Several council members expressed support for such a mechanism, as it could bring to their attention imminent threats to international peace relating to terrorism and violent extremism.²¹ Being informed at an early stage would empower council members to determine the course of action necessary and engage with relevant officials in the field and at headquarters to develop an appropriate UN response. The development of such an early-warning mechanism would require greater information sharing and cooperation among UN entities and officials, particularly those focused on counterterrorism, preventive diplomacy and mediation, peace operations, and peace-building issues.²² The informal group of experts created by Resolution 2017 and the Secretary-General's Regional Inter-Agency Task Force on the Sahel provide two possible models for the development of analyses needed to underpin an early-warning mechanism.

Strengthen analytical capacities at UN headquarters and field missions

Increased opportunities for regional and country desk officers in the DPKO and DPA to interact with colleagues working on thematic issues such as terrorism can contribute to more-integrated conflict analyses, such as those requested in the council's presidential statement of 24 February 2010. However, it is also essential that each of the relevant departments is sufficiently staffed and resourced to address these challenges.

Moreover, council members could facilitate greater cooperation and information sharing through informal platforms such as the "internal think tank" outlined in Resolution 2017, which may be convened to provide confidential reports where the council requires further information or analysis on a possible threat.

Terrorism prevention need not be considered a new function of the United Nations. It is instead an integral component of the world body's mission to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to prevent conflict and uphold the principles of the Charter.

²¹ Security Council member state representatives, comments at CGCC roundtable discussion on the Security Council and terrorism prevention, New York, December 2012.

²² Barnett Rubin and Bruce Jones argued in 2007 that because the United Nations has had limited effectiveness in implementing conflict prevention programs, it should focus on its role as a norm setter and strategic center of political action. They argued that the DPA could "serve as the centre for identifying conflict risk factors and strategies to mitigate their effects." See Barnett R. Rubin and Bruce D. Jones, "Prevention of Violent Conflict: Tasks and Challenges for the United Nations," *Global Governance* 13, no. 3 (2007): 391–408. In line with this argument, closer interaction among the DPA, CTITF, CTED, and Security Council members is essential in developing the analytical basis for terrorism prevention efforts.

Make greater use of “horizon-scanning sessions”

“Horizon-scanning sessions,” introduced by the United Kingdom in 2010, offer an opportunity for the DPA to help ensure that the council “is better primed for conflict-prevention action by offering a proactive and non-crisis-mode assessment of some possible threats, both new and existing, to international peace and security.”²³ In the fall of 2011, following the first roundtable hosted by CGCC and the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations, a horizon-scanning session specifically raised the need and importance for a greater focus on terrorism prevention efforts.

A number of council members expressed their appreciation for these sessions, but the sessions have been held less frequently recently. They provided an important means for council members to learn confidentially about possible imminent threats and could be requested through the monthly presidency to facilitate informal discussions on areas where the council may be called on for a response on short notice. In January 2013, Pakistan reintroduced the idea of a monthly evaluation of the Security Council, which might also offer opportunities to have a discussion about the council’s response to imminent challenges.

Empower regional and field missions to provide strategic analysis

The Security Council should explicitly task field missions and regional offices, where appropriate, to address issues relating to terrorism and engage national authorities in the host countries to determine how UN support might aid their efforts to address such threats. Council members should encourage regional offices and field missions, where relevant, to appoint a designated liaison with the mandate and capacity to provide strategic analysis and regular assessments on possible terrorism-related threats. In doing this, they should be able to draw on all relevant information available to the UN team in the field, including those team members closely engaged in development, humanitarian, and peace-building efforts. Additionally, the liaison could serve as a focal point in the mission on violent extremism and counterterrorism-related issues.

These analyses and assessments also may inform broader reports by the mission and relevant UN actors in the field on political dynamics and security challenges and be relayed regularly to relevant UN entities such as CTED or the CTITF.

Moreover, issues relating to transnational security threats, including terrorism and violent extremism, could be integrated into the agenda of the council’s fact-finding missions. This would allow council members to engage directly with national and local actors to determine if or to what extent these issues are related to potential violence and conflict.

²³ Security Council Report, “Conflict Prevention: Horizon Scanning,” *Monthly Forecast*, 29 October 2010, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2010-11/lookup_c_gIKWLeMTIsG_b_6355203.php.

Develop a tool kit of resources and mechanisms available to support terrorism prevention efforts

The CTITF and CTED could develop a compendium of mechanisms and resources that support terrorism prevention efforts, including implementation of the first pillar of the Strategy. Such a compendium could be made available to field missions, regional UN offices, and the Secretariat. It could provide illustrative examples of ongoing projects that contribute to terrorism prevention measures, allowing other stakeholders to get a clearer sense of where and how their own efforts could make a contribution.

Continue to support capacity-building initiatives that enhance preventive capacities

Capacity-building assistance provided by CTED and the CTITF supports member states and regional bodies in implementation of the Strategy and compliance with Security Council Resolution 1373. The council, through its Counter-Terrorism Committee, should continue to support the facilitation of such assistance, particularly where it boosts preventive capacities, for example, by supporting the development of legislative and regulatory frameworks that constrain the operating space for terrorists, supporting states in their efforts to effectively address incitement to terrorism while carefully balancing human rights obligations, and providing platforms for strengthening professional capacities and developing regional practitioner networks.

Integrate terrorism prevention actions into broader conflict prevention efforts, where appropriate

UN entities focused on conflict prevention could add violent extremism and terrorism to the challenges under consideration. In practice, more-regular interaction between regional and country desk officers in the DPA, DPKO, CTED, and CTITF would be helpful in raising awareness more broadly about relevant aspects of the Strategy and ongoing efforts that support its implementation. Where suitable, stakeholders from the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Rule of Law Unit, and UN Women may contribute their expertise in highlighting potential challenges to be brought to the council's attention. As indicated above, the CTITF Working Group on Preventing and Resolving Conflict provides a valuable platform for interaction among relevant entities.

Terrorism prevention need not be considered a new function of the United Nations. It is instead an integral component of the world body's mission to maintain international peace and security and, to that end, to prevent conflict and uphold the principles of the Charter. Terrorism is a contributory cause to and one of the outcomes of conflict; in some instances, acts of terrorism are embedded in broader dynamics of armed conflict or political violence, some of which have regional and international implications. The political and institutional investments made over the past decade in strengthening multilateral conflict-prevention capacities will be weakened should the world body find itself unable to more proactively address the transnational threats confronting its members today.

The views expressed in this policy brief are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of CGCC.

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CGCC works to improve counterterrorism cooperation and capacity through collaborative research and policy analysis and by providing practical advice. CGCC develops innovative counterterrorism programming and training and assists key stakeholders to develop sustainable solutions to preventing terrorism. CGCC is working to improve intergovernmental cooperation at the global, regional, and subregional levels; support community-led efforts to counter violent extremism; ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law; and empower civil society and victims of terrorism to speak out. As transnational threats evolve, CGCC is also working to foster a new generation of holistic, rule of law-based responses to organized crime and other forms of transnational violence.

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