Reintegrating Former Boko Haram Associates / Réintégration des ex-associés de Boko Haram

In August 2018, a regional strategy for the stabilization, recovery, and resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin was adopted, which recognizes the interrelated experiences of communities surrounding the Lake Chad Basin and the benefits of a common approach. The strategy sets out nine priority pillars for action to generate applicable policies and programs geared toward the short- and long-term stabilization and development of the region, including on the handling of individuals associated with Boko Haram.

This policy brief assesses Cameroon’s strategies and policies for reintegrating associates of Boko Haram against the recently adopted Lake Chad Basin regional stabilization strategy, the realities experienced by Boko Haram-affected communities, and the experiences of individuals detained on account of their associations. For comparative purposes, references to the experience of Niger are included. Co-authored by academic experts, the brief offers a set of recommendations promoting a cohesive approach, calling for government action, and recognizing the role of communities at the forefront of reintegration efforts.

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En août 2018, une stratégie régionale a été adoptée pour la stabilisation, le rétablissement et la résilience des zones du bassin du lac Tchad touchées par Boko Haram. Elle reconnaît les expériences interdépendantes des communautés riveraines du bassin du lac Tchad et les avantages d’une approche commune. La stratégie repose sur neuf piliers prioritaires et vise à élaborer des politiques et des programmes pertinents pour garantir, à court et à moyen terme, la stabilisation et le dével­oppement de la région du bassin du lac Tchad, y compris la gestion et la prise en charge des ex-associées de Boko Haram.

La présente note politique évalue les stratégies et les politiques du Cameroun visant à réintégrer les
ex-associés de Boko Haram par rapport à la stratégie régionale de stabilisation du bassin du lac Tchad récemment adoptée, les réalités vécues par les communautés touchées par Boko Haram, et celles des personnes détenues en raison de leurs associations. Des références à l’expérience du Niger sont présentées aux fins de comparaison. Rédigé en collaboration avec des universitaires, le document propose une série de recommandations favorisant une approche cohérente, engageant le gouvernement à agir et reconnaissant le rôle des communautés au premier plan des efforts de réinsertion.

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Structural factors that can fuel support for violent extremism, like corrupt governance and inequality, are often intertwined with individual-level vulnerability factors, such as a search for identity or a need for quick answers to issues of injustice. Under these circumstances, individuals can be drawn to black-and-white answers that seem to offer simplicity, clarity, and certainty. Unfortunately, a hallmark of violent extremist ideologies is this binary thinking, stripped of complexity and with an identifiable in-group/out-group dynamic that offers a sense of community and belonging to help people make sense of the world. As policymakers and practitioners work to address the larger structural factors fueling violent extremism, psychological interventions may help address the binary construct of thinking that can make violent extremist ideologies sound appealing at the individual level. This policy brief explore the concept of integrative complexity – an empirical, peer-reviewed, and cross-culturally validated measure of the complexity of thinking – and the ways it can be applied in contexts of violent extremism and other instances of intergroup conflict.

Within the realm of policy discussions, anti–money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) efforts are generally treated as a package deal. From a policymaking standpoint, the combination makes sense. There is a convergence between the types of information and stakeholders relevant to money laundering and terrorism financing, and after the September 11, 2001 attacks it was expedient to add CFT to existing AML frameworks. Yet in practice, critics have argued this “marriage” places undue burden on the private sector and resulted in ineffective and even harmful outcomes.

This brief examines where and how AML frameworks are fit for purpose relative to CFT and considers where additional CFT-specific efforts are necessary. It begins with a brief summary of the evolution of money laundering and terrorism financing policies, discussing the unification of the two fields and the key differences between the motivations and typologies of money laundering and terrorism financing crimes. Against that backdrop, it explores the four objectives of CFT efforts (prevent, detect, freeze, and trace) to identify areas where existing unified AML/CFT frameworks are working and areas where more nuance is required to effectively combat threats specific to terrorism financing. The brief concludes with recommendations on how current CFT policy discourse and evolution can meaningfully support broader counterterrorism objectives.

As policymakers and practitioners in Southeast Asia increasingly recognize the importance of investing in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) measures, it is critical to integrate a gender analysis when developing related national action plans, strategies, and programs. This policy brief examines key challenges, gaps, and needs of national and regional stakeholders and concludes with recommendations for these actors to consider in advancing gender sensitive P/CVE policy and practice in the region. The brief draws on desk research and extensive consultations with a range of civil society actors, experts, policymakers, and practitioners from the region, including a regional workshop and gender-sensitive P/CVE projects undertaken by local civil society organizations, supported by the Global Center and the government of the Netherlands.

This policy brief explores the oft-under examined question of state-perpetrated violence and its treatment within the global preventing and countering violence extremism (PCVE) agenda. While there has been a gradual recognition that human rights, good governance and human security are critical factors in violence prevention, PCVE policy and programming continues to focus on addressing only violence associated with specific radical ideas and is overwhelming centered on individuals and communities of particular identity groups. This agenda often obscures and disregards substantial levels of violence perpetrated by states and other actors.

Against the backdrop of growing body of work highlighting the biases, inconsistencies and assumptions of mainstream radicalization theory over the past decade, a paradigm shift is long overdue. To that end, this policy brief highlights the intersections of political violence, violent extremism, and human insecurity through a series of thematic vignettes on corruption, human rights abuses, and war-making. illustrating ways in which state conduct plays a central role in manifesting or escalating political violence from which violent extremism and terrorism emerge. Recognizing the scale and magnitude of state-perpetrated violence and its role in manifesting further violence is essential for charting a new course toward a more holistic response to violent extremism that adequately accounts for and responds to a wider spectrum of political violence, including the violence perpetrated by states.

This policy brief establishes a framework to develop and evaluate National Action Plans (NAPs) on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Based on the key good practice components identified in international literature on NAPs across policy fields ranging from sustainable development to tuberculosis control, this framework aims to improve approaches to P/CVE strategic planning by national authorities. It may enable a range of stakeholders to better assess the strengths and weaknesses of new or existing P/CVE NAPs, as well as provide basic guidelines to support and further improve their development, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

Based on his experience policing during the Troubles in Northern Ireland and supporting the police reform process following the Good Friday Agreement, Stephen White offers a practitioner’s perspective on how police-community relations eventually were moved from a place of distrust in certain sections of society to one of wider acceptance and partnership. The policy brief highlights how implementing a comprehensive community policing strategy can serve as a means and an end in itself when dealing with drivers of intercommunal violence and violent extremism. The brief concludes to offer a cause for optimism along with an evidence-based template for reforms that others may wish to consider when undertaking comprehensive security sector reforms to aid in peacebuilding and the prevention and countering of violent extremism context.

The UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) was established in 2004 with the core mission of supporting the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) in monitoring the implementation of counterterrorism obligations required by Security Council Resolution 1373 and facilitating technical assistance to member states to aid their implementation activities. Since 2004, however, CTED’s mandate has expanded considerably in response to the evolution of the threat and the increased number of stakeholders benefiting from CTED assessments and analyses, a group that includes not only the council itself, but also UN member states in general, regional and functional organizations, and other counterterrorism-relevant entities inside and outside the UN system.

This policy brief looks at CTED’s role in light of the need to maintain and strengthen its comparative advantage in assessing member states’ counterterrorism efforts while addressing existing and emerging threats of terrorism and aligning its working methodologies with these developments. It also assesses what CTED and the CTC can do to enhance coordination with partners within and outside the UN system. It then examines the benefits and limitations of CTED’s outputs in relation to its mandate, comparative advantage, capacity, and impact, and concludes by offering some ideas and recommendations for the Security Council, the CTC, and CTED to consider for the next four years and beyond.

This paper assesses how the revised Official Development Assistance (ODA) guidelines will impact the European Union (EU) and its decisions on financing external support for actions to prevent violent extremism. It examines the situation before and after the revision to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ODA eligibility rules, and concludes with specific recommendations for the EU to consider, including: devoting more resources to activities aimed at preventing violent extremism (PVE) across a wider array of EU Instruments (geographic and thematic); and urging the EU and its member states to press the OECD to collect, analyze, and disseminate data on how PVE funds are spent when recorded as ODA.

Since 2011, the Global Center has worked with the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), with generous support from the government of Norway, to implement a process that engages civil society actors and experts in efforts to enhance regional cooperation in South Asia. This process, undertaken in partnership with the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, included regular dialogue and engagement with nongovernmental actors in South Asia to foster deeper understanding of local and regional drivers of terrorism and violent extremism and to identify critical gaps, opportunities, and priorities for capacity-building support to address the threat.

This assessment presents key outcomes of the multiyear civil society and experts process. It provides an overview of regional challenges and the efforts by the Global Center and CTED to identify key needs and priorities to inform responsive policies and programs to address the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in South Asia. A set of recommendations highlight practical ways that multilateral and regional organizations and national governments can work with civil society, experts, and practitioners to address this threat in the region.