Scoping Study on Independent Civil Society–UN Counterterrorism Engagement

In 2023, the Global Center on Cooperative Security and Rights & Security International consulted with nearly 200 peacebuilding and P/CVE implementers, human rights defenders, activists, lawyers, journalists, researchers, community leaders, and scholar-practitioners from around the world, assisted by an advisory committee of 15 diverse civil society representatives. ​

We found an overwhelming consensus that the UN is failing to meaningfully engage with, promote, and protect civil society in the context of the world body’s counterterrorism efforts, and that there is common desire to see the UN correct this course.

 

Research Questions

Understanding and Relevance
Do civil society actors understand which UN entities are involved in counter-terrorism and P/CVE? Do they view those UN entities as relevant to the human rights issues that civil society confront and are addressing day-to-day?

Perceived Value and Benefits
Do civil society groups in various regions see value in engaging with the UN on these issues? What are the perceived benefits of engaging with the UN?

Concerns & Preconditions
If civil society groups and activists are hesitant about engaging with the UN on these issues, what are their concerns? What are the necessary preconditions for greater engagement?

Our research process was designed to mirror the engagement practices recommended in the report, grounded in transparency, accountability, and reciprocity – with multiple avenues for civil society partners to engage, participate in decision-making, and impact the project results:

• Advisory Committee: A geographically- and gender- diverse advisory committee of 15 civil society representatives selected from a pool of 121 applicants supported the project team in making decisions around the design and implementation of consultations and aided in our analysis.

• Landscape Assessments: For each in-person regional consultation we also secured local experts to produce landscape assessments of civil society and counterterrorism issues in the region, and translated into local languages as needed, to inform our research and discussions.

• Consultations: Following each of our 10 consultations, we developed and translated as needed detailed reports capturing the discussions and solicited feedback from participants to ensure its accurately reflected the proceedings.

• Online survey: As our consultations were not accessible to many civil society groups, the project team developed a mutli-lingual global survey to elicit the experiences of individuals and organizations that were unable or unwilling to participate in the in-person and virtual discussions.

Harouna Abdoulaye, COPAVE
Beth Alexion, Saferworld; CSO Coalition on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism
Ali Altiok, United Network of Young Peacebuilders
Miguel de la Vega, Unidosc
Hussein Khaled, Haki Africa
Mira Kusumarini, Empatiku Foundation
Sarah Le Mesurier, International Commission of Jurists
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, University of Minnesota Law School

Victoria Ohaeri, Spaces for Change
Cholpon Orozobekova, Bulan Institute
Inès Osman, MENA Rights Group
Mahi Ramakrishnan, Beyond Borders Malaysia
Arjun Sethi, Georgetown University Law Center
Ashleigh Subramanian-Montgomery, Charity & Security Network
Marco Velasquez Ruiz, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Bogota

Findings

Existing entry points for engagement with the UN’s counterterrorism architecture are extremely limited, and inaccessible to most CSOs – particularly those most impacted by conflict and abusive counterterrorism measures.

Civil society groups clearly see benefits that could accrue from more meaningful engagement with the UN on counterterrorism and P/CVE efforts.

Substantial barriers and risks are impeding meaningful engagement with civil society, and their willingness to engage in the Global South.

Pre-conditions for civil society engagement
In our synthesis, we identify seven critical preconditions around which participant perspectives coalesced for greater civil society engagement with the UN’s counterterrorism efforts:

1. More robust and effective measures to protect civil society from repression ostensibly justified under counterterrorism and P/CVE measures, as well as from reprisals and intimidation before, during, and after engagement.

2. Oversight and accountability practices that ensure counterterrorism and P/CVE norms, guidance, and programs adhere to—and demand Member State compliance with—human rights standards.

3. Clarity about existing avenues, conditions, and procedures for engagement of CSOs within its counterterrorism architecture—and expand them.

4. Explain clearly at the outset what impact civil society participants can expect to have as a result of their engagement and ensure that civil society input consistently has a demonstrable, substantive impact.

5. Adopt more robust accessibility practices for information on counterterrorism policies and programs.

6. Materially compensate and otherwise support, civil society groups.

7. The UN counterterrorism architecture must prioritize engagement with civil society at grassroots and local levels.

These preconditions cannot be overcome by any UN entity overnight, and progress demands buy-in and trust from civil society, as well as substantial political support and investments by Member States.

Steps toward more meaningful CSO-UN engagement in the short term can foster incremental progress toward addressing these preconditions and increase engagement significantly over time. 

The report offers a framework and recommendations for the UN and its Member States to meaningfully engage civil society while incrementally addressing the preconditions for engagement.

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Final Report

Independent Civil Society–UN Counterterrorism Engagement: A Scoping Report

Author: Matthew Schwartz, Sarah St. Vincent, Tufyal Choudhury, Damarie Kalonzo, and Franziska Praxl-Tabuchi

Date: May 2024

 

Read the Report

Landscape Assessment Reports

The Scoping Study was informed by a series of regionally focused research products prepared by local civil society experts. These reports were later finalized and prepared for publication with the generous support of the Government of Canada.

Exploring Eastern Africa’s Landscape: A Scoping Study on an Independent Civil Society-UN Counter-Terrorism Engagement Mechanism
Author: Karanja Muraya (Africa Center for Engendered Security), African Journal of Empirical Research 4, no 2 (2023)
Date: Dec 2023

Read the Report

Landscape Assessment Civil Society and Counterterrorism Mechanisms in Europe
Author: Magda El Haitem (El Haitem Law)
Date: May 2024

Read the Report

Iniciativas para prevenir el uso indebido de las organizaciones sin fines de lucro en América Latina
Author: Gabriela Pellón (Independent Consultant) and Miguel de la Vega (Unidosc)
Date: January 2024

Read the Report

Redefining civil society’s role in the UN counter-terrorism architecture
Landscape assessment: Middle East and North Africa
Author: MENA Rights Group
Date: May 2024

Read the Report

UN & Multilateral Efforts and Civil Society Engagement on Counterterrorism and Preventing and/or Countering Violent Extremism in South-East Asia: A Landscape Assessment
Author: Marc Batac (Independent Consultant) and Tuan Nguyen-M (Build Program Manager, Initiatives for International Dialogue)
Date: May 2024

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Mécanisme d’engagement indépendant entre la société civile et les Nations Unis en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme: Rapport d’état des lieux Afrique de l’Ouest
Author: Abdoulaye Diallo (Independent Consultant) and Mouhamadou Lamine Bara Lo (Independent Consultant)
Date: January 2024

Read the Report

Watch the Launch Event:

Click here to watch the launch event from the UN Web TV site.

Among other efforts, the Global Center is currently leading a global process to engage civil society around the work of the United Nations on countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism, with the goal of establishing a mechanism by which civil society can advocate, inform, and hold states accountable on counterterrorism.

Separately, on 9 March, 2023, the Global Center organized a high-level event at the UN Headquarters to inform the negotiations on the future of UN counterterrorism efforts. An all-women civil society panel briefed member states and UN entities on the importance of inclusive, human rights-based approaches to counterterrorism, which need to account for the negative impacts on civic space, humanitarian action, and human rights defenders.

It is in this context that in 2017 we were invited to partner with Cameroon’s National School of Administration and Magistracy (ENAM), the official training program for Cameroon’s public servants. Within ENAM, we established an expansive human rights-based training program for judges and prosecutors, governmental authorities, investigators, and civil society actors; a curriculum now taught to all incoming recruits as well as seasoned officers. Our legal team has since trained hundreds of Cameroonians of various sectors who are active in the country’s long-term security and governance efforts. We continue to deepen our programming in partnership with Cameroonian experts and institutions, including recently developing an anti-torture course for investigators.

Our legal team built a groundbreaking network of 180 judges, attorneys, traditional authorities, and civil administrators to address governance and security challenges facing communities impacted by Boko Haram. The insights garnered through this community-based network directly informed our draft of a new law that adequately harmonizes existing Cameroonian legal frameworks with international human rights standards which has been submitted to the President.

Building on these successes, we funded local organizations working to enhance community resilience in regions impacted by Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa. Through our subgrants program, we supported 13 grassroots organizations promoting peacebuilding and governance—from the launch of a peace radio station to a leadership development program for women who are responding to local security challenges. This work continues through our support to USAID’s multiyear programming in the country. The Global Center has unique access and influence, thanks to our privileged role serving as one of only two independent organizations in the country funded by the U.S. Department of State to support Cameroonian security efforts. This program has strengthened collaboration among governance, justice, and community actors, and significantly contributed to the country’s long-term efforts to prevent violent extremism and build sustainable peace.

Prisons around the world have seen an increase in individuals who are involved in violent extremism, presenting new challenges for authorities. In response, we work with several national prison services to develop human rights–based training programs to help staff identify violent extremist radicalization and recruitment in prisons and to support the management, rehabilitation, and reintegration of violent extremist prisoners.

This work began in 2017 in Morocco, where we trained the entirety of its prison system staff—approximately 9,000 individuals—across all prison facilities in the country. We also lead a unique program for all prison psychologists in Morocco, who can serve as critical agents in addressing the psychological risks and needs of violent extremist prisoners. Building on these successes, we have replicated the model in Indonesia, Kenya, and Trinidad and Tobago. Our program Kenya is underway to train all 30,000 prison staff around the country, delivered by Kenyan officers through a training-of-trainers framework designed to maximize institutional ownership and sustainability. In Indonesia, we implement a unique program for female prison officers managing violent extremist prisoners as well as an advanced training that has become the standard training program for prison staff posted to high security prisons. In Trinidad and Tobago, we supported the development of a national strategy to prevent violent extremism in prisons and designed and institutionalized a new curriculum for recruits.

In line with the Global Center’s 2021 Annual Report launch, a brief snapshot was developed to highlight the our organizational story, presence in the sector, and the whole-of-society approach to the work we do.

Our Space. Where do we focus and operate?

Concentrate on community level injustice, inequality, and disengagement anywhere in the world with local partners to counter conditions that breed and enable violent extremism.

Means. What is our operating model?

Programming, policy analysis, and advocacy to communities, policymakers, and influencers; strong and diverse alliances and local partnerships; independence; innovation.

Success. What makes the difference to those we serve?

Credibility and trusted expertise; informed, unbiased, high quality, and customized programs; consistent on-time project delivery; optimized funding efficiency.

Roadmap: How are we moving forward?

Enhancing awareness of our work; driving more multi-sectoral engagements to improve funding; increasing global capacity and programming; identifying and accelerating new partnerships.

Outcomes: What results do we expect from our work?

Communities that are more resilient to polarization and radicalization to violent extremism; stronger trust-based government and community collaboration that advances human rights and protects populations.

In April 2022, Chania Lackey, Global Center Regional Programs Coordinator for Eastern Africa, addressed the Joint Open Briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee on the issue of ISIL in Africa. Chania briefed the Security Council on the issues regarding the financing of ISIL-affiliated terrorist groups in Africa, especially through the trade of minerals and other extractives.

Drawing on the Global Center’s expertise in countering the financing of terrorism and our programming across the African continent, we have observed that ISIL cells and affiliates are largely self-financing, relying on both legal and illicit activities and using formal as well as informal channels to raise money. Notably, there are avenues for detection and disruption at each financing stage—raising, storing, and moving funds. However, doing so requires the private sector to be meaningfully and effectively engaged, a salient barrier in stemming terrorism financing in the region.

While the exploitation of oil and gas by ISIL has attracted significant attention over the last years, terrorist groups on the African context face significant barriers in obtaining the resources and honing the skills required to exploit oil or gas in territories where they are active. On the other hand, we have observed strategic exploits of precious metals and stones—in particular gold, which is present in at least 34 out of 54 African countries. Gold is attractive given its high and stable value, portability, and the cash intensive nature of the gold trade.

Artisanal gold mining has boomed since 2012, producing up to 2 billion US dollars’ worth annually. More recently, gold has drawn attention as a source of terrorism financing, with considerable activity reported in Central and West Africa. Gold poses particular vulnerabilities given the limited anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) measures and controls in place across the continent. As such, ISIL affiliates are able to extort artisanal miners, mine gold themselves, and refine, sell, or tax gold that is traded both legally and illegally.

Chania illustrated a theoretical trajectory of how ISIL might extract, transport, and sell gold. She identified key points in the process where authorities might disrupt the process, again emphasizing that such interventions require coordinated engagement by across the public and private sector.   In sum, ISIL’s self-financing model presents challenges to the existing CFT architecture, requiring collaboration from private sector entities on the frontlines of detecting and preventing terrorism financing.

The Global Center is an implementing partner of the Strong Cities Network, which facilitates collaboration between municipal governments and civic leaders on violence prevention initiatives. Launched in 2015 at the UN General Assembly to mount a city-led response against hate, polarization, and extremism, the SCN now includes 140 local governments, from small municipalities to megacities.

We are helping grow the network by engaging municipalities from Central and Southeast Asia; by joining, governments and civic leaders have access to regional dialogues and city visits that facilitate effective strategies across cities. As part of this work, we also allocate small grants for community-led initiatives in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Through our work around the world, we witness how young people are primary targets of armed groups of all stripes. This is notably true for violent extremist networks, which tend to focus their recruitment on individuals between 15 and 30 years old. This is evident among al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in Kenya and Nigeria, respectively, which capitalize on young people’s sense of economic, social, and political marginalization and despair.

Young people also play pivotal roles as leaders for positive change. Both Kenya and Nigeria have a vibrant, youth-led civil society landscape, which has proven critical to building and sustaining resilient communities. Yet civil society—particularly youth people—working in communities impacted by violent extremism often struggle to secure and sustain the funding required to maintain long-term programming and establish formal organizations. Many civic and nonprofit leaders are not connected to regional or national communities of practice, much less international networks—hindering their ability to contribute to and capitalize on peer expertise and resource-sharing.

It is in this context that we recognized the opportunity to invest in the next generation of change-makers and peacebuilders in Nigeria and Kenya. With a focus on organizations in regions with high levels of violent extremist activity, we made a multi-year commitment to twenty grassroots violence prevention initiatives, including through the provision of small grants, capacity development, and networking and mentoring opportunities. Our partnership effectively equipped youth Nigerian and Kenyan leaders with the skills, networks, and resources to address community grievances, stand up localized communities of practice, and ultimately stem the growth of extremist violence.

Our capacity development and training programs draw heavily on train-the-trainer and other peer-to-peer models to help ensure ownership by participants as well as the sustainability of these programs after our role formally ends. These workshops included an innovative peer exchange: Kenyan facilitators traveled to Nigeria and Nigerian facilitators traveled to Kenya, with both leading workshops to share their insight into combatting the strategies and methods used by al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, ISIS, and al-Qaeda. The program presents a successful new model for grantmaking that foregrounds hyper-local community and youth engagement as requisites in preventing violent extremism. Further, the framework for pairing regions and countries on the basis of shared experiences is easily replicable.