



Building Stronger Partnerships to Prevent Terrorism: Recommendations for President Obama

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The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation is a nonpartisan research and policy institute that works to improve coordination of the international community's response to terrorism by providing governments and international organizations with timely, policy-relevant research and analysis. The Center has analyzed multilateral counterterrorism efforts on behalf of over a dozen governments, the UN, and private foundations and is the only research center in the world focused on strengthening global counterterrorism cooperation.

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Building Stronger Partnerships to Prevent Terrorism: Recommendations for President Obama

President Barack Obama is the first U.S. president to take office since the 9/11 attacks. He and his national security team thus have a unique opportunity to learn from the successes and failures of his predecessor's response to the terrorist threat and recalibrate the U.S. government's counterterrorism policies and strategy accordingly.

There has not been a successful attack on U.S. soil since 2001, however there are continual reminders of the need for more effective counterterrorism measures that protect the United States and promote and protect human rights and other fundamental freedoms that separate our way of life from that of the terrorists who wish to destroy it. America's citizens and its closest allies have been innocent victims of terrorist attacks around the world, from Bali to Riyadh to Madrid to London to Islamabad to Mumbai. Leading al Qaeda figures have been killed or captured, but more new terrorists have been recruited and stepped forward and more people around the world radicalized at least in part as a result of the excesses of the U.S.-led "Global War on Terror," including the invasion of Iraq.

A more effective and sophisticated U.S. strategy, which places greater emphasis on strengthening cooperation and building partnerships with governments, multilateral bodies, civil society, and the private sector, is needed to address this disturbing trend and make the United States and the international community more secure.

Respected organizations and individual experts have analyzed an array of complicated

counterterrorism issues that faced the Bush administration. They have offered the incoming administration sound recommendations that aim to improve counterterrorism policy and in some cases correct mistakes that have hampered both America's efforts to prevent and combat terrorism and its ability to lead the international community. For example, there have been widespread calls for closing the military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, moving all terrorist prosecutions from military commissions to U.S. federal courts, and renouncing torture.¹ Some have called for more clarity and specificity in articulating the threat, moving away from a "general 'War Against Terror' and toward a specific war against al Qaeda and its affiliates."² Others have linked a reduction of forces in Iraq and U.S. leadership in restarting the Middle East peace process to more effective counterterrorism efforts.³ Various studies have highlighted the need for a more coherent approach to crucial issues including combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism⁴ and for better interagency coordination on counterterrorism.⁵

All of these recommendations are vital for repairing America's image, restoring its leadership role, and tackling the terrorist threat in a more coherent way. They should be (and many are being) adopted by the president,⁶ however, they are not sufficient in themselves. These actions must be complemented by more inclusive, coordinated, and holistic approaches to building counterterrorism capacities and partnerships around the world. It has almost become a truism to say that the terrorist threat is global and that the U.S. ability to deal effectively with that threat requires international cooperation and will only be as strong as the weakest

links in the international community. In the years since 9/11, however, despite the rhetoric, this issue has not received the attention it warrants.

The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation has focused on improving international coordination and counterterrorism capacity-building efforts. Over the last two and a half years, it has worked with hundreds of policymakers and government and nongovernment experts and engaged with many more from around the world on improving cooperative counterterrorism efforts. As part of that work, the Center served as the secretariat for the International Process on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, which involved participants from more than 45 countries and dozens of experts from the United Nations and regional and nongovernmental organizations. The International Process involved workshops in Japan, Slovakia, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. The sessions looked at ways to strengthen international counterterrorism cooperation and improve international counterterrorism capacity-building efforts. In addition, the Center has examined U.S. efforts to engage with international partners and has taken stock of the effectiveness of U.S.-initiated bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism capacity-building programs overseas. This work has included a series of Ford Foundation sponsored events and roundtable discussions on lessons for the next U.S. president dealing with cutting edge counterterrorism issues, such as radicalization, terrorist financing, and capacity building.

“A more effective and sophisticated U.S. strategy, which places greater emphasis on strengthening cooperation and building partnerships with governments, multilateral bodies, civil society, and the private sector, is needed to make the United States and the international community more secure.”

Drawing from that experience, this policy brief offers a number of steps for President Obama to take to enhance U.S. cooperation with, as well as strengthen the capacity of, the international community to prevent and counter terrorism.

Broadly speaking, although training and equipping foreign security and law enforcement officials should continue to be a priority, more U.S. resources and attention should be given to strengthening existing and building new counterterrorism partnerships at the regional level. These efforts need to address longer-term and more fundamental capacity problems related to a lack of rule of law, poor governance, and underdevelopment. The United States needs to take care promoting its counterterrorism objectives overseas where in many regions the very term “counterterrorism” has become politically suspect. A more nuanced approach based on increased multilateralism, shared security concerns, and more active engagement with civil society and the private sector is needed to build durable support for U.S. counterterrorism efforts and objectives and ensure their sustainability over the long term.

There are a number of steps that President Obama should take to help reframe the counterterrorism discourse, strengthen cooperation, and build capacities around the world. Some but not all of them involve providing the Department of State with the resources and mandates to allow it to assume a leadership role in coordinating, implementing, and promoting U.S. counterterrorism policies.

President Obama should:

1. Direct his national security advisor and budget director to conduct an inventory of all U.S. foreign assistance programs that are funding counterterrorism-related capacity-building activities at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, including but not limited to efforts underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such an inventory has never been undertaken. It would allow the president to get a clearer understanding of where U.S. resources to build counterterrorism capacities around the world are currently being directed, both geographically and thematically, and whether and where a shift in focus and additional resources are needed.⁷

2. Appoint a senior diplomat or other highly respected civilian official as the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator and ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism. This position has been held since 9/11 by current or retired military or intelligence officials who, while well-qualified in many respects, generally had limited diplomatic experience and tended not to appreciate fully the range of ways in which multilateral bodies can be used by the United States to further its counterterrorism objectives. Changing the Coordinator's profile to a civilian model, thereby making it more comparable with that of the vast majority of his or her counterparts around the world, will be particularly important given the need for the United States to place, and be seen as placing, greater emphasis on nonmilitary counterterrorism tools, including multilateral institutions such as the UN and regional organizations.

3. Work with Congress to ensure that the State Department's Office of the Counterterrorism Coordinator (S/CT) is provided with the necessary mandate and funds to support and sustain a wide range of international, regional, and bilateral capacity-building and other nonmilitary counterterrorism programs that extend beyond government-to-government assistance. This effort should not only better equip S/CT to carry out its statutorily mandated role of "overall supervision (including policy oversight of resources) and coordination of the U.S. government's counterterrorism activities"⁸ but also allow the State Department to assume a more active role in promoting

counterterrorism cooperation overseas, including through the development of partnerships with governments, civil society, the private sector, and the UN and other multilateral bodies around the world. Many of the different U.S. counterterrorism assistance programs have been used primarily to support narrow law enforcement and border security training and technological objectives. For example, of the four managed by S/CT, apparently only the sparsely funded Counterterrorism Engagement (CTE) program (\$1.2 million requested for fiscal year 2009) may be used for broader strategic and other purposes, such as fostering regional cooperation, countering radicalization, and enhancing U.S. public diplomacy.⁹ Congress should provide S/CT significantly more funding and grant it greater leeway in the expenditure of those funds. This could be accomplished by giving S/CT more flexibility to spend funds appropriated to Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) on activities other than law enforcement training and/or by setting up an additional funding stream or contingency fund. Some or all of the funding which is currently appropriated to the Defense Department under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 should also be diverted to the foreign affairs budget and used to support current or new more flexible assistance programs administered by S/CT.

4. Direct the State Department, under S/CT's leadership, to play a leading role in building multi-stakeholder, regional cooperative networks to combat terrorism.

Building regional cooperative networks would complement ongoing U.S. efforts under the State Department's Regional Strategic Initiatives to improve coordination of the array of capabilities of U.S. government agencies in particular regions and the training and other capacity-building assistance the United States currently provides to foreign governments. S/CT should be provided with the resources necessary to allow it to lead the U.S. government's efforts in this area. Among other things, S/CT should focus on

- building the capacities and otherwise strengthening the role of regional organizations and civil society groups to help ensure local ownership of activities on the ground;
- providing U.S. financial and political support for the creation of regional mechanisms to facilitate greater counterterrorism cooperation in regions where none currently exist;
- funding discrete UN programs, which can deliver technical and other counterterrorism-related capacity-building assistance in regions or countries where the United States may lack access or leverage and the UN might be a more politically palatable actor; and

- promoting the development of flexible, multi-stakeholder counterterrorism networks in different regions of the world, including through the organization of seminars and other workshops that bring together government and nongovernment experts from countries within a region, as well as experts from relevant parts of the UN system and regional bodies.

These workshops and the necessary attendant follow-up would seek to promote regional cooperation, capacity building, and information sharing among individuals and organizations. They would stress the importance of developing counterterrorism partnerships at all levels and whole-of-government responses to the terrorist threat. The Department of Defense is currently the lead U.S. agency in this field, but the Defense Department's continuation in this role will be counterproductive as the United States seeks to shift away from the excessive militarization of counterterrorism efforts in the U.S. government and in partner countries around the world. Initial efforts are underway to realize this shift, but they need to be followed up and strengthened.

5. Reinvigorate the Group of Eight (G-8) Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG), which was created in 2003 largely at the behest of Washington to enhance donor coordination and global counterterrorism capacity-building efforts.

The CTAG has not delivered the anticipated results, suffering from the lack of continuity from year to year due to its rotating presidency; diminishing interest in G-8 capitals; lack of legitimacy in the developing world; insufficient information sharing among its members and transparency with non-members, civil society, and the private sector; a narrow, security-focused mandate; and the absence of too many key donors as members. Thus, the United States should encourage CTAG members to share more information with one another regarding their respective capacity-building programs, which will require more interagency coordination, cooperation, and commitment at the national level. Additionally, the United States should encourage CTAG members to make their work more transparent and to place more emphasis on outreach to help raise awareness. This could involve inviting representatives from regional bodies and civil society to participate in a segment of each CTAG meeting. The United States and its partners should also expand the CTAG's mandate beyond narrow law enforcement and other security-related issues to include a broader set of counterterrorism capacity-building topics, such as good governance, development, and the rule of law, where enhanced and coordinated capacity-building is needed. Finally, the United States and its CTAG partners should expand the CTAG's membership to include all of the major counterterrorism donor countries (e.g., Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden)¹⁰ and countries from the developing world to ensure that the perspectives of those on the receiving end of capacity-building assistance are taken into account.

6. Expand international cooperation and capacity-building efforts to combat WMD terrorism by focusing more attention and resources on maximizing and sustaining the impact of the G-8's Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

The United States should ensure that the Global Partnership receives the funds that its members pledged when it was established in 2002, an amount that should be above and beyond what they were already spending. By the Global Partnership's own estimates, only \$7.8 billion has been expended toward Global Partnership projects, less than half the target amount, with less than four years remaining in its original 10-year timeline. The United States and its partners should focus on areas of greatest risk (e.g., reducing nuclear and biological terrorism threats) rather than simply on those areas where they have the most technical expertise. Efforts should also be made to improve coordination among its members, a prerequisite for which is improving coordination of national WMD terrorism threat reduction assistance activities in Global Partnership countries. The president should name a White House coordinator for all WMD terrorism activities within the U.S. government. The partners should also expand the participation of donor countries and, as called for during the 2008 G-8 summit, of those on the receiving end of the program's projects to ensure that the Global Partnership's principles and funding are applied to proliferation threats around the world and not just those in the former Soviet Union. The goal should be to expand the donor base to allow the program to provide assistance wherever needed to reduce the threat of catastrophic terrorism. Finally, efforts should be made to deepen its relationship with the UN Security Council's 1540 Committee to allow it to become more active in helping countries implement their obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to improve legislation and export controls, increase border security, and strengthen physical protection of nuclear and biological facilities.

7. Ensure that the UN Security Council's 1540 Committee is provided with the necessary mandate, resources, and other tools to maximize its contributions to strengthening national capacities to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD and related materials.

The United States should work with other members of the Security Council to

- expand the 1540 group of experts beyond the current level of eight and ensure it has the necessary expertise to address all aspects of the resolution;
- authorize the group to move beyond trying to match assistance providers with countries in need and to provide legislative and export-control regulation drafting assistance directly to states when requested;

- request the UN secretary-general to establish a Resolution 1540 capacity-building trust fund in the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs to fund such assistance delivery activities. The United States should make a significant contribution to this fund to highlight both its leadership role in promoting and its commitment to cooperative approaches to address the WMD terrorism threat;
- encourage more engagement between the group of experts and nongovernment organizations, which, according to some estimates, deliver at least one-third of global assistance in fields related to the implementation of Resolution 1540;
- encourage the committee and its group of experts to articulate more effectively the global nature of the WMD terrorism threat. For example, continued efforts should be made to sensitize officials in the developing world that their countries could be used by terrorists as targets or transit points even if they do not have pharmaceutical facilities or chemical factories on their territory. For those that do, the point should be made that biological or chemical agents produced in such facilities could be used by a local insurgent group or otherwise in the context of a civil war, i.e., not just against the U.S. or Western interests;
- allow the committee's group of experts to provide independent analysis of the WMD terrorism threat that highlights its different regional and subregional dimensions, which it is not allowed to do under its present mandate;¹¹ and
- instruct the committee to develop common standards and best practices in all relevant areas of Resolution 1540, including nuclear safety and accounting, preparedness, and consequence management,¹² and stimulate the sharing of these standards and practices across different regions.

8. Coordinate anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing (AML/CTF) capacity-building efforts better within the U.S. government (among the Departments of State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Justice); with other major assistance providers, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank; and with other bilateral donors. In general, a high level of informal cooperation has developed among key international AML/CTF-related bodies since 2001, but this cooperation and coordination does not extend to capacity-building programs to fill gaps and avoid duplication. Bilateral donors are often reluctant to share information with multilateral bodies on their AML/CTF technical assistance programs and with one another. Even within the U.S. government, including the interagency Training and Assistance Sub-Group of the Counterterrorism Security Group (and its Terrorist Financing Working Group,

which is chaired by the State Department), coordination and cooperation is still lacking; and interagency turf battles and duplicative efforts, especially between the State and Treasury Departments, continue to impede progress on improving CTF capacities.

9. Ensure that FATF is provided with the necessary resources and support.

The mandate of FATF, which develops, propagates, and monitors implementation of global AML/CTF standards and best practices, has expanded significantly since 9/11, starting with the addition of CTF and more recently with the added focus on WMD proliferation and the targeting of proliferation financing. Its mutual evaluations of compliance with FATF standards, its guidance on a risk-based approach to AML/CFT, and the work it undertakes through its FATF-style regional bodies are all critical components of efforts to build global AML/CTF regimes. Given the FATF's expanding workload, without a commensurate increase in resources, FATF's limited secretariat may not be able to sustain this increased activity over the long term. Further, some FATF members themselves lack the resources to participate in the increasing number of FATF working group meetings. Careful attention should be paid to ensure that FATF's expanding mandate is met with additional resources. Although its small secretariat and informal structure have served FATF well for a number of years, consideration should be given to a more permanent and formal institutional arrangement, including a larger permanent secretariat.

10. Develop and emphasize the importance of a horizontally integrated approach to transnational security capacity building by encouraging the UN to overcome its silo mentality.

Due to its convening power, legitimacy as a result of its universal membership, and its technical expertise and capacity, the UN has been acknowledged for the critical role it has to play in providing capacity-building assistance to states to address a range of transnational security challenges, including terrorism. Yet, the contributions of the UN have been limited so far, largely as a result of a lack of a common strategic vision among its key member states that recognizes the interlocking nature of different global security threats as well as the need to design capacity-building and other programs that seek to address them in a holistic manner that is sensitive to the range of political and cultural contexts in different regions.

For example, many of the tools needed to improve national counterterrorism capacities are the same as those needed to address a host of other transnational security challenges (e.g., transnational organized crime, WMD proliferation, and drugs, human, and small arms and light weapons trafficking), whether it be properly secured borders and export controls; rigorous legislation and regulations; properly trained police, prosecutors, judges, and other law enforcement and criminal justice officials; or a coordinated interagency response at the

national level. Yet, UN assistance in these areas too often fails to take into account these linkages and potential synergies. Currently, issues such as sanctions, transnational organized crime, terrorism, nonproliferation, and small arms and light weapons are being addressed by different parts of the UN Secretariat in institutional silos. There is often significant fragmentation within each one, as evidenced by the multiple UN actors engaged in each issue with limited coordination among them.

The United States needs to encourage the UN to overcome this silo mentality and move toward the development of a horizontally integrated approach to transnational security capacity building. For example, on counterterrorism, many states in the global South are more likely to welcome capacity-building and other technical assistance if it is linked to addressing fundamental state-capacity shortcomings relevant to a range of issues rather than explicitly linked to what is often seen as the Western-imposed counterterrorism agenda. Yet, the current UN approach lacks the flexibility to engage with individual countries in such a nuanced and integrated manner.

11. Ensure that U.S. capacity-building efforts are coordinated better to enhance prevention-focused counterterrorism and radicalization programs.

To the extent that there is at least some coordination, either in the U.S. government or in the UN, on building counterterrorism capacities of partner countries since 9/11, it is largely taking place in law enforcement and other security-related fields.

Despite the widespread recognition that development and good governance programs aimed at stopping corruption, alleviating social and political marginalization, and increasing local institutional capacities to govern and deliver services efficiently will also help states to implement and enforce security measures better, there remains inadequate information sharing and other forms of coordination and cooperation between development and counterterrorism capacity-building actors. Closer coordination and cooperation is also needed among donor countries to prevent duplication and to ensure the most pressing gaps are filled, especially in developing countries.

Such coordination and cooperation are essential elements of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that seeks to prevent political violence as well as react to it. Therefore, coordination and cooperation between development and counterterrorism capacity-building efforts needs to be strengthened without compromising or politicizing development work and without diluting counterterrorism efforts. The president should encourage the State and Defense Departments and the U.S. Agency for International Development to

- deepen their cooperation and coordination on capacity-building programs aimed at countering radicalization overseas;

- engage more regularly with relevant nongovernmental and other development organizations as well as donor countries; and
- build on lessons learned from other countries to develop and implement a “prioritized assistance strategy.”¹³

12. Call for and work with partners to develop a more inclusive, coherent, and effective UN counterterrorism program.

U.S. efforts to sustain a global coalition against terrorism and strengthen international counterterrorism cooperation and capacity building should include renewed leadership in support of more coherent, inclusive, and effective efforts through the UN. Although unilateral and bilateral action must continue to be at the forefront of U.S. counterterrorism activities, the UN, because of its global membership and the legitimacy it offers, has a number of comparative advantages, including sharing the burden on capacity building, offering a forum for cross-regional expert-to-expert engagement, and providing a global assessment of counterterrorism implementation efforts.

With the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the first-ever global counterterrorism strategy in 2006, aptly named the “UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” the UN has a consensus, holistic framework in place to address the terrorist threat. Certain characteristics of the UN effort, however, needlessly limit the world body’s ability to support implementation of the framework and its impact more broadly and should be addressed by the Obama administration. These include the lack of a broad-based forum to give a wide range of countries a sense of ownership over the UN counterterrorism program. The 15-member Security Council continues to dominate the UN counterterrorism agenda, despite the council’s lackluster performance and limited representation, which breeds increasing resentment from the wider UN membership. Also among these characteristics is the continuing lack of coordination and cooperation among the many relevant UN bodies and offices, scattered around the globe and operating under distinct and often overlapping mandates.

The United States should therefore push for a streamlined and reformed UN counterterrorism architecture that includes an appropriately designed intergovernmental body, supported by a properly resourced counterterrorism department in the UN Secretariat and headed by a UN high commissioner for counterterrorism.¹⁴ The UN has high commissioners or special representatives of the secretary-general in more than a dozen thematic areas, many of which were created to improve both the coordination within the UN of a number of relevant programs and the coherence of the message the UN is projecting to the world as it works in the particular field. Yet, on an issue at the top of the world body’s agenda that requires a whole-of-system response at the national, regional, and global levels, the UN is faceless.

Notes

¹ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “Fighting Terrorism Fairly and Effectively: Recommendations for President-Elect Barack Obama,” November 2008, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1108web.pdf>; Human Rights First, “The Next Administration and Human Rights,” <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/advocacy/index.aspx>.

² Managing Global Insecurity Project, “A Plan for Action: A New Era of International Cooperation for a Changed World: 2009, 2010, and Beyond,” November 2008, p. 32, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2008/11_action_plan_mgi/11_action_plan_mgi.pdf.

³ Daniel Benjamin, “Strategic Counterterrorism,” *Policy Paper*, no. 7 (October 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2008/10_terrorism_benjamin/10_terrorism_benjamin.pdf.

⁴ Partnership for a Secure America, “WMD Report Card: Evaluating U.S. Policies to Prevent Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Terrorism Since 2005,” <http://www.psaonline.org/downloads/ReportCard%208-25-08.pdf>.

⁵ Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, eds., “Terrorist Threat and U.S. Response: A Changing Landscape,” *Policy Focus*, no. 86 (September 2008), <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=297>.

⁶ Some of those recommendations are already being adopted. For example, on 22 January 2009, President Obama signed executive orders directing the closure of the military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay within a year and ordering the Central Intelligence Agency to close its remaining secret prisons and prohibiting it from using coercive interrogation techniques. William Branigin and Michael D. Shear, “Obama Orders Guantanamo’s Closure Within a Year,” *Washington Post*, 22 January 2009.

⁷ According to the Government Accountability Office, the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator (S/CT) has “not provided a congressionally mandated annual report to Congress on U.S. government-wide assistance related to combating international terrorism since 1996. After 1996, S/CT has only submitted to Congress annual reports on the ATA program, such as the number of students trained and courses offered. Moreover, these reports contained inaccurate program information. Additionally, the reports lacked comprehensive information of the results on program assistance that would be useful to Congress.” Charles Michael Johnson Jr., “Combating Terrorism: Guidance for State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program Is Limited and State Does Not Systematically Assess Outcomes,” testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, June 4, 2008, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08875t.pdf> (Highlights page).

⁸ 22 U.S.C. § 2651a.

⁹ S/CT has oversight over the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, the Counterterrorism Finance (CTF) program, the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), and the Counterterrorism Engagement (CTE) program, all of which are funded through the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account. With a combined budget of some \$160 million, they represent only a fraction of what the State Department, not to mention the other agencies, have at their disposal to support international counterterrorism assistance activities.

¹⁰ Currently, three non-G-8 countries are CTAG members: Australia, Spain, and Switzerland, with each having been admitted at the urging of the United States, largely for political reasons.

¹¹ Absent such analysis, it will be difficult to convince many countries of the urgency both of the threat and the allocation of the necessary domestic resources to address it.

¹² For example, as pointed out by the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, the resolution does not define “effective” or “appropriate” measures for nuclear security and accounting systems. The commission calls for these definitions to be “formulated at the highest levels to ensure that internationally agreed-on standards will be implemented by all nations.” Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, *World at Risk* (New York: Vintage, 2008), p. 55, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2008/wmd-prolif-terror-commission.htm>.

¹³ Karin von Hippel has recently written that a “dedicated U.S. government foreign assistance strategy to counter radicalization in the Arab and Muslim world should put emphasis on macro-reforms in two key areas: (1) support for good governance and anticorruption programs and (2) improvements in social service provision.” See Karin von Hippel, “A Counterradicalization Strategy for a New U.S. Administration,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, no. 618 (July 2008), <http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/618/1/182>.

¹⁴ There are a number of different models on which to draw when considering the structure and mandate of such a body (e.g., the UN Development Programme, International Atomic Energy Agency, UN Human Rights Council, UN Peacebuilding Commission, and, as advocated by the Managing Global Insecurity Project, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees). For a discussion of the pros and cons of some of these models, see Alistair Millar and Eric Rosand, *Allied Against Terrorism: What’s Needed to Strengthen Worldwide Commitment* (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2006).



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